JUDGMENT
Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against an order of the learned single Judge directing the second respondent in the writ petition to pass a supplemental award within three months from the date of receipt of the order fixing the market value of the land acquired from the writ petitioners as on 1st August, 1997 and pay compensation to the writ petitioners accordingly together with all statutory benefits like solatium, additional compensation and interest. The learned single Judge followed the decision of another learned single Judge reported in M. Hanumanna v. District Collector, Anantapur . having more or less similar directions contained therein. Due reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri AIR 1992 SC 1538. wherein the Supreme Court has been pleased to observe in paragraph 4 of the report as under:
“4. It is the admitted case before us that the undisputed huge patch of land has been substantially improved upon under the scheme. Cancellation of the notification does not bring the matter to an end. Obviously fresh proceedings would be taken after complying with the defect if the judgment of the High Court is allowed to stand. If the acquisition is not made the respondents should enjoy usual benefits of their land on account of the development of the neighbouring area and if the re-acquisition is made there would be claim for higher compensation. Looking at the matter from these different angles, we have thought it appropriate to allow the appeal, vacate the judgment of the High Court and allow the acquisition to remain subject, however, to the condition that the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act issued in 1985 shall be deemed to be one dated 1-1-1988 and the market value of the land for the acquisition shall be determined with reference to that date. We would like to point out that the potential value of the land has substantially enhanced on account of the improvements made pursuant to the notification which had been assailed. We have directed the deemed date of the notification under Section 4 (1) to be postponed by almost three years and during this period the appellant has brought about the bulk of the improvements in the neighbourhood. We direct that 25 per cent of the potential value of the land relatable to the improvements made by the appellant would only be available to the respondents, but in fixing market value all other legitimate considerations shall be taken into account. We make it clear that we have no intention to extend the benefit under Section 28-A of the Act to the owners of the lands already acquired under the notification of 1980 or 1985 on the basis of our direction that the respondents’ lands shall be deemed to have been notified under Section 4 (1) of the Act on 1-1-1988. In fact our order must be deemed to be a separate notification for acquisition and, therefore, it would not be a common notification for the purpose of Section 28-A of the Act. The respondents should, therefore, be entitled to this benefit that instead of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act being of 1985, it shall be treated to be of 1-1-1988. The appellate authority is now entitled to take position in accordance with law subject to the valuation of the compensation in the manner indicated. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.”
2. Incidentally, be it noted that as against the mandatory order of the learned single judge to pass a supplemental award within a specified date, fixing the market value of the land as on 1st August, 1997, the State Government preferred this appeal inter alia contending that question of passing any supplemental award in the matter does not and cannot arise and in any event the mandatory direction as contained therein is otherwise not tenable in accordance with the provisions of law. The record depicts that the appellate Court, however, directed payment of the compensation on the basis of the admitted rate, namely, Rs. 101/- per square yard as was assessed earlier. The Land Acquisition Officer, however, passed an award recording therein the valuation in the manner indicated below:-
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Sl. NTS Extent Rate Land Addl. MV. 30% Interest Total
No. No. in Value at 12% Solatium
Sq.Yds.
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1. 364/2D 2311/2 101 23381.50 32301.06 7014.45 39540.34 102237.35
2. 364/2E 1421/2 101 14392.50 19882.94 4317.75 24339.00 62932.19
3. 364/2F 381 101 38481.00 53160.70 11544.30 65075.06 168261.06
4. 364/2G 133 101 13433.00 18557.42 4029.90 22716.49 58736.81
5. 365/2C 200 101 20200.00 27905.88 6060.00 34160.13 88326.01
109888.00 151808.00 32966.40 185831.02 480493.42
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It, therefore, appears that whereas there is an obligation to pay compensation at the rate of Rs. 101/- per square yard, the State – Respondent has chosen to have the property valued and as has been submitted by the learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal, the valuation has been submitted to the authority concerned with a request to pay the compensation in terms of the valuation within the shortest possible time. The learned Advocate for the State, in support of the appeal, also contended that, as a matter fact, additional market value at the rate of 12% has already been taken note of along with 30 per cent solatium and the statutory interest amounting to quite a substantial amount of money and question of there being any grievance so far as the quantum of compensation is concerned does not and cannot arise.
3. Mr. Manohar, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners, however, contended that, as a matter of fact, the writ petitioners are small plot holders. He submits that they were assured of alternative sites which have not been effected as yet and it is only recently that the inability to make over alternative sites has surfaced. He contended that the land value assessed at Rs. 101 /- per square yard on the basis of the market value of the year 1987 is utterly wrong and irregular and cannot be accepted. As a matter of fact, he submits, the law as declared by the Supreme Court as regards assessment of the quantum of compensation has not been followed at all in the contextual facts of the matter under consideration.
4. While it is true that the rate has been assessed at Rs. 101/- per square yard on the basis of the availability of rates as of the year 1987 but the fact remains that an award has already been published and all the statutory requirements have duly been taken note of. The Land Acquisition Act itself provides that in the event of there being an award and in the event of the award not being up to the expectation of the person concerned, the person concerned can take appropriate steps in terms of the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Manohar, on this aspect of the matter submitted that since the writ petitioners are poor plot holders, a further flood gate would be opened and further delay would be caused in the matter of obtaining the compensation. He, however, submitted that this Court may be pleased to direct the Revenue Divisional Officer to consider the award further and assess compensation at the rate as is prevalent on the date of the award. We are, however,, unable to record our concurrence to such a submission since once an award is passed and the statute expressly provides as to the steps to be taken in regard thereto, question of the Court directing for any compensation to be assessed in a particular manner does not and cannot arise. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran (2 supra), as noted above, does not really lend any support to such a contention of Mr. Manohar.
5. It is at this stage that the learned Advocate appearing for the State submitted that, as a matter of fact, Government is not desirous of proceeding with the appeal any further and as such the appeal be dismissed, excepting, however, that the order of the learned single judge, by reason of the award being passed, cannot be sustained any further. Alternatively the learned State Advocate contended that, as a matter of fact, upon the award being passed in the matter, there is due compliance with the order of the learned single Judge excepting, however, as to the date fixed, namely, 1st August, 1997.
6. Be that as it may, we are not going into that issue. But the fact remains and as recorded earlier, the learned single Judge ought not to have fixed the date which ought to be taken in the contextual facts as the date of valuation. In that view of the matter and since the award has been passed, we direct that no further order need be passed in this appeal excepting that the order of the learned single Judge shall not be given effect to and there shall be permanent suspension of the order. In the event, however, the writ petitioners are not in a position to accept the award, they would be at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law by initiation of reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is at this stage Mr. Manohar submitted that the respondents may be directed to refer the matters to Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. As such, the Revenue Divisional Officer is directed to refer the matters to Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act within a period of six weeks from the date hereof. And, upon such a reference, the Civil Court is directed to consider the matters and pass appropriate orders thereon within a period of three months from the date of reference. While dealing with the matter, however, due regard be had to the factum that the award has been passed in the year 1998 and the valuation has been taken note of for the year 1987. The amount awarded in favour of the writ petitioners in the award, however, be deposited by the appellant within ten days from the date hereof. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.