JUDGMENT
P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. Writ petitioner-respondent has moved this Court questioning the order of dismissal from service. A learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the misconduct is proved but interfered with the quantum of punishment and directed for reinstatement of the petitioner-respondent with 50% of the back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. The District Judge, Eluru, West Godavari District and the Registrar (Administration) of the High Court have preferred this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
2. Facts which are noticed in the impugned judgment and which are not disputed before us, are as follows:
In the affidavit in support of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner was appointed as Process Server by the District and Sessions Judge, Eluru, West Godavari District. He, however, was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding on two charges viz.,
(i) that on 28-2-1991, while doing Court-hall duty at Additional District Munsif’s Court at Tadepalligudem, he misbehaved with a lady accused Smt. Sk. Ramjan in S.T.C. No. 37/91 on the file of the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tadepalligudem, by pressing her breast with elbow when she went to the Head-Clerk to pay the fine amount and when she complained to the Head-Clerk about his misbehaviour, the Head-Clerk, however, pacified the matter;
(ii) that on 5-3-1991 at about 12-30 noon he was found by the Head-Clerk Shri V. Subba Rao of Additional Munsif Magistrate’s Court, Tadepalligudem, misbehaving with the parties at the down-stairs of First Additional District Munsif’s Court, Tadepalligudem while he was on duty in Court-Hall and when the Head Clerk questioned his conduct he rebelled against him in the presence of some other employees of the Court.
3. In course of the enquiry, although defacto-complainant for the first charge was not examined, a Clerk of the Court, however, deposed and the Enquiry Officer held that the charge was proved. The District Judge decided to impose the punishment of dismissal. There is nothing, however, on the record to show that the petitioner-respondent preferred any administrative appeal and, if any, what finally happened in the administrative appeal. Learned Single Judge has adverted to the contentions of the parties and has finally commented:
“The preponderance of probabilities for arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner was involved in an offence of misbehaving with the said lady, in my view, is improper and is vitiated by the fact of non-examination of Smt. Sk. Ramjan. The Enquiry Officer further goes to the extent of saying that the prestige of Court is involved and, therefore, it has to be held against the petitioner as to having committed the offence as stated by P.Ws.1 and 2, is also vitiated in the absence of any sound analogy arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. That apart, the first respondent who is the District Judge has only adopted the finding of the Enquiry Officer without examining the probabilities on which the entire case against the petitioner is being demonstrated, especially when an order of dismissal is made against the petitioner which is in the nature of depriving the bread and butter to the dependents as well to the petitioner.”
Learned Single Judge has dealt with quite elaborately with the principle of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, at quite a few places commented upon the conduct of Smt. Sk. Ramjan, the defacto-complainant for her making complaint to the Head-Clerk with respect to the misbehaviour she suffered at the hands of the petitioner-respondent, and finally posed the question whether the District Judge is justified in imposing punishment of dismissal on the petitioner-respondent and taken the view, when the magnitude of punishment has the effect of denying livelihood to a person, the authorities in whom such discretionary powers are vested to impose the punishment of that magnitude have to necessarily apply their mind and pass appropriate order meeting the ends of justice. Proceeding precisely on the above, he has interfered with the order of dismissal and recorded the modified punishment upon the petitioner-respondent.
4. Although in the case of State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore (D.N.) the Supreme Court has completely ruled out judicial review in respect of the imposition of punishment, it is explained in subsequent judgment and this Court in District and Sessions Judge, Guntur v. Madhava Rao (D.B.) has stated the law in these words:
“In a series of judgments, the leading one being the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra , it is pointed out “But the Court, in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable; nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that some but not all the findings are unassailable, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed was final and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed, the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice.”
The above has been reiterated in several judgments of the Supreme Court, the latest being in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow . It is not as if the Court has completely ruled out judicial review even in respect of the imposition of punishment. When it has spoken of the jurisdiction, it has clearly indicated that the Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not act as a Court of appeal, but has to limit itself to the well known norms and principles of judicial review. A punishment which is shockingly disproportionate to the proved guilt or misconduct will be obviously arbitrary and discriminatory so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That, however, will present a different situation and the Court may call upon in such a situation the competent authority to re-consider in the light of its own findings whether the imposition of punishment was unreasonable. In a case in which the Court in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution would find, however, that the punishment imposed is unreasonably harsh, it can interfere, but it shall not substitute itself as the Court of appeal to decide what may be the adequate punishment.”
It is obvious that learned Single Judge has not taken notice of the law on the subject that the High Court had no jurisdiction to review the penalty imposed by a competent authority on a public servant if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with and unless it is found that punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the proved guilt or misconduct and is obviously arbitrary and discriminatory so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court must exercise the well considered refrain by leaving the discretion about the imposition of penalty with the competent authority. Quite a few other aspects in the impugned judgment, it has been canvassed at the Bar, cannot be said to be in accordance with the rules the Courts apply for judicial review of an order of the competent authority in the matter of disciplinary proceedings or otherwise in respect of quasi-judicial orders. One of the settled principles is that adequacy of evidence is not a matter which would ever receive attention of the Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is absence of evidence or any irrelevant material taken into consideration which alone would give occasion for interference in the matter of finding of guilt of any delinquent officer. Evidence for the purposes of disciplinary enquiry is not strictly the evidence as understood in the context of a civil proceeding in a Court of law. It is just taken as equivalent to materials exhibiting the conduct of the delinquent officer. Learned Single Judge” has gone quite beyond the rules recognised by the Courts for the purposes of judicial review of administrative or quasi-judicial orders. In all respects, thus, we are constrained to observe, the impugned judgment has ignored the constraints which the Courts must exercise before interfering with the punishment in a disciplinary proceeding as adequacy of evidence is not a matter for interference by the Court in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. So in the case of impugned judgment one has to hold that it is infracted by an error of law. The Court may have a different view as to quantum of punishment but it has to get away from interfering with the imposition of punishment by the competent authority unless it has reasons to hold that it is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt proved. In the case of the petitioner-respondent, District Judge, in our view, has taken rightly into consideration that the Court’s dignity has sufferred because one of its employees has misbehaved with a woman litigant. We, for the said reason, are inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. It is accordingly set aside. The writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition dismissed but on the facts and in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.