JUDGMENT
V. Jagannathan, J.
1. All these appeals arise out of one and the common order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Bellary and appellant herein, viz., New India Assurance Co. Ltd., is aggrieved by the said order insofar fixing the liability on appellant insurance company to pay the compensation to the claimants in respect of whom the common order was passed.
2. Heard Mr. Rajagopalan, the learned Counsel for appellant and Mr. Lakshmikant Reddy, learned Counsel for respondents-claimants. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 and the respondent No. 3 remained absent.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the accident in question is not in dispute and so also the fact of 60 odd persons have been found travelling in the vehicle in question and being injured when the accident occurred at about 9 a.m. on 10.11.1997. However, the main contention is that appellant insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation because, the policy in respect of the vehicle in question cover the risk of the workers engaged at Bellary site and, therefore, when the policy covers the risk of workers who were found at the location, it is deemed that the policy is in the nature of a ‘location policy’ taken out under Workmen’s Compensation Act and, therefore, unless the workers were found to have sustained injuries at the work spot, the question of making the insurance company liable to pay the compensation when the accident occurs on a road will not arise. The other contention put forward is that the policy was taken out by Ray Constructions Ltd., the respondent No. 2, which is the insured whereas the claimants have stated before the Commissioner that they were all the workers under J.V.S. Ltd., respondent No. 3 and, therefore, even on this score, the insurance company cannot be made liable to pay the compensation.
4. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents-claimants submitted that though the policy is of the nature of the location policy, by application of the principle of notional extension theory, the liability of the appellant insurance company can be notionally extended to the place where the accident occurred. In the alternative, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that it has come in the evidence before the Commissioner that the claimants though were engaged by the contractor, viz., respondent No. 2, yet, respondent No. 3, being the principal employer, will be liable to pay the compensation.
5. In the light of the submissions made as above, I have carefully perused the impugned order and also the policy in question. The policy taken out by respondent No. 2, which is a workmen compensation policy, mentions as under with regard to the coverage of the risk:
Supervisors, workers engaged in civil and structural work at J.V.S. Ltd. at Bellary site.
Therefore, it is clear that the risk is covered only of the workers and supervisors engaged in the civil and structural work at J.V.S. Ltd. at Bellary site. Therefore, in respect of the workers, who were found injured not at Bellary site, but elsewhere, viz., on the way from their villages to the factory, the question of the appellant insurance company covering the risk will not arise. Secondly, so far as the notional extension theory is concerned, at the most, the employer may become liable by virtue of application of notional extension theory, but the liability of the appellant insurance company will not arise in view of the specific type of risk that is covered by the policy.
6. Therefore, the order of the Commissioner in making the appellant insurance company liable to pay the compensation is unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside. The question then arises is as to who will be liable to pay the compensation to the claimants. The Commissioner observed in the course of his order at pages 12 and 13 that all claimants were engaged by the contractor, i.e., respondent No. 2, for carrying out the work of the principal employer, i.e., J.V.S. Ltd., respondent No. 3. Therefore, having regard to the provision of law obtaining under Workmen’s Compensation Act, the principal employer will be liable to pay the compensation even in respect of the workers engaged by the contractor so long as the work that was done by the contractor was the work which is ordinarily part of trade or business of the principal employer. This is clear from Section 12 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and, therefore, in the instant case, respondent No. 3 will be liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation to the respective claimants.
7. In the result, all the appeals are allowed and that part of the impugned order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation fixing the liability on the appellant insurance company is set aside and J.V.S. Ltd., respondent No. 3, is liable to pay the compensation to the claimants and to the said extent, the impugned order of the Commissioner stands modified. The amount in deposit made by the insurance company shall be refunded to it.