IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 24.03.2010
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SATHYANARAYANAN
O.S.A.Nos.226 to 229 of 2009
Dr.A.C.Muthiah .. Appellant in
all O.S.As.
Vs
1. The Board of Control for Cricket
in India, Rep. By its President,
M.A.Chidambaram Stadium, Chepauk,
Chennai.
2. N.Srinivasan
Treasurer, The Board of Control
for Cricket in India. .. Respondents in all O.S.As.
Appeals against the order and decreetal order dated 13.07.2009 in O.A.Nos.1299 and 1300 of 2008 and A.No.5740 of 2008 in C.S.No.1167 of 2008 and O.A.No.1042 of 2008 in C.S.No.930 of 2008.
For Appellant : Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram
Sr. Counsel for Ms.Uma
For Respondents : Mr.P.S.Raman, Adv. General
for Mr.P.R.Raman/R-1
: Mr.K.Harishankar for R-2
* * * * *
J U D G M E N T
D.MURUGESAN, J.
All the above appeals question the common order dated 13.07.2009 made in O.A.Nos.1299 and 1300 of 2008 and A.No.5740 of 2008 in C.S.No.1167 of 2008 and O.A.No.1042 of 2008 in C.S.No.930 of 2008. The issues involved in all these appeals are common and hence, the appeals are taken up together for disposal by this common judgment.
2.The controversy relates to the question as to whether the second respondent would be entitled to participate in the General Body Meeting that was scheduled at Mumbai on 27.09.2008 or any other subsequent dates for the election of new office bearers of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), in view of the fact that he was awarded the franchised Indian Premier League rights for the ownership of ‘Chennai Super Kings’ team by BCCI, even while he was the Managing Director of India Cements Limited and he was the Honorary Treasurer of BCCI at the time when such franchise was given. The further controversy relates to clause 6.2.4 of the regulations framed by the BCCI thereby making an exclusion of events like Indian Premier League (IPL) or Champions League, Twenty20 tournament, for the Administrator to have directly or indirectly any commercial interest in the matches or events conducted by the Board.
3.For the disposal of the appeals, some of the following facts are relevant:
a)The BCCI is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The object of BCCI is to control the game of cricket in India and give its decision on all matters which may be referred to it and to encourage the formation of State, Regional or other Cricket Associations and the organisation of inter-state and other tournaments. It is governed by a set of rules and regulations. The full members of BCCI numbering 30 includes Tamil Nadu Cricket Association as well, apart from various such associations from other States. It also includes Railways Sports Promotion Board. It has associate members also. The rules and regulations provide for composition of the Board, viz., a President, 5 Vice-Presidents (one from each zone), an Honorary Secretary, an Honarary Joint Secretary and an Honorary Treasurer. Further, a Member, Associate Member or an Affiliate Member of the Board shall also have one representative. The rules and regulations provide for the powers and duties of the Board. They provide for a working committee with demarcation of powers and duties. The constitution of the working committee consists of President, Honorary Secretary, Honorary Joint Secretary and Honorary Treasurer. The duties of the office bearers of the board are also defined. In terms of regulation 32, the misconduct of the players, umpires, team officials, administrators, referees and selectors are defined and in addition, the procedure as to how the misconduct should be dealt with is also defined. In respect of any dispute arises as to the legality of the election of office bearers, Vice-Presidents or members elected on the Working Committee, Standing Committee or the Committees, between the members of the Board interse and so on, a provision for arbitration is also contemplated under regulation 37. Thus, Rules and Regulations contemplate the overall regulations and control of all activities by the Board members. A mechanisam is also provided to take action against erring members including the umpires, players, etc.
b) Dr.A.C.Muthiah, the appellant/plaintiff filed C.S.No.930 of 2008 for a permanent injunction restraining the BCCI from permitting Mr.N.Srinivasan, the second respondent herein, to participate in the General Body Meeding scheduled in Mumbai on 27.09.2008 or any other subsequent date for the election of new office bearers. He also sought for a judgment and decree of mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to act under clause 32 (II) of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary enquiry against the said N.Srinivasan. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to exercise the power as per clause 8(6) of the Regulations relating to the misconduct. Basically, the suit was filed on the ground that the said N.Srinivasan, who was holding the post of Honorary Treasurer in BCCI and was also the Managing Director of India Cements Limited, should not have been awarded the franchised Indian Premier League rights for ownership of ‘Chennai Super Kings’ team by the BCCI, as in terms of clause 32 (II) of the rules and regulations, it amounts to an act of indiscipline or misconduct.
c) Along with the said suit, the appellant has also filed O.A.Nos.1041 to 1043 of 2008. The first original application being filed seeking for a temporary injunction restraining the BCCI from permitting Thiru.N.Srinivasan to participate in the General Body Meeting. The second original application being filed for temporary mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to act under clause 32(II) and the third original application being filed for temporary mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to exercise the power under clause 8(6) of the regulation. Apparently, all the above interim prayers are, in effect, the relief sought for in the suit. None of the prayers in the applications were granted and in fact, O.A.No.1041 of 2008, was dismissed even on 26.9.2008 on the ground that it was made at the last minute after the arrangements for the meeting were over and the regulation also provides for penalty to be levied in case of any breach of rules.
d) Subsequently, a set of regulations for players, team officials, managers, umpires and administrators were formulated with effect from 27.9.2008, which include clause 6.2.4., the issue in question. The said clause reads as under:-
“6.2.4.No Administrators shall have, directly, or indirectly, any commercial interest in the matches or events conducted by the Board excluding events like IPL or Champions League, Twenty20.”
e) Dr.A.C.Muthiah, the appellant herein, again approached this Court by filing another suit in C.S.No.1167 of 2008 for a declaration that clause 6.2.4 of the regulations insofar as it excludes the “IPL and Champions T 20 League” is illegal and opposed to public policy. The said suit was also filed for permanent injunction restraining the second respondent, N.Srinivasan, from functioning as the Secretary of the BCCI and for a mandatory permanent injunction directing the BCCI not to permit N.Srinivasan from contesting for any of the posts of Office bearers. Pending the suit, he also filed O.A.Nos.1299 and 1300 of 2008 and A.No.5740 of 2008. The first original application was filed with a prayer to suspend the amendment to clause 6.2.4, the second application being for temporary injunction restraining N.Srinivasan from functioning as Secretary and the third application being for mandatory temporary injunction directing the BCCI not to permit the said N.Srinivasan from contesting for any of the posts of Office bearer in future. The interim applications in O.A.Nos.1299 and 1300 of 2008 and A.No.5740 of 2008 in C.S.No.1167 of 2008 and O.A.No.1041 of 2008 in C.S.No.930 of 2008 were dismissed by the learned single Judge by the order under appeal.
4.1. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that prior to the present regulation, obtaining the franchise for Twenty20 matches by an Honorary Treasurer would amount to misconduct and therefore, he should be suspended and he should not be allowed to participate in any General Body Meetings in future. In this context, she would also rely upon the complaint made by Dr.A.C.Muthiah on 5.9.2008 and 19.9.2008, for which there was no response from BCCI. Inasmuch as such conduct of N.Srinivasan would amount to misconduct, the learned Judge ought to have granted the interim orders as prayed for.
4.2. Insofar as the other three appeals concerning applications in C.S.No.1167 of 2008, the learned senior counsel would submit that the new regulation was brought in only to favour Thiru.N.Srinivasan. She would submit that inasmuch as the definition of Administrator in the amended regulations relating to the Administrator includes President, Vice-President, Honorary Treasurer as well as Honorary Secretary, etc. and as per clause 6.2.4., no such Administrator should have directly or indirectly any commercial interest in the matches or events conducted by the Board, the insertion/amendment has been made excluding events like IPL and Champions League Twenty20 contrary to the regulations, which are applicable only to test matches, ODI matches, Twenty20 matches, tour matches and any domestic or international matches as provided under clause 1.2 of the said regulations.
5.1. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General, would, on the other hand, submit that as far as the relief that the BCCI should not allow N.Srinivasan to participate in the General Body Meeting to be held on 27.9.2008 is concerned, the prayer has become infructuous, as the elections were over and that apart, such an interim relief was not granted by this Court while the said application was heard on 26.9.2008. That apart, according to the learned Advocate General, the suit was filed only at the last minute when the elections were already scheduled, showing that the appellant was not bona fide in approaching the Court at an earlier point of time. As far as the mandatory injunction to BCCI to suspend N.Srinivasan is concerned, it is entirely for the Board to consider with reference to clause 32(II) and to take action and even for a proved misconduct, only a penalty is warranted and not the suspension of office bearers.
5.2. As far as the challenge to the clause 6.2.4 is concerned, he would submit that it is nothing to do with the rules or regulations of the BCCI. It is only a separate code evolved for the purpose of conduct of T20 matches. He would also submit, in any event, the Board unanimously decided to include such a clause and the appellant, not even a member of the BCCI and as a stranger cannot question the said clause. He would submit that, that clause being only a code, is not amenable to challenge and that too, by an individual without a suit being filed under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C. on the representative capacity. In any event, there is no public interest involved in the matter, which is opposed to public policy. In any case, the learned Advocate General would submit that as both the reliefs sought for in the suit as well as in the interim applications are identical, such reliefs cannot be ordered unless a strong prima facie case is shown and as no such prima facie case is shown, grant of such interim reliefs would amount to grant of decree as such, even without any trial. With the above submissions, the learned Advocate General sought for dismissal of the appeals.
6. In view of the above submisions and factual aspects, the following questions arise for consideration:
1) Whether the suits filed by the appellant are maintainable ?
2) Whether the second respondent would be disentitled from participating in the General Body Meeting convened to elect the office bearers ?
3) Whether the second respondent should be suspended from the post of Honorary Secretary ?
4) Whether clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators of BCCI should be suspended ? and
5) Whether the appellant would be entitled to mandatory injunction to BCCI to act under clause 32(II) of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary enquiry against the second respondent on the complaints made by the appellant ?
Question No.1:
” Whether the suits filed by the appellant are maintainable ?”
7. According to Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel for the appellant, in terms of clause 1(n) of the Regulations of the Board, an Administrator shall mean and include former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Hony.Secretaries, Hony.Treasurers and Hony.Joint Secretaries of the Board. As the appellant was a past President of BCCI, he is entitled to bring to the notice of the Board as to any misconduct of the office bearers including the Secretary, who held the post of Hony. Treasurer when the first suit was filed and was elected to the post of Secretary when the second suit was filed. Therefore, the appellant could certainly maintain the suit in the interest of the Board. On the other hand, Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General appearing for BCCI and Mr.Harishankar, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, would submit that in a suit for specific performance, in terms of provision of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interest to deny, his title to such character or right. In terms of Section 35, a declarative decree made by the Court would be binding only on the parties to the suit and the persons claiming through them respectively. Hence, the suit if not filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of C.P.C. in a representative capacity, it cannot be binding on everybody and even if the declaration is given, it could be only binding between the appellant and the BCCI and not otherwise. In the absence of such suit filed in the representative capacity by an individual, namely, Dr.A.C.Muthiah, the said suit is not maintainable.
8. Order 1 Rule 8 of C.P.C. is only an exception to the general rule that all persons interested in a suit ought to be made parties thereto. Where large body of persons are interested in one issue, the said provision facilitates an individual to approach the Court without recourse to the ordinary procedure. It is also intended to avoid numerous suits being filed for decision of a common question. The Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. T.N.Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642 explained the scope and object of the said rule. For filing such a suit, necessary permission of the Court should be obtained under clause (b) of sub-rule 1, since to enable a person to file a suit in a representative capacity for and on behalf of the numerous persons, where they have the same interest, the only condition is the permission of the Court. The provision also requires that the Court in such a case, give, at the plaintiff’s expenses, notice of the institution of the suit to all persons having the same interest and the Court has reserved the power to entertain an application from any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted, vide State of A.P. v. G.V.Suryanarayana, A.I.R. 1965 SC 11. We may also refer that the proper course for a plaintiff while instituting such a suit in the representative capacity is to obtain permission before the suit is instituted. However, that rule does not permit the leave being granted even after filing of the suit. In the given case, no such application was filed even after filing of the suit.
9. The contention of the respondents is that the suits had been instituted by the appellant/plaintiff in his individual capacity and the same would be binding only on the plaintiff and that the nature of relief claimed is in public interest and therefore, the suits in individual capacity are not maintainable. On the other hand, it is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the suits were filed in the capacity of past President. In our opinion, these are all matters which could be decided only after trial and for the purpose of granting interim orders, only a prima facie consideration is required. In this context, we may refer to the plaint averments in the suits. In the plaint filed in C.S.No.930 of 2008, all that the appellant had stated that he is the past President and he is interested in the promotion of the game of Cricket in India and in maintaining the purity of administration of BCCI. Even in the paragraph relating to the cause of action, he had not stated that he is filing the suit in the capacity of an Administrator. A careful reading of the plaint does indicate that the entire averments are pointing out only the second respondent, N.Srinivasan and the plaintiff had questioned the conduct of the said N.Srinivasan by sending two complaints to the President of BCCI on 5.9.2008 and 19.9.2008. Even in those two complaints, the appellant/plaintiff had not mentioned that he is making the complaints in the capacity of past President. Under such circumstances, the BCCI questions the maintainability of the suit. We are of the prima facie view that both the suits have been filed only in the individual capacity and not in the capacity of an Administrator and accordingly, the submission of Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General, in this regard must be accepted.
Question Nos.2 & 3 :
“Whether the second respondent would be disentitled from participating in the General Body Meeting convened to elect the office bearers ?” and “Whether the second respondent should be suspended from the post of Honorary Secretary ?”
10. The appellant, while preferring the suit in C.S.No.930 of 2008, also filed an application in O.A.No.1041 of 2008 praying for an injunction restraining the BCCI from permitting the second respondent, N.Srinivasan, to participate in the General Body Meeting scheduled at Mumbai on 27.09.2008 or any other subsequent date for the election of new office bearers of BCCI and also to contest for the post of secretary or any other post in the BCCI. The learned Judge has rejected the said application on two grounds, viz., as per sub-clause 1 of clause 6.2. of the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers and Administrators of BCCI, six months time had been given to the President of BCCI to determine the allegations brought to his notice and in the event the Administrator committing any default against the spirit of the regulations, the BCCI has been authorised to levy a fine of Rs.1 lakh to Rs.5 lakhs and/or debar the Administrator from holding such position for a minimum period of one year and maximum of three years. This order has not been questioned any further. Hence, the second respondent had participated in the General Body Meeting and ultimately, he was also elected as Secretary. Under the said circumstances, the appellant/plaintiff in his subsequent suit in C.S.No.1167 of 2008 has also prayed for a similar relief in O.A.No.1300 of 2008 for a temporary injunction restraining N.Srinivasan from functioning as Secretary of BCCI.
11. In our opinion, under the very same sub-clause 1 of clause 6.2., the BCCI has got six months time to determine the allegations brought to its notice and if the allegations are found to be true, then a levy of fine and/or debar the Administrator from holding such position for a minimum period of one year and a maximum of three years is contemplated. Our attention is not drawn to any of the subsequent complaints given by the appellant to BCCI after the earlier two complaints dated 5.9.2008 and 19.9.2008. For the very same reason, the learned Judge has also rejected the said relief of injunction, which we do not find any reason to interefere with. That apart, on mere allegations, an injunction cannot be ordered as those allegations are to be substantiated at the time of trial.
Question No.4 :
“Whether clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators of BCCI should be suspended ?”
12. It is the contention of Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, that after the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators of 2008 were made and in the light of the regulations including Twenty20 matches as well, clause 6.2.4. should not have been excluded the events like IPL and Champions League Twenty20. In this context, we may mention that BCCI has its own set of Rules and Regulations in the form of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations, which we have considered in the earlier portion of the judgment. That Rules and Regulations relate to the Players, Umpires, Team Officials and Administrators. Those regulations shall also apply to the test matches, ODI matches, tour matches and any domestic or international matches. It is the specific stand of the BCCI that the above matches are arranged, conducted, controlled and regulated by these regulations. These regulations have nothing to do with the subsequent regulations of 2008, viz., Regulations for Players, Team Officias, Managers, Umpires and Administrators, which were framed for the purpose of conducting Twenty20 matches on commercial basis. Though BCCI organises and controls such matches, the players are purchased by individuals and in such circumstances, the application of Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI cannot be pressed into service. Therefore, the contention that clause 6.2.4. are to be read with the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI is not acceptable.
13. From the rival contentions, it appears to us that whether these subsequent Regulations of 2008 could be questioned by an individual in a suit on the ground that they are part of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI and not a separate code of conduct for the conduct of Twenty20 matches. That apart, though as rightly pointed out by Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, that the Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of BCCI also include Twenty20 matches and the definition of an Administrator under the said regulations includes the past President as well, in view of the inclusion of Twenty20 in the Regulations of 2008 with a definition to the same, viz., a limited over international match classified as Twenty20 in accordance with ICC Regulations, we are unable to agree with the contention that clause 6.2.4. should have been included with IPL or Champions League Twenty20. However, the question is as to whether clause 6.2.4 should include or exclude those events is a matter for this Court to consider and decide at the interlocutory stage. When we point out that when a set of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations were framed for the conduct of BCCI and the present rule, which was introduced in the year 2008, is only a code of conduct for the Administrators and cannot be considered, prima facie, as part and parcel of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of BCCI itself and such code of conduct is unanimously framed by the entire Board members to exclude certain events, it is not for this Court to go in deep the question as to whether such exclusion displaces the fairness on the part of BCCI. As the clause stands today, it excludes certain events wherein even the Administrators could franchise a team in Twenty20 matches, which is purely commercial in nature. Further, there are no materials placed before this Court whether these IPL matches are official matches conducted by ICC or they are conducted on commercial basis. In the absence of those materials and in view of the fact that the parties would also be entitled to let in evidence at the time of trial, the exclusion in the clause which has been incorporated in the Rules and Regulations cannot be stayed unless there is a strong prima facie case made out. The learned Judge has also rightly appreciated the stand of the respondents and has rejected the contention of the appellant/plaintiff.
14. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, would heavily rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India and another v. Netaji Cricket Club and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 741 and contend that the BCCI, which controls the sport of cricket and earns huge revenue not only by selling tickets to viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV and broadcasting the same, should follow the doctrine of fairness and good faith in all its activities. She would be right in making the said submission as has been held by the Apex Court. Nevertheless, whether an Honorary Treasurer or an Honorary Secretary of BCCI would be disentitled from franchising a team for IPL matches on the ground that he is also the Managing Director of India Cements is a further question to be considered. On the one hand, it is the contention of the appellant that N.Srinivasan himself has made a statement while he addressed a investor conference as follows, “India Cements is in IPL, solely with the view to build our brand name move extensively in Tamil Nadu and that Cricket ultimately will make tons of money for the company”. That statement shows that he being the Managing Director is also a beneficiary of the IPL, which would be contrary to the Regulations. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents that the IPL franchise are purely on commercial basis and in the wake of clause 6.2.4., it has excluded the restrictions of an Administrator to franchise a team. Here again, the controversy should be viewed only on a prima facie consideration. Under the circumstances, by way of interim order, the very clause cannot be suspended and we do not find any reason to hold that such a clause is opposed to public policy.
Question No.5 :
“Whether the appellant would be entitled to mandatory injunction to BCCI to act under clause 32(II) of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary enquiry against the second respondent on the complaints made by the appellant ?”
15. Insofar as this question is concerned, we may again point out that except that the two complaints dated 5.9.2008 and 19.9.2008, there are no other subsequent complaints. The BCCI, the authority to receive such complaints, in terms of Clause 32(II) of the Rules, shall refer the same within 48 hours to the Commissioner appointed by the Board to make a preliminary enquiry. In the event such commission is not appointed and enquiry also is not ordered, Clause 37 may be pressed into service for referring such a dispute to the Arbitration. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to grant the injunction, which is mandatory in nature, before the parties were put on trial.
16. With regard to the exercise of power for grant of an ad-interim injunction, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and others, (1992) 1 SCC 719, wherein the Apex Court held as follows:-
“4.Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 86(i)(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerned with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.
5.Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of the granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”
This Court also, in a decision in S.Krishnaswamy and others v. South India Film Chamber of Commerce and others, AIR 1969 Madras 42, has dealt with such a power and held as follows:-
“13.The principles which govern the grant or refusal of an interim injunction in aid of the plaintiff’s rights are well settled and they depend upon a variety of circumstances. In the nature of things, it is impossible to lay down, any set, rigid or general rule on the subject by which the discretion of the court ought in all cases be regulated. As the plaintiff, by the interim injunction undoubtedly seeks to interfere with the rights of the opponent before the plaintiff’s right is finally established, the injunction is not granted as a matter of course and it is necessary for the plaintiff to make out a strong prima facie case in support of the right that he asserts. It is true that at the interlocutory stage, the court should not embark upon a detailed investigation on the relative merits of the contentions of the parties and it is enough if the plaintiff raises questions of a substantial character calling for decisions after an examination of the facts and the law arising in the case. The Court can consider the nature and the merits of the rival contentions at the interlocutory stage only as bearing upon the limited question as to whether or not the plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case. The Court should avoid expressing any opinion on the merits which would partake the character of a decision of the main issues in the case. The plaintiff should next make out the Court’s interference if necessary to protect him from an injury or mischief imminent and it is at the same time irreparable. He should make out that the injury is so serious, irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of Court is necessary even before his rights are established at the trial. Inseparably connected with this, is the burden, which lies upon the plaintiff to make out, that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which would ensue from withholding the injunction would be far greater from what would ensue from the injunction being granted. Lastly, which again is a very important consideration, is that in considering whether an interim injunction should be granted the court must have due regard to the conduct and dealings of the parties, before the application is made to the Court, by the plaintiff to preserve and protect his rights, since the jurisdiction to interfere being purely equitable, is governed by the equitable principles (Vide 21, Halsbury’s Laws of England, paragraphs 766 and 767).
14.On the question of the balance of convenience and the threatened mischief or injury irreparable or otherwise, regard must be had to the nature of the suit and the particular right asserted like suits against Government, Public Corporations, Municipal Corporation, Statutory bodies, Social clubs and its members, Societies registered under the Societies Registration Act and its members distinguished from litigation between private individuals. In the case of clubs and Societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, the general principles governing the right of suit of an individual share holder or a member of the Company would apply and ordinarily the Court will not interfere with the internal management of the Society at the instance of one or some only of the members of the Society subject to well recognised exceptions (1)where the impugned act is ultra vires of the Society, (2)the act complained of constitutes fraud or (3) whether the impugned action is illegal. The Rules are made by the Society itself for the convenience of its members for regulating their own conduct as members and for regulating the affairs of the Society as an entity. A breach of any Rule made by the Society would not give rise to a cause of action for any member to rush to Court, it must be a case of manifest illegality or where the act of omission or commission is something which goes to the root of the matter. All the members would be bound by the decision taken by the general body though there may be some violation of some Rules provided it is something which could well be condoned and ignored by the general body (Vide Shridhar Misra v. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598; Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516 and Nagappa v. Madras Race Club, ILR (1949) Mad 808 at pp. 821 to 823 = (AIR 1951 Mad 831 (2) at pp. 835-836).
17. In view of our foregoing reasons, we find absolutely no merit to interfere with the order of the learned Judge. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected M.Ps. are also dismissed.
sra
To
The President,
Board of Control for Cricket
in India, M.A.Chidambaram Stadium,
Chepauk,
Chennai