ORDER
S. Padmanabhan, J.
1. Authorities, under Section 9 of the Kerala Agricultural University Act (Act, for short), include the General Council and Executive Committee. General Council consists of (i) ex officio members, (ii) elected members, (iii) members nominated by Chancellor, and (iv) other members. Elected members are from nine distinct constituencies. One of them is four members elected by the teachers other than Deans of Faculties from among themselves. Among members nominated by Chancellor, one category is two agricultural scientists. Petitioner is one such member nominated to the general council as an agricultural scientist. But he is also a teacher. Respondents 3 and 4 are teachers, but they became members of general council not by nomination like petitioner, but by election by teachers from among themselves. Executive committee, which is the chief executive body (equivalent to syndicate), consists of ex officio members and other members. Other members in the executive committee include “one member elected from among the teachers in the general council, by the council”.
2. Crucial question for decision, in this case, is whether “one member elected from among the teachers in the general council, by the council” to the executive committee could take in only a member elected to the general council by teachers from among themselves or it could also take in a nominated member, if he is also a teacher satisfying the requirements of Section 14.
3. When election to the executive committee came, petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 submitted nominations from among the teachers in the general council. Respondents 3 and 4 objected to the nomination of petitioner, on the ground that he is not qualified for the reason that, though a teacher, he is not an elected representative of the teachers in the general council, but only a person nominated by Chancellor as an agricultural scientist. Returning officer (second respondent) overruled that objection saying that no such qualification or condition is involved and petitioner is also a teacher and a member of the general council and thus entitled to be elected.
4. Respondents 3 and 4 then filed O. P. Nos. 5647 and 5989 of 1989 challenging his nomination. This Court directed election to be held. In the election, 56 members of the general council participated. Petitioner got 43 votes. Respondents 3 and 4 got only 4 and 8 votes respectively. This Court directed the dispute regarding election to be referred to Chancellor under Section 22(4). Chancellor heard the parties and passed Ext.P1 order, holding that nomination of the petitioner was invalid for the reason that he is not a teacher, as referred to in Section 14, since he is only a nominated member of the general council as an agricultural scientist.
5. This original petition was filed to quash Ext.P1 and to forbear from further steps being taken on the basis of Ext.P1. I heard all concerned. Petitioner alone supported his case. Chancellor (first respondent) and respondents 3 and 4 opposed him. Returning Officer (second respondent) did not contest.
6. Reasons assigned by Chancellor for setting aside the nomination of petitioner are twofold. (1) Only one teacher, other than Dean, finds a place in the executive committee. Therefore, to uphold the democratic principles implied in the statutory provision in Section 14 “one member elected from among the teachers in the general council, by the council” has to be taken as meaning ‘teacher’ referred to in Section 10 as an elected member. Otherwise, the spirit of the statutory provision would be defeated because any of the members nominated by Chancellor could, in certain circumstances, qualify as a teacher by virtue of professional status as a teacher thereby minimising the chances of one of the elected teachers being represented in the executive committee, which would be against the guiding principle behind the statutory provision, and (2) Precedent of the Chancellor of University of Calicut accepting the nomination of a nominated member from the constituency of teachers is not acceptable for the reason that it is a conventional type of university and that standard is not applicable to an unconventional type of university like Kerala Agricultural University, which has no affiliated colleges. Term ‘teacher’ could be used in a broader perspective in the case of a conventional university, but scope of its applicability is limited in the case of Agricultural University as only university teachers are represented in the general council.
7. I fail to appreciate the grounds, for reasons more than one. Admittedly, general council is the same as senate and executive committee is equivalent to syndicate. Statutory provisions applicable are similarly passed by same legislative. Statute has not recognised any distinction as ‘conventional’ or ‘unconventional’ university. Such terms are conspicuously absent. I was not told from which provision the Chancellor used these terms. Therefore, that must be something imported from outside the statutory provisions. Same rule is applicable to all universities and expressions used are also the same. Admittedly, petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 are teachers and members of the general council satisfying the requirements of Section 14, in order to become eligible for election. Only requirements of eligibility under Section 14 for being elected to the executive committee in the case in question is that he should be a member of the general council and he should also be a teacher. Section 14 does not say that he should be “a member elected to the general council by the teachers other than Deans of faculties from among themselves”. What is stated is only “one member elected from among the teachers in the general council, by the council”. Teachers, who are members in the genera! council, need not necessarily be teachers elected by the constituency of teachers. If that was the requirement considered necessary by the legislature, it would have definitely used words necessary for that purpose in Section 14 because we find such qualifications in appropriate places when it is considered necessary.
8. There is nothing in Section 14 indicative of an intention of the legislature that only an elected member and not a nominated member is eligible. It is not possible to read into Section 14 any democratic principle involving the spirit of the provision to the effect that only an elected teacher is intended as construed by the Chancellor. So also, there is nothing to show that the seat is reserved for teachers elected to the general council by teachers alone. Consequently, there is no question of representative of teachers being reduced in the executive committee, as apprehended by Chancellor. As section shows, both nominated and elected members to the general council are eligible provided they are teachers. A teacher can be an agricultural scientist also. Admittedly, petitioner is an eminent teacher and a renowned agricultural scientist. It was as a renowned scientist that he was nominated to the general council by Chancellor. By that nomination, He cannot lose his status as a teacher. We cannot read into the provisions something which is not there. In order to accept the interpretation given by Chancellor, we will have to read something more into Section 14. Simply on account of the constituencies provided in Section 10 for election, I do not think I will be justified in reading into Section 14 an intention to exclude teachers who are not elected. Question of representative character does not arise in view of the fact that Section 14 does not specify anything of that sort. There is no point in saying that Section 10 does not contemplate any teacher becoming member of the general council other than by election from the constituency of teachers. A nominated agricultural scientist by himself could be a teacher.
9. There is nothing in Section 14 to indicate that the term ‘teacher’ is used in a broader perspective concerning a conventional university and in a narrow perspective so far as an unconventional university is concerned. Only one sense or concept is there and no distinction, as pointed out by Chancellor, could be read into the provisions. Chancellor could only interpret and not legislate. As I have earlier stated, no such distinction is there in the Act or Rules and no such differentiation is also there. There is no scope for evolving any democratic principles or spirit of the legislation for arriving at a conclusion foreign to the scope of the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. Spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to legislature and not to Court (Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh. AIR 1954 SC 749). We can only follow what the legislature said. We cannot legislate in order to add something into what the legislature said for giving a different interpretation.
10. Then the contention was that Court may not be justified in disagreeing with an academic body even if a different conclusion is thought possible. I do agree, provided it is concerning an academic issue in which the expertise and discretion of the academic body will have to be normally respected by Court, which cannot claim that much expertise. But the matter in issue is not an academic question involving any discretion to be exercised by an expert academic body. What is involved is only interpretation of statutory provision to decide what the legislature intended and said. In such a case, Court need not sacrifice its opinion to any expertise or discretion. In interpreting the plain statutory provision, there is no question of any democratic principle or spirit being introduced especially when statutory intent is clear from the plain words used. So also, it is one of the principles of interpretation that if two equally plausible views are there, one in favour of qualification and the other in favour of disqualification, that in favour of qualification will have to be preferred if the statutory provisions are not against it in its plain meaning. Petitioner is definitely qualified. Ext.P1 is liable to be quashed.
Original petition is allowed and Ext.P1 is quashed. Second respondent is prohibited from taking any action on the basis of Ext.P1 treating the nomination and election of petitioner to the executive committee as invalid. Second respondent is directed to publish the result of election. No costs.