PETITIONER: DR. BOOL CHAND Vs. RESPONDENT: THE CHANCELLOR, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/09/1967 BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. SHELAT, J.M. CITATION: 1968 AIR 292 1968 SCR (1) 434 CITATOR INFO : RF 1971 SC1828 (5) RF 1971 SC2242 (21) D 1992 SC1872 (15,16) ACT: Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, Sch. I CC.4(vi) & (vii)--Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898--s. 14. Chancellor given power to appoint Vice-Chancellor but not to determine employment--whether such power implied in power to appoint--Nature of Vice-Chancellor's employment--whether contractual--whether rules of natural justice required to be followed when determining his employment. HEADNOTE: The appellant was a member of the Indian Administrative Ser- vice in the Madhya Pradesh Cadre and was compulsorily retired from the Service for misconduct by an order of the President in February, 1963. In June, 1965 he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University, by the then Chancellor of the University. On March 31, 1966 the new Chancellor who Was in office at the time, ordered the suspension of the appellant from the office of Vice-Chan- cellor and also issued to him a notice to show cause why his services I should not be terminated. The appellant filed a petition in the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus to quash the Chancellor's order of suspension. In the meantime the Chancellor passed an order on May 8, 1966, in exercise of the power under Clause 4(vi). of Schedule I to the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, read with s.14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, terminating the services of the appellant with immediate effect. The appellant then amended his petition and sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order of May 8, 1966. The High Court rejected the petition. In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, (i) that the Chancellor had no power under the Act or the Statutes to terminate the tenure of office of a Vice Chancellor; and (ii) that the Chancellor was bound to hold an enquiry in accordance with the rules of natural justice before determining the appellant's tenure, but the appellant had not been given a proper opportunity to explain why his services should not be terminated and, furthermore, the Chancellor had taken into consideration evidence which was not disclosed to the appellant. On the other hand, it was contended for the respondent that since the claim for relief by the respondent was founded on an alleged breach of contract, the remedy of the appellant, if any, lay in an action for damages and not in a petition for a high prerogative writ. HELD, dismissing the appeal: (i)The absence of a provision setting up the procedure for determining the employment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does not lead to the inference that the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined. [439H] A power to appoint ordinarily implies a power to determine employment and this rule is incorporated in s.14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act I of 1898. [437H-438A] S.R. Tiwari v. District Board, Agra, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55 and Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian- cum-Managing Officer, Bombay, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 120; referred to. 435 An intention contrary to the rule was not evidenced either by the fact that under Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is for three years or because there was no express provision covering the determination of service of a Vice-Chancellor for misconduct as there was in the case of teachers. Clause 4(vii) of the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a person appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to continue in office for three years; the clause merely places a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor, when fixing the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor. It could not be held that a person appointed a Vice-Chancellor is entitled to continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if it turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm, or grossly immoral. [438E-F; 439G-H] S.14 of the General Clauses Act is a general provision: it does not merely deal with the appointment of public servants. It deals with all appointments, and there is no reason to hold, having regard to the context in which the expression occurs, that the authority invested with the power of appointment has the power to determine employment as a penalty, but not otherwise. [438G-H] (ii)The new Chancellor did issue a notice upon the appellant requiring him to show cause why the tenure of his service should not be terminated and the appellant made a representation which was considered; the appellant was informed of the grounds of the proposed termination of the tenure of his service and an order giving detailed reasons was passed by 'the Chancellor. The High Court had rightly held on the facts that the appellant had the fullest opportunity of making his representation and that the inquiry held by the Chancellor was not vitiated because of any violations of the rules of natural justice. [443D; 446C] (iii) The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its source in the University Act: investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment but that power may not be exercised arbitrarily; it can be only exercised for good cause, i.e. in the interests of the University and only when it is found after due enquiry held in a manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that the holder of the office is unfit to continue as Vice- Chancellor. [441G] A.Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur, [1962] 3 All E.R. 633; Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board and Anr., [1958] All E.R. 322; Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and Ors. v. Silva. [1964] 3 All E.R. 865; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ridge v. Baldwin and Ors. [1964] A.C. 41; referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 19, 1966 of
the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 739 of of 1966.
N. C. Chatterjee, S. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg, K.M.K. Nairand
L. M. Singhvi, for the appellant.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, Chetan Das Dewan,
Deputy Advocate-General for the State of Haryana and N. H.
Hingorani, for the respondent.
436
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. The State of Madhya Pradesh held an enquiry against
the appellant Dr.’ Bool Chand–a member of the Indian
Administrative Service-on charges of- “gross misconduct and
indiscipline” in respect of the conduct of the appellant
when he was Collector District Rajgarh. The Enquiry Officer
held that in recording certain remarks “regarding
association of tile Commissioner of Bhopal with one B.L.
Gupta a pleader of Zirapur”, the appellant was “actuated by
malice” and his conduct “offended against official
propriety, decorum and discipline”, and that the appellant
had without permission removed a safe from the Rajgarh
Treasury. The President of India served notice upon the ap-
pellant requiring him to show cause against the order of
compulsory retirement proposed to be passed in regard to
him. The President also consulted the Union Public Service
Commission. The Union Put”,- Service Commission was of the
view that “in the light of the findings and conclusions
stated by them and having regard to all the circumstances
relevant to the case. the penalty of compulsory retirement
on proportionate pension should be imposed upon” the
appellant. and they advised the President accordingly. By
order dated February 28, 1963. the President directed that
the, appellant be compulsorily retired from the Indian
Administrative Service with immediate effect.
In March 1965 the appellant was appointed Professor and Head
of the Department of Political Science in the Punjab Univer-
sity. On June 18, 1965, the appellant was appointed Vice-
Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University by order of Mr.
Hafiz Mohd Ibrahim-who was the Chancellor of the University.
After Mr.Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim vacated the office of
Chancellor of the University, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Governor
of Punjab. held the office of Chancellor. On March 31,
1966, the Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh ordered that the
appellant be Suspended from the office of Vice-Chancellor,
and by another order the Chancellor issued a notice
requiring the appellant to show Cause why his services as
Vice-Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University be not
terminated. The appellant submitted his representation, and
shortly thereafter filed a petition in the High Court of
Punjab for a writ in the nature of mandamus quashing the
order and the notice dated March, 31, 1966. On May. 8, 1966
the Chancellor passed an order in exercise of the power
under sub-cl. (vi) of cl. 4 of Sch. 1 to the Kurukshetra
University Act, 1956, read with s. 14 of the Punjab General
Clauses Act, 1898, terminating with immediate effect “the
services” of the appellant “from the office of Vice-
Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University”. The petition was
then amended by the appellant. and a writ of certiorari or
appropriate writ calling for the record and quashing the
order dated May 8. 1966, terminating the services of the
appellant was also claimed. The High Court rejected the
petition filed by the appellant. Against that
437
order, with certificate granted by the High Court, this
appeal has been preferred.
The first argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that
the Chancellor had no power to terminate the tenure of
office of a Vice-Chancellor. It is necessary, in
considering the validity of that argument, to read certain
provisions of the Kurukshetra University Act 12 of 1956. By
s. 4 the University is invested with the power, inter alia,
to do all such things as may be necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of all or any of the objects of
the University. By s. 7. amongst others, the Chancellor,
the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar are declared to be
officers of the University. By s. 8 the powers, duties of
officers, terms of office and filling of casual vacancies
are to be prescribed by the statutes. Section 14(1)
provides that the statutes in Sch. I shall be the statutes
of the University and that the “Court of the University
shall have the power to make new or additional statutes and
to amend or repeal the statutes. By s. 21 it is provided
that every salaried officer and teacher of the University
shall be appointed under a written contract, which shall be
lodged with the University. By cl. 4 of Sch. I the Vice-
Chancellor is declared the principal executive and academic
officer of the University, and also the ex-officio Chairman
of the Executive Council, the Academic Council, and the
Finance Committee, and is invested with authority to see
that the Act. the Statutes, the Ordinances and the
Regulations are faithfully observed, and to take such action
as he deems necessary in that behalf. The Vice-Chancellor
is also authorised to exercise general control over the
affairs of the University and to give effect to the
decisions of the authorities of the University. Sub-clauses
(vi) & (vii) of cl. 4 provide:
“(vi) The ‘Upa-Kulapati’ (Vice-Chancellor)
shall be appointed by the ‘Kulapati’
(Chancellor) on terms and conditions to be
laid by the ‘Kulapati’ (Chancellor).
(vii) The ‘Upa-Kulapati’ (Vice-Chancellor)
shall hold office ordinarily for a period of
three years which term may be renewed.’.’.
From -a review of these provisions it is clear that the
Vice-Chancellor is an officer of the University invested
with executive powers set out in the Statutes and his
appointment is to be made ordinarily for a period of three
years and on terms and conditions laid down by the
Chancellor.
There is no express provision in the Kurukshetra University
Act or the Statutes thereunder which deals with the
termination of the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor. But
on that account we are unable to accept the plea of the
appellant that the tenure of office of a Vice-Chancellor
under the Act cannot be determined before the expiry of the
period for which he is appointed. A -power to appoint
ordinarily implies a power to determine the
438
employment. In S. R. Tiwari v. District Boarel, Agra,(1) it
was observed by this Court at p. 67:
“Power to appoint ordinarily carries with it
the power to, determine appointment, and a
power to terminate may in -the absence of
restrictions express or implied be exercised,
subject to the conditions prescribed in that
behalf, by the authority competent to
appoint.”
A similar view was also expressed in Lekhraj Sathramdas
Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing
Officer, Bombay (2) . That rule is incorporated in s. 14 of
the Punjab General Clauses Act I of 1898. That section
provides:
“Where, by any Punjab Act, a power to make any
appointment is conferred, then, unless a
different intention appears, the authority
having for the time being power to make the
appointment shall ‘also have power to suspend
or dismiss any person appointed whether by
itself or any other authority by it in
exercise of that power.”
Counsel for the appellant urged that since the general rule
is given a statutory form, the validity of the exercise of
the power to determine the tenure of the office of the
appellant must be found in s. 14 of the, Punjab General
Clauses Act. Counsel says that s. 14 has no application to
the interpretation of the Kurukshetra University Act,
because cl. 4(vii) of the Statutes which prescribes that the
appointment of a Vice-Chancellor shall ordinarily be for a
period of three years discloses a different intention. But
cl. 4(vii) of the Statutes does not purport to confer upon a
person appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to
continue in office for three years: the clause merely places
a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor, when fixing
the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor.
Counsel also urged that under s. 14 of the Act power to ap-
point includes power to dismiss, but not to determine
employment. In support of that contention he urged that in
relation to the tenure of service of a public servant, the
expression “to dismiss” has come to mean to determine
employment as a measure of punishment. But s. 14 of the
General Clauses Act is a general provision: it does not
merely deal with the appointment of public servants. It
deals with all appointments, and there is no reason to hold,
having regard to the context in which the expression occurs,
that the authority invested with the power of appointment
has the power to determine employment as a penalty, but not
otherwise. The expression “dismiss” does not in its
etymological sense necessarily involve any such meaning as
is urged by counsel
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55.
(2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 120.
439
for the appellant. The implication that dismissal of a
servant involves determination of employment as a penalty
has been a matter of recent development since the Government
of India Act, 1935, was enacted. By that Act certain
restrictions were imposed upon the power of the authorities
to dismiss or remove members of the civil services, from
employment. There is no warrant however for assuming that
in the General Clauses Act, 1898, the expression “dismiss”
which was generally used in connection with the termination
of appointments was intended to be used only in the sense of
determination of employment as a measure of punishment.
The expression “Punjab Act” is defined in s. 2(46) of the
Punjab General Clauses Act as meaning an Act made by the
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab in Council under the
Indian Councils Acts, 1861 to 1909, or any of those Acts, or
the Government of India Act, 1915, or by the Local
Legislature or the Governor of the Punjab under the
Government of India Act, or by the Provincial Legislature or
the Governor of the Punjab, or by the Provincial Legislature
or the Governor. of East Punjab under the Government of
India Act, 1935, or by the Legislature of Punjab Linder the
Constitution. By s. 14(1) of the Kurukshetra University Act
12 of 1956, it was declared that on the commencement of the
Act, the Statutes of the University shall be those as set
out in the Schedule 1. The Statutes incorporated in the
First Schedule were made by the Legislature and must for the
purpose of s. 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act be
regarded as “Punjab Act”. They do not cease to be “Punjab
Act” merely because they are liable to be altered by the
University Court in exercise of the power conferred by s.
14(2) of the University Act.
It was also urged that whereas provision was made by cl. 6
of the Annexure to Ordinance XI that the services of the
tea-hers may be summarily determined on the ground of
misconduct, .here was no such provision for determination of
the employment of the Vice-Chancellor and that also
indicated an intention to the contrary within the meaning of
s. 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. We are unable to
agree with that contention. It is true,. the office of the
Vice-Chancellor of a University is one of great
Responsibility and carries with it considerable prestige and
authority. But we are unable to hold that a person
appointed a Vice-Chancellor is entitled to continue in
office for the full period of’ his appointment even if it
turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm,
or grossly immoral. Absence of a provision setting up
procedure for determining the employment of the Vice-
Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does
not, in our judgment, lead to the inference that the tenure
of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined.
The first contention raised by counsel for the appellant
must therefore fail.
It was then urged by counsel for the appellant that the
Chancellor was bound to hold an enquiry against the
appellant before
440
determining his tenure, and the enquiry must be held in
consonance with the rules of natural justice. The
Additional Solicitor-General submitted that since the claim
for relief by the appellant was founded on an alleged breach
of contract, the remedy of the appellant, if any, lay in an
action for damages, and not in a petition for a high
prerogative writ. The Additional Solicitor-General invited
our attention to the averments made in the petition filed by
the appellant that the Chancellor “was bound by the letter
of appointment which created a tenure of office for three
years” and which the Chancellor could not unilaterally
determine in the purported exercise of an assumed power, and
that in any event no such circumstances had been disclosed
which would entitle the Chancellor to avoid the contract of
service which was binding on the University, and submitted
that since it was the appellant’s case that his appointment
as Vice-Chancellor was purely contractual, and the
Chancellor had no power unilaterally to determine the
contract, no relief of declaration about the invalidity of
the order of the Chancellor may be granted in exercise of
the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue high prerogative
writs, and the only remedy which the appellant is entitled
to claim is compensation for breach of contract, in action
in a Civil Court.
It is true, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in A. Francis v. Municipal Councillors of
Kuala Lumpur(1), that when there has been purported
termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the
contract of service still subsisted would rarely be made and
would not be made in the absence of special circumstances,
because of the principle that the Courts do not grant
specific performance of contracts of service. The same view
was expressed in Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital
Board and Anr(2) and in Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and
Ors. v. Silva(3). In these cases the authority appointing a
servant was acting in exercise of statutory authority but
the relation between the person appointed and the employer
was contractual, and it was held that the relation between
the employer and the person appointed being that of master
and servant, termination of relationship will not entitle
the servant to a declaration that- his employment bad not
been validly determined.
If the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor gave rise to the
relation of master and servant governed by the terms of
appointment, in the absence of special circumstances, the
High Court would relegate a party complaining of wrongful
termination Of the contract to a suit for compensation, and
would not exercise its jurisdiction to issue a high
prerogative writ compelling the University to retain the
services of the Vice-Chancellor whom the University does not
wish to retain in service. But the office of a
(1) [1962] 3 All E.R. 633.
(2) [1958] 1 All E.R. 322
(3) [1964] 3 All E.R. 865.
441
Vice-Chancellor is created by the University Act: and by his
appointment the Vice-Chancellor is invested with statutory
powers and authority under the Act. The petition filed by
he appellant in the High Court is a confused document.
Thereby the appellant did plead that the relation between
him and the University was contractual, but that was not the
whole pleading. The appellant also pleaded, with some
circumlocution that since he was appointed to the office, of
Vice-Chancellor which is created by the Statute, the tenure
of his appointment could not be determined without giving
him an opportunity to explain why his appointment should not
be terminated. The University Act, the Statutes and the
Ordinances do not lay down the conditions in which the
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor may be determined, nor
does the Act prescribe any limitations upon the exercise of
the power of the Chancellor to determine the employment.
But once the appointment is made in pursuance of a Statute,
though the appointing authority is not precluded from
determining the employment, the decision of the appointing
authority to terminate the appointment may be based only
upon the result of an enquiry held in a manner consistent
with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. This Court
observed in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani(1) -it p.
1271:
“It is one of the fundamental rules of our
constitutional set-up that every citizen is
protected against exercise of arbitrary
authority by the State or its officers. Duty
to act judicially would, therefore, arise from
the every nature of the function intended to
be performed, it need not be shown to be
super-added. If there is power to decide and
determine to the prejudice of a person, duty
to act judicially is implicit in the exercise
of such power. If the essentials of justice
be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a
person is made, the order is a nullity. That
is a basic concept of the rule of
law and
importance thereof transcends the significance
of a decision in any particular case.”
The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its source in the
University Act: investment of that power carries with it the
power to determine the employment; but the power is coupled
with duty. The power may not be exercised arbitrarily, it
can be only exercised, for good cause, i.e. in the interests
of the University and only when it is found after due
enquiry held in manner consistent with the rules of natural
justice, that the bolder of the office is unfit to continue
as Vice-Chancellor.
In Ridge v. Baldwin and Others(1) a chief constable who was
subject to the Police Acts and Regulations was, during the
pendency of certain criminal proceedings in which he was
arrested
(1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625.
(2) [1964] A.C. 41.
442
and charged together with other persons, with conspiracy to
obstruct the course of justice, was suspended from duty by
the borough watch committee. The chief constable was
acquitted by the jury on the criminal charges against him
and he applied to be reinstated. The watch committee at a
meeting decided that the chief constable had been negligent
in the discharge of his duties and in purported exercise of
the powers conferred on them by S. 191(4) of the Act of 1882
dismissed him from office. No specific charge was
formulated against him, but the watch committee in arriving
at their decision, considered his own statements in evidence
and the observations made by the Judge who acquitted him. in
support of the order of dismissal. The chief constable
appealed to the Home Secretary who held that there was
sufficient material on which the watch committee could
properly exercise their power of dismissal under s. 191(4).
The decision of the Home Secretary was made final and
binding on the parties by s. 2(3) of the, Police Appeals
Act, 1927. The chief constable then commenced’ an action
for a declaration that the purported termination of his
appointment as chief constable was illegal, ultra vires and
void,, and for payment of salary. The action was taken in
appeal to the House of Lords. The House of Lords (Lord
Evershed dissenting) held that the decision of the watch
committee to dismiss the chief constable was null and void,
and that accordingly notwithstanding that the decision of
the Home Secretary was made final and binding on the
parties, that decision could not give validity to the
decision of the watch committee. Lord Reid observed at p.
65:
“So I shall deal first with cases of
dismissal. These appear to fall into three
classes: dismissal of a servant by his master,
dismissal from office held during pleasure,
and dismissal from an office where there must
be something against a man to warrant his
dismissal.
The law regarding master and servant is not in
doubt. There cannot be specific performance
of contract of service, and the master can
terminate the contract with his servant at any
time and for any reason or for none. But if
he does so in a manner not warranted by the
contract he must pay damages for breach of
contract. So the question in a pure case of
master and servant does not at all depend on
whether the master has beard the servant in
his own defence: it depends on whether the
facts emerging at the trial prove breach of
contract.
Then there are many cases where a man holds an
office at pleasure. Apart from judges and
others whose tenure of office is governed by
statute, all servants and officers of the
Crown hold office at pleasure, and this has
been held even to apply to a colonial judge
(Terrell v. Secretary of State for the
Colonies (1952) 2 Q.B. 482). It has always
been held, I think rightly, and the reason is
clear. As the person having the power of
dismissal need
443
.lm15
not have anything against the officer, he need not give any
reasons.
So I come to the third class, which includes the present
case. There I find an unbroken line of authority to the
effect that an officer cannot lawfully be dismissed without
first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing
his defence or explanation.”
The case of the appellant falls within the third class
mentioned by Lord Reid, and the tenure of his office could
not be interrupted without first informing him of what was
alleged against him and without giving him an opportunity to
make his defence or explanation.
The Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh did issue a notice upon
the appellant requiring him to show cause why the tenure of
his service should not be terminated. The appellant made a
representation which was considered, and his tenure was
determined because in the view of the Chancellor it was not
in the public interest to retain the appellant as Vice-
Chancellor. The appellant was informed of the grounds of
the proposed termination of the tenure of his office and an
order giving detailed reasons was passed by the Chancellor.
But the appellant contended that in arriving at his
decision. the Chancellor misread the order of the President
and took into consideration evidence which was not disclosed
to the appellant, and failed to consider evidence in his
favour which was on the, record. It is true that the order
of the President only recites that the appellant was
compulsorily retired as an officer of the Madhya Pradesh
Cadre of the Indian Administrative Service: it does not
expressly state that the order of compulsory retirement was
imposed as a penalty. But a review of the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant which culminated in the
order of the President leaves no room for doubt. The order
of compulsory retirement was passed against the appellant as
a penal order.
There is no substance in the plea that the order of the
Chancellor was vitiated, since the Chancellor in
ascertaining the true. effect of the order of the President
took into consideration a letter from the Secretary
(Services), Government of India, Ministry of’ Home Affairs,
dated May 6, 1966. The letter which has been set out in the
order of the Chancellor merely catalogues the various, steps
taken by the different authorities which considered the case
of the appellant before the order of compulsory retirement
of the appellant from the Indian Administrative Service was
passed by the President. That letter contains no new
material.
The plea that the -Chancellor was influenced by evidence
which was not disclosed to the appellant is also without
substance.
444
It appears that before he passed the order of suspension the
Chancellor had received letter from Prof. D.C. Sharma and
Dr. A. C. Joshi in answer to enquiries made by him relating
to the circumstances in which the appellant was appointed to
the post of Professor of Political Science in the University
of Punjab, and these letters were not disclosed to the
appellant. Counsel for the appellant says that these
letters indicate that the University authorities fully
knowing that the appellant was compulsorily retired from the
Indian Administrative Service, appointed him as Vice-Chan-
cellor. But the appellant did not specifically plead or
make out the case that the Chancellor Mr. Hafiz Mohd.
Ibrahim was made aware of the order of compulsory
retirement. The Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh in passing
the impugned order considered the grounds set up in the
representation and then posed the question whether his
predecessor in office, when he made the appointment -of the
appellant was aware of the fact that the appellant had been
compulsorily retired as a measure of punishment from the
Indian Administrative Service, and came to the conclusion
that there was nothing to show that he–Mr. Hafiz Mohd.
Ibrahim-was aware of the order of compulsory retirement. In
paragraph .13 of his -order, the Chancellor Sardar Ujjal
Singh observed:
“At the time of his appointment as Vice-
Chancellor, the fact of his compulsory
retirement was not known to the Chief Minister
or the then Chancellor. The alleged knowledge
of the fact of compulsory retirement on the
part of the Chief Minister, Cabinet or the
previous Chancellor is, therefore, without any
basis.”
Unless he was moved in that behalf by the appellant it was
not the duty of the Chancellor Sardar Ujjal Singh, before he
passed the order against the appellant determining the
tenure of his appointment, to enquire of Mr. Hafiz Mohd.
Ibrahim who passed -the order of appointment and of the
Chief Minister, Punjab, whether they had come to know of the
order of the President. In the petition filed before the
High Court the petitioner merely averred in ground (iv) (d)
that “the order of the Chancellor was vitiated, inter alia,
because the Chancellor had without any material come to a
conclusion that there was no basis to allege knowledge of
the fact of compulsory retirement on the part of the Chief
Minister or the Cabinet or the previous Chancellor”: he did
not set up the case that the Chancellor had information
about the order of the President. His principal plea was
that he was under no obligation to disclose that he was
compulsorily retired from the Indian Administrative Service.
In the affidavit filed by Sardar Ujjal Singh, the assertion
made in ground (iv) (d) is denied. Affidavits of Mr. Hafiz
Mohd. Ibrahim and Mr. Ram Kishan. Chief Minister. Punjab,
were also filed before the High Court. and it was averred
that neither of them knew at the time when the appointment
was made that the appellant bad been compulsorily retired by
the President from the Indian Administrative Service.
445
Mr. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim further averred that “this
information did not also come to his notice so long he
remained Chancellor of the Kurukshetra University”, and that
if the fact of compulsory retirement of the appellant as a
penalty had been within his know-. ledge, he would not have
appointed the appellant as Vice-Chancellor. Even after the
affidavits by Mr. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim and Mr. Ram Kishan
were filed, the appellant by his supplementary affidavit
which was filed on July 27, 1966, did not contend that, Mr.
Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim or the Chief Minister had information
about the determination of his employment in the Indian
Administrative Service. His plea was that the members of
the syndicate. the members of the senate and the Vice-
Chancellor of the Punjab University had knowledge about
determination of his employment. when lie was appointed
Professor of Political Science; and that plea. we agree with
the High Court, was wholly irrelevant.
It is true that the Chancellor in his order recorded that
Mr. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim did not know at the time of making
the appointment of the appellant to the office of Vice-
Chancellor that he was compulsorily retired from the Indian
Administrative Service. But no inference arises therefrom
that Sardar Ujjal Singh before he passed the orders made any
enquiries or had access to evidence which was not disclosed
to the appellant. We are unable to agree with counsel for
the appellant that before a conclusion could be recorded, it
was the duty of Sardar Ujjal Singh to ascertain from Mr.
Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim and Mr. Ram Kishan whether they were
aware before the appellant was appointed Vice-Chancellor of
the order passed by the President. The Chancellor, Sardara
Ujjal Singh. was, in Our judgment, under no obligation.
unless moved by the appellant, to hold such enquiry. It was
for the appellant to take up the defence that Mr. Hafiz
Mohd. Ibrahim was informed of the order of the President
and to take steps to prove that fact. He did not take up
that defence, and he cannot no,,\ seek to make out the case
that the order was vitiated because the Chancellor Sardar
Ujjal Singh did not make an enquiry which the Chancellor was
never asked to make. The reference to the letter of Prof.
D. C. Sharma in the order of the Chancellor has no bearing
either on the true effect of the order of the President or
on the question whether the Chancellor was cognizant of the
order passed by the President.
The argument that when considering the letter of Prof. D.C.
Sharma, the Chancellor should have also considered the
letter of Dr. A.C. Joshi requires no serious consideration.
The letters of Prof. D. C. Sharma and Dr. A. C. Joshi are.
in our judgment. irrelevant in considering whether the
Chancellor Mr. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim was aware of the order
passed by the President. It is impossible to raise an
inference that because the order of the President was
gazetted and certain members of the syndicate and senate
were aware of tile order of the President, knowledge must
also be attributed to the Chancellor.
446
The proceeding resulting in the order passed by the Chancel-
lor does not suffer from any such infirmity as would justify
this Court in holding that the rules of natural justice were
not complied with. It is unnecessary in the circumstances
to consider the argument advanced by the Additional
Solicitor-General that even if Mr. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim was
aware of the order passed by the President ordering
compulsory retirement of the appellant from the Indian
Administrative Service, it was still open to his successor
Sardar Ujjal Singh to determine the tenure of office of the
appellant as Vice-Chancellor, if in his view it appeared,
having regard to the antecedents of the appellant, that the
appellant was unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor.
We agree with the High Court that. the appellant had the
fullest opportunity of making his representation and that
the enquiry held by the Chancellor was not vitiated because
of violation of the rules of natural justice.
In the very scheme of our educational set-up at the Univer-
sity level, the post of Vice-Chancellor is of very great
importance, and if the Chancellor was of the view, after
making due enquiry, that a person of the antecedents of the
appellant was unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor, it would
be impossible, unless the plea that the Chancellor acted
maliciously or for a collateral purpose is made out, for the
High Court to declare that order ineffective. The plea that
the Chancellor acted mala fide was raised, but was not
pressed before the High Court.
The appeal therefore fails. There will be no order as to
costs.
R. K. P. S. Appeal dismissed.
447