JUDGMENT
Binod Kumar Roy, J.
1. This is a defendant’s revision against an order by which the trial court had reviewed its earlier order dated 17-6-1985, and had proceeded to struck off his defence under Section 15(1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. The necessary facts are as follows:-
On an application dated 21-12-1984, under Section 15(1) of the Act, filed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties, the trial court passed an order dated 2-2-1983 directing the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent as well as future rent by 15th of every succeeding months. On 21st December, 1984 the plaintiffs-opposite parties filed an application for striking off the defence of the petitioner on the ground that the rent for the period August and September 1984, have not been deposited. The petitioner filed a rejoinder. The trial court by an order dated 17-6-1985, held that the rent for the months of August and September, 1984, having been deposited on 13-9-1984, there is no substance in the petition dated 21-12-1984 filed by the plaintiffs and it proceeded to reject the same.
3. I am informed at the Bar that the plaintiffs did not move higher against the aforesaid order dated 21-12-1984.
4. It appears that on 2nd September, 1985, a petition was filed by the plaintiffs for seeking review of the order dated 17-6-1985.
5. The petitioners dontested the aforementioned application after putting a rejoinder. By the impugned order the court below has allowed the prayer for review, of the plaintiffs-opposite parties.
6. Mr. A.K. Singh Chouhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petition in question seeking review being filed on 2-9-1985, it was apparently barred by limitation inasmuch as it has not been filed within 30 days of the order dated 17-6-1985. He further submits that the trial court has erred exercising its jurisdiction without condoning the delay occurred in filing the aforementioned review petition. He next submitted that during the relevant period that is to say in August and September 1984, initially there was strike of judicial officers and then of the Non-gazetted employees of the Government, as a result of which, the functioning of the court was hampered. He submitted that before the expiry of the peremptory date i.e. 15th September, 1984, the petitioner took precaution and got the necessary challans passed by the court concerned on 12th September, 1984 itself and then on 13th September, 1984 deposited the rent for the months of August and September, 1984 in the name of the plaintiffs with the State Bank of India. He further submitted that due to strike the challans, other than the one, though which the deposit aforementioned was made could not be obtained and that on the challans themselves, signature of the Treasury Officer were obtained. True photo copies of the. relevant challans have been appended as Annexures 1 and 2 to the revision application. He also submitted with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Miss Santosh Mehta’s case, reported in 1980, (3) SCO 610, that while interpreting Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal view. He submitted with reference to another decision of the Supreme Court, in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari’s case, reported in 1985 (3) Supreme Court cases 53, that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time once fixed for payment of monthly rent foil due. He further submitted with reference to that very case that failure to comply with an earlier direction should not necessarily visit the tenant with the consequenoe of his defence being struck off, because there might be myriad situation under which default may be committed and that in the instant case situation being beyond the control of the tenant, he had correctly adopted the course after obtaining necessary permission from the court itself and the Treasury ‘ Officer to deposit the rent in question with the State Bank of India. Mr. Chauhan also proceeded to submit that the scope of Section 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure being well defined, the court was not justified in reviewing its earlier order.
7. Mr. Ahsan, learned Counsel appearing for the landlords-opposite parties submitted, while relying on the Division Banch decision of this Court in Shamdhu Narain Modak’s case, reported in 1983, PLJR 129, that the rent in question not having been deposited in the court, there was a default and thus the impugned order need not be interfered with in revision.
8. It is well-settled that the period for filing a review petition is only 30 days (See Article 124 of the Limitation Act). No petition for condoning the delay was admittedly filed by the landlords-opposite parties. Under the Civil Court’s Rules framed by this Court, a petition for review has to be registered as a Miscellaneous case and then it is to be disposed of in accordance with law. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, cast a duty on the court to dismiss such applications, on the ground of limitation, even though expiry of limitation has not been set out as a defence. In that view of the matter, the trial court has committed a jurisdictional error in proceeding to entertain the aforementioned review application and disposing of on merits by the impugned order.
9. The fact that there was strike of Judicial Officers from 16th August, 1984 to 30 August, 1984 and then of the N.G.O.’s of the State from 4th September, 1984 to 29th September, 1984 has not been disputed Necessary averments in this regard are in paragraph 7 of the revision application. No counter-affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties rebutting the aforementioned stand. The last date, being 15th August, 1984, which was a public holiday, being Independence Day of the country.
10. Mr. Chauhan, in order to substantiate his contention apart from relying upon the documents, Annexures 1 and 2 attached with the revision petition also produced their originals before me. Mr. Ahsan, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties, was afforded earlier an opportunity to doubt the genuineness of the aforementioned documents, but even today, very fairly points out that he is not in a position to doubt their genuineness. In that view of the matter, there cannot be any iota of doubt that the petitioner took all precautions and did every possible act in getting the challans passed through court on 12-9-1984 and then from the Treasury Officer on 13-9-1984 and deposited the amount with the State Bank of India in the name of the plaintiffs The challans having been passed by the court and accordingly deposited with the State Bank of. India must be deemed to have been on behalf of the Court itself and I do not see any default on that score either.
11. The Supreme Court very recently in A.R. Antulay’s case, reported in l988 SC p. 1531 laid down to the following effect through its majority view:
No man should suffer because of the mistake of the Court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure or irregularities, Rules of procedures are the hand-maids of justice and pot the mistress of justice. Ex debito justitiae the Court must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied.
In view of the aforesaid declaration, no illegality whatsoever was done by the trial court when it passed its earlier order on 17-6-1985, rejecting the plaintiff’s petition dated 21-12-1984. In that view of the matter, there was hardly any justification for the trial court to review its earlier order.
12. Mr. Ahsan, expressed his anxiety that his client may not be in a position to withdraw the amount deposited with the State Bank of India. I think his apprehensions are meaningless. For removal of doubts, I clarity that the landlord-opposite parties shall be entitled’ to withdraw the concerned amount without any hitch or murmor.
13. Mr. Ahsan further points out that since the eviction suit is of the years 1982 and this matter has remained pending for about more than three years in this Court, a direction be issued to dispose of the same expeditiously. The request made is most reasonable and I direct the court below to dispose of the suit expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of the receipt of this order.
14. For the reasons mentioned above, I set aside the impugned order and allow this revision application. But in the circumstances without cost.