High Court Karnataka High Court

Dr. G.M. Mascarenhas vs R. Venkatachalam on 12 April, 1990

Karnataka High Court
Dr. G.M. Mascarenhas vs R. Venkatachalam on 12 April, 1990
Equivalent citations: ILR 1990 KAR 1396
Author: K Swami
Bench: K Swami, N Hanumanthappa


ORDER

K.A. Swami, J.

1. Pursuant to the order passed on 11-4-1990 in O.S.A.No. 8/1990 Appeal against order in , this appeal has been posted before us along with O.S.A.No. 8/1990. However, it is now brought to our notice that the application seeking interim order made in this appeal was got dismissed as not pressed on 2-4-1990.

2. At this stage, it is contended that the Miscellaneous First Appeal has to be decided by a Single Judge and it has not been referred to a Division Bench, therefore, no Order, either interim or final, can be passed by a Division Bench. In the normal circumstances, it is so, because, as per the provisions contained in the Karnataka High Court Act, and in the light of a decision in RAVINDRANATH P.V. v. SMT. RUKMINIAMMAL, Appeal against Order in , has to go before a Single Judge.

3. The subject matter of O.S.A.No. 8/1990 is as to whether the caveator, who is the respondent in this appeal and who has undoubtedly an half share in the subject matter of the suit, is entitled to participate in a probate proceeding filed by the 1st appellant in this appeal. The Will in respect of which the probate is sought for by the 1st appellant relates to Home School which is the subject matter of O.S.No. 3800/1989 pending on the file of the X Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City and in which the respondent in this appeal has half share and as such he is the co-owner of the school with late Miss. A.B. Madappa who is stated to have left a will in favour of the 1st appellant bequeathing her right, title and interest in the Home School. In O.S.No. 3800/1989, the learned X Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, has passed an order of temporary injunction restraining the appellants and their agents from interfering with the respondent’s (who is the plaintiff in the suit) right to peacefully manage, organise and participate in the day-to-day affairs and in the discharge of the functions as the sole Proprietor of the Home School till the production of the probate by the appellants.

4. In the light of the order passed by us today in O.S.A.No. 8/1990, an Administrator has been appointed to the Home School and the appellants herein are also permitted to deliver to the Administrator such suggestions as they deem it necessary in respect of the matters stated in the order relating to the administration of the Home School by the Administrator. Thus it is clear that though O.S.A.No. 8/1990 arises out of a probate proceeding and this appeal arises out of a suit for permanent injunction, but the subject matter of the suit and the subject matter of the Will are not different – the Home School is the subject matter in both. The parties are common to both the proceedings. Therefore, in such a situation, there is every likelihood of conflicting orders being passed relating to administration of the school by a Division Bench and by a Single Judge who will be seized of the matter, O.S.A.8/1990 and M.F.A. 2014/1989 respectively and such conflicting decisions are likely to result in miscarriage of justice and affect the very administration of the School. Therefore, in a case like this, if in the absence of an order of reference, a Division Bench directs M.F.A. No. 2014/1989 to be posted a long with O.S.A. No. 8/1990 and consequently, M.F.A.No. 2014/1989 has to be heard along with O.S.A. No. 8/1990, it will not be acting without jurisdiction as the subject matter of M.F.A. No. 2014/1989 is no other than the subject matter of the will and during the pendency of both the proceedings, it is necessary to pass an order ensuring proper administration of the School. Hence we are of the view that if a matter which is required to be decided by a Single Judge is closely connected with the matter which is required to be decided by a Division Bench, the Division Bench on hearing the matter is satisfied that in order to avoid conflicting decisions and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is necessary to hear the matter to be heard by a Single Judge along with the matter before a Division Bench, it is open to the Division Bench to direct such matter to be posted along with the matter before them and decide both the matters together. The jurisdiction exercised by a Single Judge or a Division Bench is the jurisdiction of the High Court and exercise of jurisdiction is ultimately intended to render justice to the parties. In such cases, there is no question of either lack or absence or want of jurisdiction, in such cases, it becomes necessary to hear both the cases together to effectively adjudicate the contra-versions between the parties and to do justice. Therefore, the power to call for such connected cases by a Division Bench even without an order of reference is inherent in the very jurisdiction itself which a Division Bench exercises. The criteria for this is that both the matters should require to be heard and decided together to avoid conflicting decisions and miscarriage of justice and as far as possible, both must be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim. Of course in such a case, it would not be open to a Single Judge to call for a matter to be decided by a Division Bench though connected with the one pending before him and decide both of them. In such a situation, a Single Judge has to refer the case to a Division Bench so that both the matters can be heard together. The power to club the cases, power to withdraw and power to transfer the cases are only intended to advance the cause of justice. Hence in a case like this, absence of an order by a Single Judge referring a case to a Division Bench does not affect the jurisdiction of the Division Bench to consider the case on merits along with the connected case. Hence the contention is rejected.

5. We are of the view that if the order of temporary junction passed by the trial Court which to appealed against, if allowed to operate in the terms in which it is passed, it becomes difficult for Dr. G.M. Mascarenhas and Mrs. Maria Mascarenhas or their Counsel to enter the School and deliver the suggestions to the Administrator. Therefore, even though I.A.No.I was dismissed as not pressed, we are of the view that the order dated 28-9-1989 passed in O.S. No. 3800/1989 by the X Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, shall have to operate in conformity with the order dated 12-4-1990 passed by us in O.S.A. No. 8/1990 because the subject matter of both the appeals is common viz., ‘The Home School’. We accordingly direct that the order dated 28-9-1989 passed by the X Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, shall operate in conformity with the order dated 12-4-1090 passed in O.S.A. No. 8/1990.