ORDER
9-1-1997:
1. This contempt proceeding has been instituted by Dr. H. Singh Khalsa, whom we shall hereinafter refer to as the ‘complainant’ and who was at the relevant time running Khalsa Medical and Educational Trust. The complainant claims that he is specialised in the field of Electropathy/Electro Homeopathy, which is an alternate system of medicine and it is his case that the Trust was running an institution by name Khalsa Institute of Medical Sciences for the purpose of doing research
and imparting education in this particular branch of medicine to persons who are desirous of obtaining such knowledge. The Trust and the Institute were granting certificates to the candidates who successfully complete their training and examination. It is the case of the complainant that he is fully and perfectly entitled to carry on this profession of his and according to him, the decision taken by the State authorities who were of the view that since this system of medicine is not recognised, that he has committed illegalities is unjustified. The authorities had earlier taken action against the petitioner and that is the background of litigation which culminated in the complainant obtaining an order from this Court because he apprehended further arrest and this Court on such a petition being filed, passed an order in favour of the complainant directing that in the event of his arrest, he should be released on bail on the sum of Rs. 5,000/-. Apart from this, the complainant also points out that while disposing of an earlier writ petition, this Court had directed the police authorities not to interfere with the complainant’s institution except in accordance with law. It is in this background that the incidents which have given rise to the filing of the present contempt proceedings took place.
2. The complainant alleges that the respondent, who at the relevant time was an Assistant Commissioner of Police, is alleged to have acted on the complaint filed by the Registrar, Karnataka Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Board, and arrested the complainant at the institute at 11.30 a.m. on 4-1-1995. The complainant has made very serious accusations against the respondent which we are briefly summarising. He contends that the respondent locked the institution which act was in breach of the earlier directions of the High Court not to interfere with the working of the institute and he thereafter contends that despite his having shown to the respondent the anticipatory bail order which had been passed in his favour, that the respondent is alleged to have contemptuously said that such Court orders are nothing but scraps of paper. It is alleged that the respondent is supposed to have refused to abide by the Court order and that consequently he did not release the complainant on bail as directed in that Court order. He further contends that he was retained in custody right upto 9.30 p.m. on the following night and that in the course of this operation the respondent took charge of the amount of Rs. 2,500/- which was on his person. According to the complainant, the respondent finally released him after taking a personal bond on the night of 5-1-1995. Prior to this, the respondent had demanded that the complainant pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- and he has also demanded that the complainant should pay Rs. 5,000/- per student in order to get out of the prosecution. In addition to this, the respondent is alleged to have threatened the complainant and to have warned him that he should not complain about anything that had happened in any Court and more importantly that he should withdraw the writ petition and any other legal proceedings which had been instituted by him. According to the complainant, on the next morning he was once again arrested by the Madiwala Police Station under the directions of the respondent and on this occasion, the complainant’s wife and some other
persons were also arrested and the accused were produced before the learned Magistrate who released them on bail. The complainant points out that he complained to the learned Magistrate that he had been arrested on 4-1-1995 and the learned Magistrate had recorded this fact in the order passed by him. After his release, the complainant addressed a detailed complaint containing the above allegations against the respondent to the police authorities, but it is his case that they refused to take note of that complaint. Thereafter, the complainant has instituted the present proceedings.
3. There is one crucial aspect of the matter on which the complainant’s Counsel has placed very strong reliance viz., the fact that the reports of the police action appeared in the press on 8-1-1995 and learned Counsel submitted that this was on the basis of a press release issued by the respondent’s office. The learned Counsel has obtained a copy of that press release and produced it before the Court and since there was a dispute with regard to the contents of this press release, this Court directed the department to produce an authentic copy of the same which completely tallies with the statement is paragraph 1 of that press release which proceeds to state that on 4-1-1995 the respondent along with his staff raided the complainant’s institute and that action has been taken by way of seizure of documents and that the complainant was also placed under arrest. We are not concerned with the remaining portion of that press release. The complainant’s learned Counsel has placed strong reliance on this document because he submits that it is a record emanating from the office of the respondent and he submits that it establishes conclusively that the complainant was arrested on 4-1-1995. This aspect of the matter assumes crucial importance because the respondent has stated that the State Government had taken the view that the course in question being an unauthorised one that the complainant was misleading and cheating the student community by holding out that they were being validly qualified in the course of medicine and by issuing certificates to them which were absolutely worthless insofar as they were not eligible to practise.
4. The respondent’s case is that the Government had issued directions to take action against the persons indulging in such illegal acts and that in pursuance of this direction he as a Police Officer was required to take charge of all incriminating documents from the institute. With this object in view, the respondent and his staff visited the institute on 4-1-1995 and seized a large number of documents and records under a panchanama. The respondent states that as indicated in that seizure memo investigations were not concluded on that day and since they worked till midnight and he desired that none of the records should either disappear nor should they be tampered with that he locked the premises for the night and that he resumed the investigations on the next day. He has produced the relevant records in support of his contention that the investigations concluded on the 5th and he states that being prima facie satisfied that the offences have been committed that he directed the arrest of the accused on the 6th. He denies having arrested the accused on either of the earlier days and it is his case that
the allegations made against him are a counter-blast by the accused because the respondent had taken action against him. He also contends that the accused had been indulging in serious illegalities and that he had not desisted from this course of action which was why it became necessary for the law enforcement authorities to proceed against him and he contends in his defence that the whole object of instituting this proceeding is in order to hit back at him and the department in an effort to pressurise them into desisting from taking action against the complainant. As regards the contents of the press release in question, the respondent contends that this was a general press release which broadly sets out the nature of the action taken by the department and that it was not issued by him personally which explains why the facts have not been accurately set out. He also contends that the action had commenced on 4-1-1995 and the accused was ultimately arrested only on 6-1-1995 and he points out that the press release was on 7-1-1995 after the series of events were concluded and it is his explanation that the reference to the date 4-1-1995 is misleading insofar as it should not be construed as being the date on which the accused was arrested. He admits that in the course of his investigations he had insisted on the presence of the accused both at the institute and at his office as he had to be asked about the records and had to be interrogated, but it is his contention that no formal arrest had been done by him. He has generally denied the charges against him, but he has also tendered an unconditional apology to the Court pointing out that in the event of the Court holding that any action on his part was incorrect or that he may have exceeded his authority at any stage, that he had done the same wilfully or defiantly and that consequently he should be pardoned.
5. The complainant’s learned Counsel contended that a prime facie case for framing a charge has been made out. He has taken us through the relevant documents which have been referred to by us and he has contended that the complainant has established beyond all doubt the correctness of the ingredients of his complaint. The learned Counsel has submitted that this is a case of seriousness because the respondent has shown absolute and utter contempt for the High Court order directing that the complainant be enlarged on bail in the event of his arrest and he submitted that this conduct has been aggravated by the language used by him in referring to the Court orders as mere scraps of paper. He has also submitted that the respondent has retained the complainant in custody for two full days without having been remanded and has not even produced him before the remand Court and that this indicates his high handedness and total disregard for the Court’s order. According to the complainant’s learned Counsel, the respondent was motivated by corrupt objectives insofar as he was out to coerce the complainant into agreeing to pay large sums of money and he has thereafter submitted that this aspect of the matter assumes gravest character because it is very clear that the objectives which motivated the commission of contempt were in fact down right corrupt. The learned Advocate has in this context placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Advocate-General, State of Bihar v M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and Another, wherein the Supreme Court had occasioned to refer to certain well-known observations with regard to the need to take a stringent view of incidents where gross contempt of Court is demonstrated. We consider it appropriate to reproduce those passages fully as they are most relevant for the purpose of our judgment. They are as follows:
“….. It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its
active manifestation against obstruction and outrage”. “The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope”.
8. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edition, Volume 9, paragraph 38), there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt. It is said:
“38. Abuse of Process in General.–The Court has power to punish as contempt any misuse of the Court’s process. Thus the forging or altering of Court documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the Court or the Court’s officers by deliberately suppressing a fact, or giving false facts, may be a punishable contempt.
Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting in bona fides or which are frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. In such cases the Court has extensive alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process by striking out or staying proceedings or by prohibiting the taking of further proceedings without leave. Where the Court, by exercising its statutory powers, its powers under rules of Court, or its inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not in general punish the abuse as a contempt of Court. On the other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt”.
6. We fully share the views expressed in these passages and we are also in agreement with the submission canvassed by the complainant’s learned Advocate that if the rule of law is to be respected and enforced and if the rights of citizens are to be safeguarded within the framework of that law, the Courts have to rigorously and ruthlessly deal with each and every incident where the Court orders are flouted and more so, in all those cases where a general contempt has been displayed in dealing with the Court directions. There can be no two opinions about the fact that any misplaced sympathy or leniency would undoubtedly subvert the administration of justice and that therefore the Courts ought not to show any softness in cases of this type.
7. The complainant’s learned Counsel relied on one of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Afzal and Another v State of
Haryana and Others, in support of his contention that if the respondent had accepted his fault and if he had tendered an unconditional apology in the first instance that the Court could have perhaps taken a lenient view, but he submitted that the entire defence taken up by the respondent is false and in this context he relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in this case wherein the Court came down in the strongest measure on a contemnor who had tried to justify and rejustify his indefensible position through false statements and false evidence. The complainant’s learned Counsel submitted that where the press note from the respondent’s own office conclusively establishes that the complainant had been arrested on 4-1-1995, that it was not open to the respondent to tender all sorts of false explanations and that therefore this is a case in which a charge must be framed and the respondent to be dealt with according to law.
8. Lastly, the learned Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Martin Burn Limited v R.N. Banerjee2, has pointed out that once a prima facie case has been made out, that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to frame a charge even if the respondent may ultimately be able to either explain away the position or get out of that charge. He submitted that this is not the stage at which any detailed evaluation of the matter should be done and that on the material placed before the Court there was no option except to frame charge against the respondent.
15-1-1997:
9. As indicated by us earlier, the respondent who was an Assistant Commissioner of Police at the relevant time has denied that he has committed breach of any of the relevant Court orders and in the pleadings he has also contended that it is wrong to allege that he treated the orders in question with contempt. He has also denied the allegations levelled against him which were to the effect that his conduct was motivated by financial considerations and more importantly, he has stated that as an officer of the department, he was only carrying out his normal functions as a Police Officer. It has been specifically pleaded that the course in question was not recognised and that consequently the authorities had lodged complaints pointing out that the accused was cheating students by conducting the course in question and that therefore action ought to be taken to stop the commission of this offence. He states that it was pursuant to this complaint that he had investigated into the matter and he does not dispute the fact that he had visited the institution on 4-1-1995 when he had taken charge of several documents and records. His case is that the only precautions which he took were in order to see that the documents and records were not tampered with as the investigation had not been completed upto midnight of 4-1-1995 and he states that this continued on the following day i.e., 5-1-1995. His case is that in the course of the investigation being carried out by him, that it
was necessary to secure the presence of the accused and to interrogate him with regard to various aspects of the case, but he contends that until this process was complete on 5-1-1995, that no decision had been taken to arrest the accused. He states that it was only on 6-1-1995 that the accused was arrested and produced before the Court in normal course. As regards the reference in the press release to the effect that the respondent and the police party under him had raided the institution on 4-1-1995 and placed the accused under arrest, the clarification put forward is that this was a general press release issued by the department on 7-1-1995 by which time the raids had been concluded and the accused had been arrested and the respondent contends that it would be incorrect to read that press release as being indicative of the fact that the accused had been arrested on 4-1-1995. Apart from the explanations that have put forward and the case made out that the respondent had not committed any act that would warrant action from this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, the respondent has specifically tendered an apology by pointing out that if at all this Court is of the view that he has acted incorrectly at any stage that he is sorry for the same as he did not intend any disrespect or defiance either to the Court or to Court orders.
10. The respondent’s learned Advocate submitted that this Court should view the position in which the respondent was placed vis-a-vis the complainant’s complaint and traced the background and history of the entire dispute. The learned Advocate submitted that despite the fact that all the concerned authorities had in clear and unequivocal terms professed that the course being conducted by the complainant was not a recognised one, that the complainant persisted in continuing to take on students at the institute to charge them for the course and to issue certificates for the same. The learned Advocate submitted that the complainant kept on litigating and virtually moving one Court after the other but did not cease his activities as a result of which the authorities were left with no option except to take firm steps in order to stop the same. The learned Advocate submits that the respondent who was the Police Officer entrusted with the unpleasant task of taking action against the complainant undoubtedly incurred the wrath and hostility of the complainant which is why the complainant has chosen to take the offensive against him by making all sorts of allegations. It is contended that if at all the desire of the respondent was to either arrest the complainant or to blackmail him or to extort money from him, that there was no reason why the respondent would have produced him before the learned Magistrate immediately after the arrest. The contention raised is that the present petition is motivated and the whole objective is in order to take the offensive and to attack the authorities who are enforcing the law with the sole objective of getting an unfair advantage insofar as the authorities concerned will be bullied into subjugation. The learned Advocate also pointed out that the press release which is being relied upon very heavily by the complainant is nothing more than a summary of the case as issued by the department, that it not exhaustive
nor does it report the full and correct time sequence and in any event, he contends that this document cannot form the basis of a virtual conviction against the respondent in a serious case of criminal contempt which entails penal consequences. The learned Advocate relied on the observations of Lord C.J. Rankin, wherein the salutary principle had been laid down that a Court should sparingly use the powers invested in it to punish for contempt and in cases where such action is sought, that a Court must proceed on the basis of two principles, the first of which is whether the misconduct is in fact wilful and signifies contempt for the authority or the law, the Judges or the Courts and secondly, by testing as to whether the act is harmful to the future administration of justice. It is true that a Court will be required to severely deal with all persons who interfere with the course of administration of justice and at the same time who indulge in conduct that undermines the dignity and status of the institutions that administer justice viz., Courts, and the persons who function in those institutions viz., Judges. The learned Advocate submitted that if the true complexion of the present case in fact boils down to a situation where the complainant is attempting to hit back at the respondent who took action against him and if everything alleged and denied is virtually word against word, that it is not a case in which this Court should even frame a charge against the respondent.
11. We are conscious of the fact that this proceeding is at the stage where the Court is required, in keeping with the rules to frame a formal charge against the respondent if a prima fade case of contempt has been made out. It is well-settled law that if on the face of it the contempt charge is sustainable which means that in the absence of being able to refute that charge, the respondent would head for a conviction, the Court would have no option except to frame charge and proceed. It does not ipso facto mean that in every case where a semblance of a contempt charge has been demonstrated that the High Court is required to mechanically frame charge and proceed with the matter. The whole object of asking the respondent to show cause is in order to assess whether after taking cognizance of what the respondent points out it could still be concluded that sufficient grounds exist to proceed. This is a slightly different aspect of the law from what obtains before criminal Courts where the charge is framed at the very inception on the basis of the material produced before the prosecuting authority and without taking into account the defence. That is the fundamental distinction between the two proceedings and it is therefore a misnomer to contend that merely because a prima facie case of contempt is made out in the petition and is supported by material that a charge must mechanically follow.
12. We cannot be oblivious of the background of the present case viz., the fact that the complainant was carrying on and that too persistently, courses in his institution and issuing certificates despite the fact that the authorities had more than once pointed out that the courses were not recognised. We are informed that the complainant had challenged
the aforesaid contention through a composite writ petition and we do not propose to comment upon the merits because it is only fair that the complainant be entitled to a full and fair opportunity of establishing before that Court whatever his contention is. The fact of the matter is that at the point when the respondent took action against the complainant, the contention of the concerned authorities and the State was that he was indulging in illegal activities and it was for this reason that the respondent was entitled under the law to proceed against the complainant and even to arrest him. Undoubtedly, the complainant was unhappy about this decision, particularly since he was at the receiving end. On the other hand, we have taken note of the fact that immediately after the complainant was released on bail i.e., on 8-1-1995 itself, he has lodged a comprehensive written complaint against the respondent setting out all the allegations which form the subject-matter of the present contempt petition. The short question is as to whether the material before us establishes that the respondent flouted any of the Court orders and that too knowingly. The first allegation against him is that the premises were locked on 4-1-1995 and the complainant’s learned Advocate submitted that the respondent was not authorised to do this as it constituted interference with the running of the institution. We have perused the records produced by the respondent and we find that in exercise of the lawful authority he had conducted a raid on the institution on that day which required him to examine various aspects of the case and that this task had not been completed on 4-1-1995 and if this was the position, it cannot be said that the respondent had either exceeded his authority or flouted the Court directions merely because the place where the records etc., were kept was locked up. This was the normal precaution which would have to be taken if the investigations were in progress.
13. The mere important aspect of the matter is the question as to whether the material establishes that the complainant was arrested on 4-1-1995 and wrongfully retained in custody until the night on 5-1-1995 when it is alleged that he was released on a personal bond. The records produced before us do not support any finding that the accused was formally placed under arrest on either of these two days. He was arrested on the 6th and produced before the Court which is a different matter, but the gravamen of the charge in the present proceeding is to the effect that the respondent had formally arrested the complainant on 4-1-1995 and that he was not released even on the next day. We have perused the affidavits that have been filed in support of this contention which undoubtedly attempt to corroborate the version of the complainant, but in our considered view, the affidavits from the persons who are closely connected with the complainant and who share his interests cannot be blindly accepted in a serious situation such as the present one. The arrest of a citizen is something that is reflected in the records and we have perused some of the records for the purpose of satisfying ourselves about this aspect of the matter and the records do not indicate that the complainant had been arrested on either of these two days. As
far as the press release is concerned, it is true that it is dated 4-1-1995 and it is true that a cursory and plain reading of the press release could create an impression that the complainant was arrested on that day. That however is too weak a circumstance in the light of the overall background of the matter to sustain a contempt charge. The press release in question did emanate from the respondent’s own department and the complainant’s learned Advocate would perhaps be justified in his submission that it must be very strictly construed and that the respondent cannot escape from the statements contained therein. What is overlooked in this contention is tbat the press release may emanate from the department but it has not originated from the respondent himself which makes all the difference. Having said this much, we need to however observe that on a very careful consideration of the material before us, we are left with little doubt about the fact that the evidence produced by the complainant goes dangerously close to sustaining the charge. It does fall short of the requirements of law very slightly which is why we refrain from proceeding further with the matter. We need to however reiterate again that there is considerable justification in the submission put forward by the complainant’s learned Advocate that this Court must take judicial notice of the fact that instances where Court orders are ignored or instances where they are defied and instances where Court orders are treated with total and abject contempt are legion and that in this background, the Court must, having regard to this more or less general state of affairs accept the position that the present respondent has also acted similarly. As far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, though the Court views the situation gravely and with a high degree of concern, one cannot go overboard and dispense with the basic requirement of ascertaining conclusively whether even in such a background that this particular respondent who is before the Court can be said to have been conclusively proven to be guilty on a contempt charge.
14. With this being the factual position of the record, we refrain from framing charge against the respondent and discharge the contempt notice. The petition to stand disposed of.
The complainant’s learned Advocate submits that there are certain other proceedings viz, Writ Petition No. 2803 of 1995 which have been instituted by the complainant wherein he has made a specific prayer for a direction to prosecute the respondent as also for purposes of claiming compensation for the illegal detention for two days which the complainant has complained of. The complainant’s learned Counsel submits that this proceeding should not come in the way of the other pending proceedings. We clarify that the observations and findings recorded by us in this order are confined to the present petition and have been made by this Court only for the purpose of disposing of the contempt proceedings. It shall be open to the complainant to agitate whatever other proceedings he has instituted on merits.