JUDGMENT
1. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the order dated 23.1.2002, passed in CWJC No. 2166 of 2001. The writ petitioner-appellant prayed for a direction to pay salary for the period 22.6.1995 to 5.10.1998 when she remained out of job i.e. from the date of termination till the date the same was revoked, hereinafter referred to as the ‘intervening period’; and for payment of salary from 5.10.1998 onwards when she joined after the order of termination was revoked.
2. The learned Single Judge rejected the prayer of the petitioner for payment of salary for the intervening period, on the grounds that the appellant accepted the joining without any objection and did not choose to challenge the order of non- payment of salary for the intervening period, for three years.
Regarding payment of salary from 5.10.1998 onwards, the learned Single Judge remitted the matter to the Vice Chancellor, Ranchi University to enquire from the college as to how many days she attended the college and pay the admitted salary which shall be subject to the decision as may be taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the recommendation of the committee of Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.C. Agarwal.
3. By order dated 19.6.2002 this appeal Was confined to the question of payment of the salary during the intervening period.
4. “The relevant facts in short are as follows.
5. During the process of converting various colleges attached to the universities, as constituent college, in the erstwhile State of Bihar, it was found that a number of employees who were employed illegally and in irregular manner, were agitating for their regularization/re-employment. A vigilance enquiry was made and universities decided to terminate the services of such employees.
6. Appellant was also served with a notice dated 31.3.1995 to show cause as to why her services be not terminated on the ground of fraud practiced by her. She filed show cause and by order dated 21.6.1995 her services were terminated.
7. Bihar Rajya Mahavidyalaya Sikchhak Avam Shiksheketar Karamchari Kalyan Mahasangh preferred a writ petition in the Hon’ble Patna High Court being CWJC No. 4021 of 1995 against the said apprehension regarding termination of services on the basis of the said report of vigilance enquiry. On 21st June, 1995 order of status quo was passed by the High Court pending the said writ petition. Ultimately the said writ petition was disposed of by Hon’ble Patna High Court on 31.1.1997 (1997 (1) PLJR 533 (Bihar Rajya M.S.A.S.K.K. Mahasangh v. State of Bihar). The High Court directed the universities to take steps in respect of regularization, in view of the observations made in the said judgment and till such steps were taken, the status quo existing on that day was to continue. Against the said judgment the State of Bihar moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Civil Appeal No. 6098 of 1997. The Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 12.10.2001 2002 (1) PLJR 85 (SC) State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya M.S.A.S.K.K. Mahasangh, directed for an enquiry to be held by Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.C. Agarwal on the terms of reference indicated in the said order. It was ordered by Hon’ble Supreme Court that during pendency of the appeal, the concerned employees who would be affected by the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, will get their full salary along with the admissible allowances and other benefits subject to any other order which may be made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
8. The Syndicate of the Ranchi University in its meeting held on 25/ 26.9.1998 decided that the teachers who were terminated after the order of status quo was passed by the High Court on 21.6.1995, be re-employed from the date of their termination but without wages for the intervening period, etc. Accordingly, a notification was issued on 4.10.1998 to the aforesaid effect i.e. reinstating the petitioner with effect from 22.6.1995 subject to the condition that she would not be entitled to any arrears for the intervening period and the said period will be treated as extraordinary leave without pay. There were other conditions in the said notification dated 4.10.1998 with which we are not concerned in this case.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no delay in objecting to non-payment of salary for the intervening period as she made representations in this regard and that she had no option that to accept the joining unconditionally.
10. Learned counsel for the University submitted as follows. The appellant joined without any objection and after three years she filed writ petition. She stated in the writ petition in a general way that representations were made but no representation was annexed with the writ petition. However, two representations dated 11.2.1999 and 4.8.2000 are annexed with this appeal, in which the appellant has generally and casually mentioned about salary for the intervening period while asking for salary after she joined. Thus the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that after accepting joining unconditionally, she filed writ petition after three years. Further the appellant has deliberately concealed that she filed a writ petition being CWJC No. 1782 of 1995(R), challenging her aforesaid order of termination. The said writ petition was admitted on 11.4.1996 but no interim order was passed staying the order of termination. The matter regarding regularization of newly converted colleges and other related matters are pending enquiry before Hon’ble M. Justice S.C. Agarwal. He pointed out that a show cause notice was issued to the appellant on 31.3.1995 as to why her services be not terminated and an FIR be not lodged for her fraudulent conduct in getting the employment as lecturer against un-sanctioned post at Mandar College with effect from 2.7.1985, although there were evidences to support that she was working in Millat Teachers Training College during that period. The appellant filed its reply on 15.4.1995 and in that circumstances the order of termination of the appellant was passed on 21.6.1995, i.e. on the day Patna High Court ordered maintaining the status quo. In the said order of termination it was found that the appellant was shown as a temporary lecturer in Mandar College and she fraudulently got the alleged appointment against an un-sanctioned post with effect from 2.7.1985 although she was working in other college during the period. She did not work nor was paid any salary at Mandar College prior to January, 1991. Therefore, in November 1986 when the Mandar College was taken over as constituent college of the university she was not working in Mandar. College. Thus it was found that her claim that she was working in Mandar College prior to the cut-off date i.e. 30.4.1986 was completely false and fraudulent and was only made for the purpose of claiming regularisation.
11. Learned counsel for the University, lastly submitted that the entire matter is now pending enquiry before Justice S.C. Agarwal Committee, and that in the aforesaid background the order of re-employment/re-instatement was passed without salary for the intervening period, and the same was in consonance with the provisions contained in Clause 28(1) of the Ranchi University Statute.
12. Mr. Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Broja Ganguly Nath and Anr., and submitted that the appellant had no bargaining power when she was offered re-employment after remaining out of service for three years, to object to the said condition regarding non-payment of salary for the intervening period. He also relied on a judgment reported in AIR 1979 SC 75 Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Their Employees etc. and submitted that it is a normal rule that back wages should be paid on the reinstatement. He also relied on Clause 28(2) of Ranchi University Statute for this purpose.
13. We are convinced that a case of reinstatement of a workman can be equated with the case in hand, where the reinstatement/re-employment was made on the premises that the appellant and others were terminated after the order of status quo was passed by the Patna High Court. We may notice here that the aforesaid Civil Appeal was filed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the year 1997 and the said order of re-employment of the petitioner was passed on 4th October, 1998 Le. during the pendency of the litigation. We are also not convinced that the appellant objected to the non-payment of salary for the intervening period, in her purported representations after she accepted joining unconditionally. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is justified in observing that the appellant did not choose to challenge the aforesaid part of the order for more than three years after she accepted joining on 5.10.1998, unconditionally.
14. In the facts and the circumstances, noticed above, we find that there was nothing wrong with that part of the order of reinstatement of the petitioner by which she was not given arrears of salary from the date of her termination, while treating such absence as extraordinary leave without pay.
15. In the result, we uphold the order of learned Single Judge under appeal and dismiss the appeal. No costs.