JUDGMENT
Arun B. Saharya, J.
(1) This is a second appeal arising out of order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing the landlord’s application for warrant of possession under section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and setting aside order of the Additional Rent Controller dismissing objections of the tenant against it.
(2) The premises on the first floor of the building were let out to Ved Prakash for a period of four years by virtue of permission granted by the Controller under section 21 of the Act by an order made on 16th November 1973, on a joint application by the landlord and the tenant. It was stated in the application, inter alia, that the landlord was occupying another portion on the same floor; that the son of the landlord was abroad, and, he was not likely to return for the next about four years; so, the landlord did not require the premises in the rear portion of the building for that period; and that the tenant required the same for residential purposes for a period of four years only.
(3) After expiry of the period of four years, the landlord applied for warrant the possession of the premises. Notice of the application was issued to the tenant. He filed a reply which was treated as objections. He denied that he was a tenant. He pleaded, inter alia, that he never occupied the premises, that he never paid rent for it, and, that the premises were in occupation of his uncle Loku Ram since 1970 on the basis of an initial lease for a limited period of 11 months, and for a further period of eleven months on the basis of permission obtained from the Controller under Section 21 of the Act, and that Loku Ram remained in possession inspite of permission sought for the third time being refused by an order made on 1st August 73 by the Controller. Loku Ram was also allowed to file objections on an application made by him for that purpose In his objections he raised pleas similar to those of Ved Prakash. He further alleged that permission of the Controller and lease obtained in favor Ved Prakash was merely camouflage since the Controller refused to grant permission for the third time in his name, that he was the real. tenant, that fraud was played on the Controller in obtaining permission to let out the premises to Ved Praksh, and that landlord was not entitled to warrant of possession under section 21 of the Act.
(4) The Controller found, on the basis of documentary and oral evidence, that Loku Ram actually surrendered his tenancy on 5th April 1973 as evidenced by Exhibit Dh 1 which was also corroborated by testimony of various witnesses who were examined in the case; Loku Ram was not the tenant; that Ved Prakash was the real tenant, he and the landlord made a joint application for grant of permission under section 21, he appeared before the Controller and made a statement on the basis of which permission was granted, he executed a registered lease deed, he occupied the premises’ and that he paid rent for some time for the use and occupation of the premises. Objections filed by Loku Ram and also by Ved Prakash were dismissed’ The Controller gave three reasons for dismissing objections of Ved Prakash: First, as he neither alleged in his objections nor did he say a word in evidence about fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining permission under section 21 of the Act; secondly, that the earlier permission obtained to let out the premises to Loku Ram was irrelevant; and, thirdly, that the permission granted could not be vitiated merely because son of the landlord has not come back to India.
(5) On separate appeals by Ved Prakash and Loku Ram, the Tribunal concurred with the Controller in finding that Loku Ram surrendered his tenancy in April 1973, that he was not the tenant, that Ved Prakash was the real tenant and dismissed objections of Loku Ram; but accepted the appeal of Ved Prakash and reversed the order of the Controller dismissing his objections, and held as follows :- “IN the instant case, the respondent concealed the material fact from the Court and it vitiated the permission. Had he stated before the court that he had been letting out “the premises to Loku Ram for a limited period again and again, the court would have come to a conclusion that the premises were available for letting with him for indefinite period and not for a particular period and that he was not entitled to the permission prayed for.”
On this conclusion, the Tribunal found that the landlord cannot invoke the provision of section 21 to recover possession of premises from Ved Prakash and dismissed the application of the landlord by which he prayed or an order to be put into vacant possession of the premises.
(6) Neither Loku Ram nor Ved Prakash appealed against order of the Tribunal nor did they file any cross-objections in the present appeal. Thus, all findings against them became final. It is no longer in controversy that Loku Ram surrendered tenancy in April 1973, he is not the tenant, permission granted by the Controller to let out the premises for a limited period of four years to Ved Prakash was not a camouflage to benefit Loku Ram or to get over refusal by the Controller to grant permission for the third time to let out the premises to him; that permission was granted by the Controller to let out the premises to Ved Prakash on admissions made by him on facts stated in the joint application made by him and the landlord for that purpose; and that Ved Prakash was the real tenant, he executed a registered lease deed, occupied the premises, used them for his residence, and paid rent for it for sometime.
(7) The only question which survives is-Whether information about the landlord letting out the premises earlier to Loku Ram twice for a period of eleven months each time could lead to an inference that from the very beginning the premises were available for letting out indefinitely, and that failure to disclose this information vitiated permission granted by the Controller in the present case. The question has to be answered in the negative now in view of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, and Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, . In the first mentioned case, the Supreme Court found that grant of three leases from 1974 through 1977 to 1980 prior to the permission granted in that case under section 21 of the Act did not lead to an inference that the property was available for being let out for an indefinite period. It was pointed out that such an assumption can be justified if there was positive material to indicate that from the very beginning there was never any intention on the part of the landlady to occupy the premises herself. In the present case also, there is no such material on record. Supreme Court explained that it is perfectly possible for the owner of a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find that for certain reasons he is unable to occupy the premises forthwith himself but that he may do so later in not very distant future and observed : “IT is not always that a man can plan his life ahead with any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in the circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear sighted vision into the future. The circumstances may justify his envisioning his need for the premises two to three years later, and therefore applying for premission under S. 21 of the Act to let out the premises accordingly. And yet, thereafter on the expiry of that period he may find that the circumstances have changed and his use of the premises t as now to be postponed by another few years. In cases as this the mere fact that the owner has let out the premises after obtaining permission under S. 21 of the Act for a limited period, and thereafter on the expiry of that period has found it necessary to obtain permission to let out the premises again for another limited period cannot necessarily lead to the inference that from the very beginning the premises were available for letting out indefinitely.”
(8) In the latter case of Inder Mohan Lal (supra) Supreme Court discussed various earlier, decisions under section 21 of the Act. After analysing the principles in Nagindas Ramdass v. Dalpatram lchharam, and S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, it was observed in para 20 at page 253 : “IT is not necessary to state under section 21 the reasons why the landlord did not require the premises in question for any particular period. Nor is there any “presumption that in all cases the tenants are weaker sections. The presumption is, on the contrary, in favor of sanction, it is he who challenges the statement and the admission of the landlord or the tenant has to establish facts as indicated in Nagindas”s case.”
(9) In view of these recent decisions of the Supreme Court, impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and it cannot be said that the landlord concealed material facts which vitiated the grant of permission under section 21 on the assumption that had he stated that the premises had been let to Loku Ram for a limited period on two previous occasions the Court could have come to the conclusion that premises were available for letting for an indefinite period.
(10) In any event, as correctly pointed out by the Controller in the present case, Ved Prakash neither alleged in his objections, nor did he say in his statement on oath that permission for grant of tenancy for a limited period was vitiated by fraud on concealment of information regarding the premises being let out to Loku Ram previously. Further, the tenant did not challenge validity of the permission during the term of the limited period of tenancy. Objections to it raised after expiry of the term can be rejected as an afterthought as pointed out by the Supreme Court in J.R. Vohra v. M/s India Export House Pvt. Ltd. .
(11) In these circumstances, the order of Tribunal is reversed, the order of the Additional Rent Controller is confirmed, objections of the tenant are rejected, appeal of the landlord for being placed in vacant possession of the premises is allowed, and, an order is hereby made to place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises by evicting the tenant or any other person whosoever may be in possession within one month from today. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.