JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 20-3-2001 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 14920 of 2000 whereby and whereunder the writ petition was dismissed. The prayer in the writ petition filed by the appellant reads thus:
“To issue any appropriate writ, order or direction, preferably a writ in the nature of mandamus declaring the orders of the 4th respondent in R.C.No. 1063/2000-D dated 29-7-2000 in refusing to appoint the existing president and the managing committee of petitioners society as a committee of persons-in-charge as per Government G.O.Ms.No. 172 dated 24-7-2000 issued by the 2nd respondent and appointing the 5th respondent as person-in-charge to the Elakolanu PACCS Ltd., Elakolanu, Rangampeta Mdl, E.G. Dist, as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction, unconstitutional and violation of the principles of natural justice and also the provisions of Act 7 of 1964 and the provisions of G.O.Ms.No. 172, dated 24-7-2000, and direct the respondents to continue the petitioners existing committee as committee of persons-in-charge until fresh election will be conducted.”
2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioners were elected as members of the Elakolanu Patnam PACCS Ltd. Their term had expired. By reason of the order impugned in the writ petition dated 29-7-2000, they were not appointed as persons-in-charge. The 5th respondent, by reason of the said order itself, was appointed in the said Co-operative Society. It is not in dispute that prior to the impugned order, the competent authority passed an order disqualifying the appellants as members of the Managing Committee under Section 21-AA of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short ‘the Act’) on the allegations of having made appointments contrary to the provisions of the Act. An appeal has been filed by the appellants against the said order.
3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants before us, as also before the learned single Judge, adverted to a question that as the said order of disqualification stood suspended, the appellants were entitled, as a matter of course, to be appointed as persons-in-charge.
4. Before answering the said question, it would be expedient to peruse the observations of the learned Single Judge which read as follows:
“In the analysis above, I find no error in the order impugned warranting interference in the writ petition. However, if the appeal preferred by the petitioners to the Co-operative Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act is determined prior to the fresh elections to the Co-operative Society in question and as a result of the appellate decision, the petitioners are totally exonerated from the allegations which have led to their disqualification under Section 21-AA, then and in such a case the 4th respondent shall reconsider the issue under Section 32(7) of the Act for appointment of all or some of them, as would appeal to him in his discretion, as persons-in-charge of the Society. If any such orders appointing the petitioners or any of them are passed by the 4th respondent under Section 32(7) of the Act, it would be open to the 4th respondent to revise the earlier order appointing the 5th respondent as person-in-charge.”
5. Mr. G. Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would submit that having regard to the fact that the appellants herein had been elected and they, on the purported order of disqualification passed against them, have been placed under suspension, there is no reason as to why they should not be appointed as persons-in-charge. Section 32(7) of the Act reads as follows:
(a) If there is no committee or in the opinion of the Government or, the Registrar, it is not possible to call a general meeting for the purpose of conducting election of members of the committee, the Government, in respect of such class of societies as may be prescribed and the Registrar in all other cases may appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding six months and the Government may, on their own and the Registrar with the previous approval of the Government, extend, from time to time, such period beyond six months, so however that the aggregate period include the extended period if any, shall not exceed three years.
(b) The person or persons so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Government or as the case may be, of the Registrar and subject to such instructions or directions as they may issue, from time to time, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or any officer of the society and to take all such actions as may be required in the interest of the society.
(c) The Registrar may fix the remuneration payable to the person or persons so appointed. The amount of such remuneration and other costs if any, incurred in the management of the society shall be payable out of the funds of the society.
(d) The Registrar may at any time, shall at the expiration of the period of appointment of person or persons so appointed, arrange for calling of a general meeting for the election of a new committee in such manner as may be prescribed. The person or persons so appointed shall cease to manage affairs of the society (SIC)n the new commitee entering upon its office.
6. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly show that even assuming that the appellants herein do not stand disqualified, the same by itself cannot be a ground for their appointment as persons-in-charge. A writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued provided the writ petitioner establishes the existence of a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the respondent. Section 32(7) of the Act does not envisage that only the erstwhile members of the co-operative society would be appointed as persons-in-charge Section 32 (7) confers discretion upon the appropriate authority to appoint persons-in-charge. It is not the case of the appellants that such a discretion has been arbitrarily exercised or is abused by the respondents herein. In such a situation, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the plea of malice-in-law, the Court shall not issue any directions which run contrary to the discretionary power conferred upon the appointing authority in terms of the aforementioned clause.
7. In the absence of any express provision in the statute, it cannot be said that the appellants had a legal right to be appointed as persons-in-charge even if it be assumed that they were not disqualified.
8. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus as prayed for by the appellants herein. The writ appeal, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.