JUDGMENT
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Mr. C. Praveen Kumar, Counsel representing the appellant-accused No. 1 and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mohammad Usman Sahid.
2. Mr. C. Praveen Kumar, the learned Counsel representing the appellant-A1 would submit that the 2nd charge against A1 to A4 is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) and A2 to A4 were found not guilty and they were acquitted but, however, Al was found guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of ten years. The learned Counsel also would submit that the 3rd charge against Al to A4 is for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, I.P.C. and also it was held to be not proved and all the accused were acquitted, and likewise, the 1st charge against Al to A4 is for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, I.P.C., and A2 to A4 were found not guilty of the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and they were acquitted, but Al was found guilty and sentenced to undergo three years imprisonment. The learned Counsel would submit that none of the ingredients had been satisfied and even as per the medical evidence, it is clear that it is a case of 100% burn injuries and the dying declarations alleged to have been made either to M.R.O. or to the Head Constable (Exs. P-3 and P-6 respectively) would not inspire any confidence and hence, the conviction and sentence imposed are liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the evidence available on record and had pointed out that in a case of this nature, where the medical evidence reveals 100% burns injuries, benefit of doubt may have to be given to the accused. The learned Counsel had also drawn the attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the learned fudge in this regard, and he also placed reliance on certain decisions and passages from Modi’s Medical jurisprudence, Lyon’s Medical jurisprudence and K.S. Narayana Reddy’s medical jurisprudence.
3. On the contrary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mohd. Usman Sahid would contend that inasmuch as the time available, in between the time when the deceased was admitted into the hospital and the death which had occurred, being very limited, there was no possibility to the investigating agency to get dying declaration recorded through a Magistrate and hence, the dying declaration recorded by the Head Constable or dying declaration recorded by the M.R.O., cannot be doubted in any way and, definitely, reliance can be placed on the same. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor had placed reliance on certain decisions to subsantiate his submissions.
4. This criminal appeal is filed by Al as against the judgment in Sessions Case No. 595 of 1995 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Karimnagar. The learned Sessions Judge tried Al to A4 for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and recorded acquittal as against A2 to A4, but convicted A1 and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. As far as the 2nd charge under Section 306, I.P.C. is concerned, A2 to A4 were not found guilty, but Al was found guilty and he was sentenced to suffer ten years imprisonment. All the accused were found not guilty as far as the 3rd charge under Section 304-B, I.P.C. is concerned,
5. The case of the prosecution is that the accused harassed one Madhunamma (hereinafter referred to in short the deceased), wife of Al, subjected her to cruelty and drove her to commit suicide by setting fire to herself. P.W. 1 is the father, P.W. 2 is the elder sister of the deceased. Al is the husband and A2 and A3 are the parents-in-law and A4 is the sister-in-law of the deceased. The deceased and Al loved each other, as a result of which, the deceased became pregnant and Al refused to marry her, but at the intervention of police, Al married the deceased. Subsequent thereto, they were blessed with a son. But Al to A4 were harassing the deceased for not getting any dowry and were demanding her to get Rs. 25,000/- and then, the deceased had gone to her parents’ house and stayed there for five or six months and again on the intervention of police, Al had taken her back, but continued the harassment alleging that she had illicit intimacy with someone else and the boy was not his son, and as the deceased was unable to bear the said harassment, on 1.12.1994 at about 6.30 a.m., she committed suicide by setting fire to herself. On 1.12.1994. at about 9.30 a.m., P.W. 9 H.C. 382 of Ramagundam Police Station recorded the statement of the deceased (Ex. P-6) at the police station as she was brought to the police station by A2 and another. On the strength of this statement, he registered a case in Crime No. 74/94 under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and issued Ex. P-7 F.I.R. and recorded the statement of the deceased under Section 161, Cr.P.C. (Ex. P8). Then, on his requisition P.W. 5-M.R.O.. Ramagundam recorded the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. P-3) at Government Civil Hospital. P.W. 10 Sub-Inspector of police had taken up further investigation and on receiving the death intimation, he altered the Section of law and issued Ex. P-9 alteration memo. Then, on his requisition, P.W. 8 conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.W. 4 and Ex. P-2 is the inquest report. On requisition, P.W. 6 conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and opined that the cause of death was due to shock, due to extensive burns. Ex. P-5 is the post-mortem report. P.W. 12- Assistant Superintendent of Police, Warangal took over the investigation from P.W. 10 and had visited the scene of offence and issued scene of offence Panchanama and prepared the rough sketch (Ex. P-10). During the course of investigation, P.Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and recorded their statements, and on 17.12.1994 he arrested Al to A4 at their residence and on completion of investigation, after receiving the relevant documents, he had laid a charge-sheet.
6. The defence of the accused is one of total denial. In support of prosecution, P.Ws. 1 to 12 were examined and Exs. P-l to P-10, Exs. X1 and X2 were marked. P.W 3 had not supported the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile.
7. Ex. P-6 reads as hereunder:
“On inquiry stated that I am resident of Lingapur. I fell in love with my villager by name Elkaturi Thirupathi and married. After some days I blessed with one son. My husband developed unnecessary suspicion that someone else was responsible for the birth of my son, and used to beat me and my son every day. Accordingly, today on 1.12.1994 at 6.30 a.m. my husband beat my son unnecessarily for which I vexed up with life and committed suicide by pouring kerosene on my body and set fire. My entire body has been burnt.”
Ex. P-3 read as hereunder:
1. Name of the victim : Elkaturi Madhunamma.
Husband's name :Elkaturi Thirupathi
Caste : Harijan
Age : 20 years.
Residence : Lingapuram
2. Sex : Female
3. Whether married : Married four years ago.
4. Whether burn injuries are : Yes.
there?
5. How burn injuries caused? : By developing unnecessary suspicion,
since four years and also beat me and
my son.
6. Date, time and place of : On 1.12.1994 I poured kerosene on my
incident body and set fire at Lingapur village.
7. Who set fire you? : Due to harassment by my husband by
developing suspicion since four years
by beating me and my son I vexed up
with life and I poured kerosene and set
fire.
8. Who set fire you or : I myself set fire to my body.
(occurred due to accidentally)
9. Whether you have got enmity : My husband developed unnecessary
with anybody suspicion on me, but I have no enemies
at all.
No doubt, it was recorded in Ex. P-3 that the patient is conscious and in good mental condition and statement given by her in his presence and above 90%.
8. The case of the prosecution is that Al and the deceased fell in love with each other and they had sexual relationship, in consequence of which, she became pregnant and after she became pregnant, she demanded Al to marry her and he refused to marry her and the pregnancy was observed by her sister P.W. 2 and others and when they questioned her as to who was responsible, she revealed that Al promised to marry her and made her pregnant. The evidence of P.W. 2 is that the deceased and Al loved each other and deceased became pregnant and when they questioned Al, he refused to marry the deceased and also told them to do whatever they like and thereupon P.Ws. 1 and 2 and other family members of the deceased went to the police station, Peddapalli and complained against Al and then Al was called and questioned by A.S.I, of police and Al admitted his relationship with the deceased and agreed to marry her and, thus, the marriage was celebrated at Venkateshwara Swamy Temple at Peddapalli. P.W. 2 also deposed that a few days thereafter, the deceased gave birth to a son and after the birth of the child, Al left the deceased and the boy at the house of her parents and went away and the deceased was again taken to his house and all the accused started harassing the deceased insisting to bring dowry of Rs. 25,000/- and the deceased was again sent back to her parents’ house and she lived there for about five or six months. P.W. 2 further deposed how they had approached the police and what had transpired in this regard in detail.
9. P.W. 1 who is the father of the deceased, deposed about the love affair of the deceased and Al. He also deposed as to how she became pregnant and how Al refused to marry her and the family members approached Peddapalli Police Station, and the celebration of marriage, and the couple being blessed with a son. In cross-examination P.W. 1 admitted that the parents of Al also attended the marriage and they blessed the couple and the marriage was celebrated in a temple and the police did not attend the marriage. This witness also deposed that he went to the house of the accused only twice when his daughter was living there. But no doubt, he had denied the suggestions that there was no ill-treatment at all. This witness also deposed that his daughter had a paralysis stroke and she was brought to his house and she was treated and recovered and this witness denied that the deceased was having stomach ache. The evidence of P.W. 2 appears, to be in a more detailed form when compared with the evidence of P.W. 1. On the strength of certain admissions made in the cross-examination by P.W. 1, submissions at length were made by the learned Counsel representing the appellant that the very story that there were threats from the times and hence, the celebration of marriage appears to be doubtful.
10. P.W. 3 was declared hostile and this witness deposed that it is not true to say that she stated before the police as in Ex. P-l.
11. P.W. 4 had attested Ex. P2-Inquest report and this witness deposed that they opined that the death was due to burns.
12. P.W. 5-M.R.O. is an important witness and he deposed that on 1.12.1994 at 9.30 a.m., he received a requisition from Ramagundam Police Station, to record dying declaration of Madhunamma and immediately he proceeded to the Ramagundam Government Civil Hospital, and recorded the statement of the deceased Madhunamma and that he put questions to her and recorded her answers and the same was recorded in the presence of the doctor and he read over the contents of the statement and the same had been admitted by her to correct and that he obtained her thumb mark on it and the patient was conscious when he recorded her statement (Ex. P-3). Her further deposed that the doctor also endorsed on the statement. He further deposed that he sent Ex. P3 to the Magistrate, at Sultanabad through a covering letter Ex. P-4. No doubt, this witness deposed that it is not true to say that the deceased was under paralysis stroke and was unable to give any dying declaration. He deposed that except himself and the doctor, none others were present at the time of his recording dying declaration (Ex. P-3).
13. P.W. 9 is the Head Constable and he had recorded the statement of the deceased (Ex. P-6) at Police Station, Ramagundam, on the strength of which, he registered it as a case in Crime No. 74 of 1994 under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and issued FIR (Ex. P-7) and he had also recorded the statement of the deceased (Ex. P8) under Section 161, Cr.P.C. Exs. P3 and P6 recorded by the witnesses already had been referred to supra.
14. P.W. 6 who is the Deputy Civil Surgeon had deposed that on 3,12.1994 on requisition of Ramagundam Police Station, this witness and Dr. V. Laxman conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased Madhunamma on 3.12.1994 at 10.00 a.m. He deposed that the entire body got involved in burns, and 100% burns are ante mortem in nature. He further deposed that the post-mortem examination was completed at 12.00 noon and the cause of death was due to shock due to extensive burns of 100%. He further deposed that the time of death was 24 to 36 hours prior to P.M. examination and he issued Ex. P5-post-mortem certificate.
15. P.W. 7 who is the Deputy Civil Surgeon, was on duty on 1.12.1994 and this witness deposed that a patient by name Madhunamma was referred by the Medical Officer, Ramagundam with 100% burns and he had examined her and admitted her in Female Surgical Ward and on the same day, at 5.30 p.m., the patient expired. He deposed that the dead body was kept in mortuary and police were intimated.
16. P.W. 8 who is the Mandal Revenue Officer, Karimnagar, held inquest over the dead body of the Madhunamma on requisition of police in the presence of P.W. 4 and others and that they opined that the death was due to burns and he prepared inquest report (Ex. P-2) attested by P.W. 4 and others.
17. The evidence of P.W. 9-Head Constable already had been referred to, who had recorded Ex. P-6.
18. P.W. 10 is the Sub-Inspector of Police and he deposed that he had taken up investigation and at 6.00 a.m., he received information on VHF set that Madhunamma expired at District Headquarters Hospital, at Karimnagar and issued alteration memo altering Section of law from 498-A, I.P.C. to Sections 306 and 304-B, I.P.C. and issued Ex. P-9 alteration memo, and that he visited Karimnagar Headquarters Hospital and filed a requisition to conduct inquest over the dead body of the deceased and during inquest, he examined P.Ws. 1, 2, 7 and others. He also deposed that the further investigation was taken by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Godavarikhani and he assisted him.
19. P.W. 11 is the Deputy Civil Surgeon, Ramagundam and this witness deposed that the deceased Madhunamma complained that she has burnt herself by pouring kerosene on her and that on examination, she was conscious, she was crying due to burns and that 95% to 100% of her body was ingulfed with burns and this witness in cross-examination no doubt deposed that the deceased told him that her husband was accusing her of her immorality and hence, she had done that act. He deposed that within 15 minutes he informed to the police. Ex. X-2 is the intimation to the police. He further deposed that the M.R.O. recorded the statement of the deceased in his presence. Police also recorded her statement in his presence. However, he denied the suggestion that the deceased was not in a position to speak, due to paralysis and this witness also denied the other suggestions. This witness further deposed that he made an endorsement on Ex. P3 that the patient was conscious.
20. P.W. 12-Assistant Superintendent of Police is the Investigating Officer and he had deposed about the details of investigation, observation of scene, preparation of rough sketch-Ex. P-10 and verification of the investigation conducted by S.I. of police and re-examination of witnesses and also examination of P.W. 3 and Narsaiah and recording their statements. He deposed that on 17.12.1994, with the assistance of S.I. of police, Ramagundam and Staff, he arrested all the four accused in A1’s residence in Lingapur and sent them for remand, on 18.12.1994 and on 27.7.1995, he filed the charge-sheet. This witness further deposed that P.W. 3 stated before him as in Ex. P1. This witness was cross-examined.
21. On the strength of the evidence, findings had been recorded and the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also had been taken in aid and ultimately A1 alone was convicted for an offence under Sections 498-A and 306, I.P.C, and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three years for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and further sentenced to undergo for a period of ten years for the offence under Section 306, I.P.C. But, however, the learned Judge directed the sentences to be run concurrently and also set-off to be given in accordance with law.
22. The principal submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the medical evidence is very clear that it is a case of 100% burns and in such a case, it is highly doubtful whether she could have made the statements either Ex. P-3 or Ex. P-6, and hence, on the strength of such statements, conviction cannot be recorded. Reliance was placed on certain passages relating to the aspect of burns in medical jurisprudence of K.S. Narayana Reddy and at page 353, it is stated as follows:
“Deep (fifth and sixth degrees, Dupuytren); In this, there is a gross destruction not only of the skin and subcutaneous tissue, but also of muscle and even bone. Nerve-endings are also destroyed, and as such the burns are relatively painless. The appearances are similar to those of the second degree, but in a more severe form. The burnt part is completely charred.”
For degree of burns, reliance was also placed on Lyon’s jurisprudence, wherein the learned Author stated degrees of burns:
For medico-legal purposes, injuries caused by the application of heated substances to the body may be divided into–
(1) Burns producing mere redness.
(2) Burns causing mere vesication.
(3) Burns causing the death of the part injured. And to these three classes may be added a fourth, viz.
(4) Burns caused by the external application of corrosive substances.
On the aspect of dermoepidermal burns, the learned Counsel also placed reliance on Modi’s jurisprudence in relation to 3rd degree, 4th degree, 5th degree and 6th degree wherein the learned Author had stated that–
Third degree: This refers to the destruction of the cuticle and part of the true skin, which appears horny and dark, owing to it having been charred and shrivelled up. Exposure of nerve-endings gives rise to much pain. This leaves a scar, but no contraction, as the scar contains all the elements of the true skin.
Fourth degree: The whole skin is destroyed. The sloughs which form are yellowish-brown and parchment-like, and separat out from the fourth to the sixth day, leaving an ulcerated surface, which heals slowly forming a scar of dense fibrous tissue with consequent contraction and deformity of the effected parts. The burns are not very painful as the nerve-endings are completely destroyed.
Fifth degree: This includes the penetration of the deep fascia and implications of the muscles, and results in great scarring and deformity.
Sixth degree: This involves charring of the whole limb including the bones and ends in inflammation of the subjacent tissues and organs, if death is not the immediate result. This degree, it may be noted, is not necessarily related to danger to life. Charring of a limb may be compatible with recovery, once the initial shock is overcome.
The learned Counsel also would maintain that the present case on hand would fall either under 4th degree or 5th degree and hence, the possibility of making such a statement being conscious, by the deceased is highly doubtful.
23. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on State of Punjab v. Gian Kaur, , wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the case of dowry death, dying declaration and credibility thereof, held that:
“Autopsy report stating that deceased-wife had sustained 100’% burn injuries all over body and both thumbs were burnt and thumb impression on dying declaration however had clear ridges and curves and the evidence of Prosecution being inconsistent, it was held that the accused entitled to benefit of doubt.”
Reliance was also placed on S.E. John Chakravarthi v, State of A.P., 2003(2) ALD (Crl.) 224 (AP), and also Shaik Mahaboob Basha v. State of A.P., II (2003) DMC 91=2003(2) ALD (Crl.) 818 (AP). In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1173, while dealing with the dying declaration recorded by police officer during investigation and admissibility and evidentiary value thereof held at paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows:
“There were two dying declarations of Ram Singh–one oral and the other written–which was recorded by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 28 on 12.12.1975. The oral dying declaration was made to P.W. 11 Tara Singh. Neither of the dying declarations was relied upon by the High Court because he had named Baldev Singh also. We may also add that although a dying declaration recorded by a Police Officer during the course of the investigation is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act in view of the exception provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is better to leave such dying declarations out of consideration until and unless the prosecution satisfies the Court as to why it was not recorded by a Magistrate or by a Doctor. As observed by this Court in Munnu Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh, , the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration during the course of investigation ought not to be encouraged. We do not mean to suggest that such dying declarations are always untrustworthy, but, what we want to emhasize is that better and more reliable methods of recording a dying declaration of an injured person should be taken recourse to and the one recorded by the Police Officer may be relied upon if there was no time or facility available to the prosecution for adopting any better method.
9. There is a dying declaration of Teja Singh Ext. PFF recorded by Harcharan Singh, P.W. 10. He was the Head Constable of the Police Post Chheharta. At the direction of the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 28 he recorded the statement of Teja Singh at the spot. This dying declaration has been relied upon by the High Court It could not be rejected on the ground that it was recorded by a Police Officer as he was in a critical condition and no other person could be available in the village to record the dying declaration of Teja Singh. But we find that there is a difficulty in relying upon this dying declaration. Jetha Singh and Ram Singh were attacked by the appellants after having raised a Lalkara at the house of Teja Singh to murder them. Nobody actually saw them murdering either of them. The place where the said two persons were murdered was about a furlong away from the house of Teja Singh. Teja Singh in his statement recorded by P.W. 10 Ext. PFF which is also signed by the Assistant Sub-Inspector stated–
‘Dalip Singh, Kundan Singh, sons of Vir Singh and Binder, son of Dalip Singh, who are from our brotherhood have caused injuries to me and the male and female members of my family and my elder brother Jetha Singh with kirpans, and spears on account of dispute over the property of Jetha Singh. They have murdered Jetha Singh and Sucha Singh by inflicting injuries to them.’
The dying declaration seems to be otherwise truthful but for the fact that it could not be within the knowledge or vision of Teja Singh that Jetha Singh was murdered by the appellants. His saying so in the dying declaration makes his statement a bit doubtful. It is, therefore, safe to leave out of consideration this dying declaration. It is important to remember that if the dying declaration both oral and written of Ram Singh are discarded so also the dying declarations of Teja Singh, then no direct evidence remains on the record in regard to the murder of Jetha Singh and Ram Singh by the appellants. In all probability they had committed the murder of these two persons also because after having raised the Lalkara they went towards the field where Jetha Singh and Ram Singh were. But in absence of a direct evidence on the point and also for want of conclusive chain of circumstantial evidence, legally it is not possible to hold that the three appellants were responsible for committing the murder of Jetha Singh and Ram Singh.”
24. No doubt, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed strong reliance on Charipalli Shankararao v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad, , and would contend that in view of the short proximity of time, there was no possibility of securing the presence of a Magistrate for recording dying declaration and in such a case the dying declarations recorded either by police or by M.R.O. can be definitely relied on. In a case of Charipalli Shankararao (supra), no doubt, the Apex Court while dealing with the recording of dying declaration by Head Constable in the facts of the said case observed that where an attempt was made to procure the services of a Magistrate for recording dying declaration and Magistrate was not available, in such a case, police is competent to record the same.
25. The evidence available on record would go to show that at 9.30 a.m., she was brought to the hospital and she died at 5.30 p.m. It is not the case of the prosecution that there was no availability of Magistrate to be requisitioned for the purpose of recording the dying declaration. Strong reliance was also placed on State of Karnataka v. Sheriff, I (2003) DMC 450 (SC)=I (2003) CCR 194 (SC)=I (2003) SLT 522=2003 SCC (Crl.) 561 wherein the Apex Court held that:
“Dying declaration need not necessarily be recorded by a Magistrate and statements of deceased recorded by Police personnel in hospital though a Magistrate could have been called to record the same that itself is not sufficient to discard the dying declarations, if the same is found to be otherwise trustworthy.”
26. As per the evidence available on record, there was possibility for securing the presence of the Magistrate in view of the fact that certain hours were available in-between. Be that as it may, a careful reading and scrutiny of Exs. P-3 and P-6 would go to show that, in substance, the alleged statements appear to be the same. Now, the question, which may have to be decided is whether on the strength of such statements, the conviction recorded be sustained or liable to be set aside.
27. No doubt, some evidence was let in, in this direction to show that Ex. P-3 was recorded when the deceased was conscious. It is a case of 100% burn injuries and it is definitely doubtful whether she was capable of making any statement at all. When two views are possible, that which would be in favour of the accused to be preferred is the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence.
28. In the light of the evidence available on record, the conviction and sentence recorded as against the appellant/A1 so far as it relates to Section 306, I.P.C. is concerned definitely cannot be sustained and hence, the appellant/Al is entitled for an acquittal in relation to the charge under Section 306, I.P.C.
29. The next question with which this Court is left with is the charge under Section 498-A, I.P.C. The evidence of P.W. 1 father-in-law of A1 is to the effect that as his daughter did not get any dowry, all the accused were harassing her and beating her often. A careful scrutiny of evidence of P.W. 1 would go to show that no other details had been mentioned except making the statement. It is pertinent to note that it is a case of love affair and the very version of the prosecution is that she became pregnant even before marriage and on intervention of police, the marriage was celebrated though Al was initially reluctant. The evidence of P.W. 2 is that the accused were harassing the deceased alleging that she has not brought the dowry and demanded her to get Rs. 25,000/- as dowry and they sent the deceased to her parents’ house and the deceased was there for about five or six months, and when they went to Ramagundam Police Station, complained against the accused and then Al came and took away the deceased to their house on intervention of police and after taking her to their house, again the accused started harassing her for not bringing Rs. 25,000/- as dowry. P.W. 2 had also deposed that the accused were also harassing the deceased that the boy was not born through Al and they were ill-treating her and they also accused the deceased of having illicit intimacy with someone and begot the child. This witness also deposed that 3 or 4 days prior to death of the deceased, the accused were beating her every day for bringing the dowry and then, she committed suicide. Except this evidence, there is no other evidence available on record even in relation to the charge under Section 498-A, I.P.C.
30. As already referred to supra, P.W. 1 had not specified any details. P.W. 2 no doubt had given certain particulars and except this interested testimony of these witnesses, no other evidence is available on record. It is also pertinent to note that an acquittal was recorded as against the other accused in relation to the charge under Section 498-A, I.P.C. These witnesses deposed about the harassment by all the accused. When the version of the prosecution had been disbelieved and findings had been recorded in relation to the other accused relating to this charge, this Court is of the considered opinion that some benefit may have to be extended to the present appellant-Al too. It may be that the episode commenced as a love affair and she became pregnant and it may be that initially, the appellant-Al was reluctant, but however, reconciled with the situation and married her, inasmuch as no independent evidence is available and on the strength of this evidence of P.W. 2 just supported by the evidence of P.W. 1, the conviction under Section 498-A, I.P.C. also cannot be sustained and hence, the appellant/A1 is entitled for an acquittal relating to the charge under Section 498-A, I.P.C.
31. For the reasons recorded above, the conviction and sentence imposed as against the appellant/A1 under Sections 498-A and 306, I.P.C. are hereby set aside and the appellant/Al is entitled for acquittal.
32. In the result, acquittal is recorded against the appellant/Al and, accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed. Bail bonds shall stand cancelled.