PETITIONER:
EMC STEEL LIMITED, CALCUTTA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1991
BENCH:
SAWANT, P.B.
BENCH:
SAWANT, P.B.
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
CITATION:
1991 SCR (1) 381 1991 SCC (2) 101
JT 1991 (1) 447 1991 SCALE (1)206
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14D-Landlady-A
widow's right to seek eviction of tenant for own residence.
HEADNOTE:
This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the
Delhi High Court whereby the High Court gave the widow-
landlady the benefit of section 14-D of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 and accordingly granted her the
Possession of the premises in question.
Before this Court it was inter alia contended on behalf
of the appellant that the relief under section 14-D was
available only to a landlady who had become a Widow after
the premises were let out either by herself or her husband.
it was further contended that if the benefit given by
section 14-D was allowed to be availed by all widows, they
may make a business of it.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: (1) The legislature w anted to give a special
privilege to the landlady who is a widow notwithstanding
whether the Premises were let out before or after she
became widow. Such conferment of special benefit on a widow
landlady is permissible even under the provisions of Article
15(3) of the Constitution which is an express exception to
the provisions of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of that Article. A
widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable person in our society and
requires special protection. [383H-384B]
(2) Section 14-D can be availed of by the widow only
once. That is a sufficient guarantee against the abuse of
the privilege granted by the section. Secondly, she has to
prove her bona fide need for the occupation of the Premises
in question for her own residence like any other landlord.
Thirdly, the provisions of section 19 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act come to play in her case also, when the order
for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for
occupation as residence is made in her favour. [384C]
382
JUDGMENT:
Dr. P. P. Kapur v. Union of India & Ors. Delhi High
Court, Civil Writ No. 2686 of 1989 overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 710 of
1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.5.1990 of the
Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 3257 of 1989.
G.L. Sanghi, Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma,
Ravinder Nath, V.B. Saharya, P.K. Jain and Prem Malhotra
for the Appellants.
Y.S. Chitale, T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, R.L. Jain, S.K.
Tredal, Kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave and Ashok Mathur
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SAWANT, J. SLP (C) No. 12 1 11 of 1990.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal raises the question of the validity and
interpretation of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). In
companion matters, we have already pronounced upon the
validity and interpretation of Section 14-B of the Act.
Hence, it is not necessary to discuss in this judgment the
points which are common to both sections. These points will
be deemed to have been concluded by the said decision.
3. The only point which remains to be dealt with and is
peculiar to Section 14-D is whether to claim possession of
such premises under the said Section, the landlady must
become a widow after the premises are let out either by
herself or her husband.
4. Section 14-D of the Act reads as follows:
“14-D. Right to recover immediate possession of
premises to accrue to a widow-(1) Where the
landlord is a widow and the premises let out by
her (2) or by her husband, are required by her for
her own residence, she may apply to the Controller
for recovering the immediate possession of such
premises.
383
(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section
(1) has let out more than one premises, it shall
be open to her to make an application under that
sub-section in respect of any one of the
premises chosen by her.
5. The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is
to provide for the control of rents and evictions, and of
rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the lease of
vacant premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union
Territory of Delhi. The original Act came into force on
February 9, 1959 having received the assent of the
President on December 31, 1958. The working of the
Act disclosed certain deficiencies, inconveniences and
hardships both to the landlords and the tenants. Their
associations, therefore, made representations. Various
committees and commissions also recommended amendments
of certain provisions of the Act. Considering the grievances
of the landlords and the tenants as well as the
recommendations of the committees/commissions, the Act was
amended in 1988 with the object of (a) rationalising the law
by bringing out the balance between the interests of
landlords and tenants, (b) giving a boost to house building
activity and maintaining the existing housing stock in a
reasonable state of repairs, (c) reducing litigation
between landlords and tenants and of ensuring expeditious
disposal of disputes between them. By this amendment
Sections 14-B to 14-D were added. The object of Section
14-D is obvious. It is to assist a vulnerable and needy
section of the Society to recover possession of the premises
as expeditiously as Possible and without the usual trials
and tribulations.
6. We have already held in the accompanying
judgment that classified landlords such as the widow
landlady under Section 14-D can apply for possession of the
premises under the respective provisions even if the
premises are not let for residence. It is not necessary to
repeat the said discussion in this judgment. Section 14-D
makes no distinction between the landladies who become
widows before and after letting out of the premises. It
merely says that where the landlady is a widow and the
premises are let out by her or by her- husband, are required
by her for her own residence, she may apply to the
Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
such premises. The language of the section in that respect
is very clear. The premises might have been let out by her
as a widow or they might have been let out by her husband or
even by herself before she had become widow. The
legislature wanted to give a special privilege to the
landlady who is a widow notwithstanding whether the premises
were let out before or after she became widow. Such
conferment of special benefit on a
384
widow-landlady is permissible even under the provisions of
Article 15(3) of the Constitution which is an express
exception to the provisions of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of
that Article. It states that nothing in the said Article
shall prevent the State from making any special provision
for women and children. A widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable
person in our society and requires special protection. We
further see no merit in the contention that if the benefit
given by Section 14-D is allowed to be availed of by widows,
they may make a business of it. There is no warrant for
such apprehension. For, in the first instance, the right to
recover possession under Section 14-D can be availed of by
the widow only once. That is a sufficient guarantee against
the abuse of the privilege granted by the section.
Secondly, she has to prove her bona fide need for the
occupation of the premises in question for her own residence
like any other landlord. Thirdly, the provisions of Section
19 of the Act come into play in her case also, when the
order for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement
for occupation as residence is made in her favour.
In this view of the matter, we find no substance in
this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
Writ Petition No. 902 of 1990
7. In the view that we have taken above, it is not
necessary to admit this writ petition. The authorities
under the Act while disposing of the applications under
Section 14-D will have to abide by this decision and not by
the decision of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 2686
of 1989 in the matter of Dr. P.P. Kapur v. Union of India &
Ors. which was brought to our notice and stands overruled.
R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.
385