JUDGMENT
Russell, J.
1. Notwithstanding the very ingenious arguments of Mr. Coyaji in this case, we are of opinion that we mint uphold the conviction and sentence.
2. On the first point with regard to misjoinder of charges, Section 2 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says: “For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in Sections 231, 235, 236 and 239.” And Section 235 says: “if, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.” And I would refer to illustration (f) to Section 235 which I read. It seems to us that we must have regard to the words of the Section itself, “One series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction.” In the present case the accused is charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt with the view of extorting information and that is a “transaction,” and in continuation of and pursuance to the same transaction he was charged with and found guilty of making a series of false entries so as to attribute another cause for the death of the deceased Ganu. It appears to is, looking to the plain words of Section 235 and illustration (f), that these charges distinctly come within that section, and, therefore, the first point urged by Mr. Coyaji has no basis, and must, therefore, fail.
3. With regard to the second point, in our opinion, that also must fail. He was charged with causing grievous hurt to the deceased for the purpose of extorting information under Section 331. That was one charge. Then he was charged with another offence under Sections 239 and 114 of which the latter is the abetment section. The Jury were unanimously of opinion that he was guilty of the main offence, viz. causing grievous to the deceased under Section 331. If that is so, it is apparent from what the Judge in express terms inferred from their unanimous verdict that they must be taken to have found the accused personally guilty under Section 331, and, under these circumstances, it was not necessary for them to go into the other question whether he abetted the offence. Under these circumstances, we think, the conviction and sentence are correct and mint, therefore stand.
Batchelor, J.
4. I agree with what my learned brother has said and need only add a word on the third point which was taken by Mr. Coyaji for the appellant, and which is that the appellant had been prejudiced by the joinder of four charges even although that joinder was not technically a misjoinder so as to invalidate the entire trial. Assuming that there was no misjoinder, and I agree with try learned brother that there was none, then I am of opinion that there was also no prejudice in the admission of evidence as to the fabrication of false reports by the appellant with a view to screen the offence committed by him upon the deceased Ganu: for it appears to me that whether there was a separate charge or not in regard to the fabrication of these false reports, their fabrication would have been a most material and important piece of evidence on behalf of the prosecution on the charge under Sections 330 and 381. I may, perhaps, add that we have now discussed all the points which were taken in this appeal, and that Mr. Coyaji in-introducing his arguments stated quite correctly that since there was a unanimous verdict of the Jury against him, he was not in a position to address us on any question of fact. I agree that the conviction and sentence should be maintained.