High Court Kerala High Court

Esakki Amma Saraswathy vs Thankamoni on 24 July, 2007

Kerala High Court
Esakki Amma Saraswathy vs Thankamoni on 24 July, 2007
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RSA No. 649 of 2007()


1. ESAKKI AMMA SARASWATHY, AGED 61,
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. THANKAMONI, D/O.ESAKKI AMMA, AGED 48,
                       ...       Respondent

2. OMANA, D/O.ESAKKI  AMMA, AGED 46 YEARS,

3. CHELLAPPAN CHETTIAR KRISHNAN CHETTIAR,

4. ESAKKI AMMA PONNAMMA, AGED 56 YEARS,

5. CHELLAPPAN CHETTIAR ARJUNAN CHETTIAR,

6. ESAKKI AMMA RAJAMMA AGED 52 YEARS,

7. ESAKKI AMMA MEENAKSHY, AGED 50 YEARS,

8. CHANDRAN, S/O.CHELLAMMA, AGED 35 YEARS,

9. THANKAMANI, D/O.CHELLAMMA, AGED 33 YEARS

10. THANKACHAN, S/O.CHELLAMMA, AGED 31 YEARS

                For Petitioner  :SRI.G.P.SHINOD

                For Respondent  : No Appearance

The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR

 Dated :24/07/2007

 O R D E R
                 M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR, J.
                   ...........................................
               R.S.A.Nos. 649 & 650                 OF 2007
                  ............................................
         DATED THIS THE 24th                 DAY OF JULY, 2007

                              JUDGMENT

Appellant is the plaintiff in O.S.108 of 1986 and first

defendant in O.S.540 of 1986, instituted by respondents 1 and 2

the defendants in O.S.108 of 1996. O.S.108 of 1996 was filed

seeking a decree for partition and O.S.540 of 1986 was filed

seeking a decree for declaration of title and possession of the

plaint schedule property. The case of appellant was that plaint

schedule property originally belonged to Late Chellappan

Chettiar and first respondent is his wife and on the death of

Chellappan Chettiar it devolved on first respondent appellant

and respondents 2 to 9 and they are in the joint possession and

enjoyment of the property and while Chellappan Chettiar was

alive he obtained kudikidappu right as per order in O.A.2608/70

and that right devolved on his wife and children and therefore

plaint schedule property is to be divided into ten equal shares

and one such share is to be alloted to the appellant ignoring the

alienations made. Respondents 1 to 3 in their written statement

contended that deceased Chellappan Chettiar was a

kudikidappukaran in the plaint schedule property and it was he

RSA 649 & 650/07 2

who constructed the building and he purchased the kudikidappu

right as per the purchase certificate granted in O.A.2608/70 and

respondents 2 and 3 obtained title to the property as per Ext.A2

sale deed dated 21.12.1970 executed by Chellappan Chettiar in

favour of first respondent and therefore respondents 2 and 3 are

the absolute owners of the property and the property was

mutated in their name and it is not in the joint possession of the

appellant or other children of deceased Chellappan Chettiar and

therefore appellant is not entitled to the decree for partition

sought for. In O.S.540 of 1986, respondents 2 and 3 sought a

decree for declaration of their title to the plaint schedule

property under Ext.A3 sale deed executed by Chellappan

Chettiar in their favour. It was contended that appellant is in

possession of two rooms as permitted by Chellappan Chettiar

and she is in permissive occupation of the room and as

respondents 2 and 3 have title to the property, they are entitled

to get a decree for declaration of their title and have a

mandatory injunction.

2. Learned Munsiff jointly tried both the suits. On the

evidence of Pws 1 to 3, DW1 and Exts.A1 to A4, learned Munsiff

found that under Ext.A1 the kudikidappu right was purchased by

Chellappan Chettiar and Ext.A1 will not enure to the benefit of

his wife and children and Chellappan Chettiar under Ext.A2 sold

RSA 649 & 650/07 3

the property in favour of respondents 2 and 2 and therefore

respondents 2 and 3 have title to the plaint schedule property.

Learned Munsiff declared the title and also granted a decree for

injunction restraining appellants and other defendants from

interfering with their possession. A decree for mandatory

injunction was also granted directing appellant and other

defendants to put respondents 2 and 3 in possession of the

building in their possession finding that they are only in

permissive possession of the property. Consequently O.S.108 of

1986 was dismissed. Appellant challenged the decree and

judgment in O.S.108 of 1986 in A.S.281 of 1997 and the decree

and judgment in O.S.540 of 1986 in A.S.282 of 1997 before

District Court, Thiruvananthapuram. Learned Additional

District Judge, on reappreciation of evidence, confirmed the

findings of learned Munsiff and dismissed both the appeals. It is

challenged in these second appeals.

3. R.S.A.649 of 2007 is filed against the concurrent decree

and judgment in O.S.108 of 1986 and R.S.A.650 of 2007 is filed

against the concurrent decree and judgment in O.S. 540 of

1986. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant was heard.

The argument of the learned counsel is that the courts below on

the evidence should have found that Ext.A1 purchase certificate

was obtained by Chellappan Chettiar not on his independent

RSA 649 & 650/07 4

right but for the family and therefore Ext.A1 shall enure the

benefit of all family members including the appellant and

therefore under Ext.A2 sale deed respondents 2 and 3 did not

derive independent title and hence the courts below should have

granted a preliminary decree dividing the property as it devolved

on the legal heirs on the death of Chellappan Chettiar . Learned

counsel also argued that in any case when appellant is found to

be in possession of a portion of the building exclusively and the

only case alleged by respondents 2 and 3 was that they were

permitted by Chellappan Chettiar to occupy, the occupation

thereafter cannot be tagged on after the right obtained by

respondents 2 and 3 under Ext.A2 and if at all the remedy is only

to seek a decree for recovery of possession and suit for

mandatory injunction is not sustainable.

4. On hearing learned counsel appearing for appellant, I do

not find any substantial question of law involved in the appeals.

As far as Ext.A1 certificate of purchase whereunder the

kudikidappu right was purchased by Chellappan Chettiar is

concerned, there is no evidence to prove that kudikidappu right

purchased was not that of Chellappan Chettiar but that of the

family. Courts below, on appreciation of evidence, found that it

was Chellappan Chettiar who was the kudikidappukaran and

under Ext.A1, the kudikidappu right was purchased by

RSA 649 & 650/07 5

Chellappan Chettiar . During the lifetime of Chellappan Chettiar

himself, under Ext.A2 he transferred his rights in favour of

respondents 2 and 3. In such circumstances, finding of courts

below that Ext.A1 will not enure to the benefit of appellant or

other legal heirs of Chellappan Chettiar, is correct and appellant

is not entitled to claim a decree for partition, as if the property

belonged to Chellappan Chettiar, when he died. It is more so

when under Ext.A2, Chellappan Chettiar earlier transferred the

property in favour of respondents 2 and 3. Therefore courts

below rightly dismissed O.S.108 of 1986.

5. The argument of learned counsel appearing for

appellant is that as appellent is found to be in exclusive

possession of a portion of the building, without seeking a decree

for recovery of possession, courts below should not have

granted a decree for mandatory injunction. The argument is that

what was contended by respondents 2 and 3 was that appellant

was permitted by Chellappan Chettiar, the father to occupy it

and if at all there was a permission, it cannot be tagged on with

the title obtained by respondents 2 and 3 and therefore they

should have filed a suit for recovery of possession.

6. The appellant instituted O.S.108 of 1986 seeking a

decree for partition of the entire property including the building

for which a decree for recovery of possession was granted, on

RSA 649 & 650/07 6

the contention that she is in joint possession of the property

along with respondents 2 and 3. There was no case that she was

in exclusive possession of the property as is now canvassed.

Therefore the legal position is that her possession can only be a

permissive one as found by the courts below. If that be the case,

the relief granted by courts below for mandatory injunction is

perfectly legal and warrants no interference.

7. As no substantial question of law is involved in the

appeals, appeals are dismissed. But in view of the fact that

appellant has been residing in the building, she is granted three

months time from today to surrender the vacant possession of

the building.

M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR, JUDGE

lgk/-