JUDGMENT
Anjani Kumar, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner-employer by means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has challenged the order dated 6th March, 1999 passed by the respondent No. 1 (Annexure ‘3’ to the writ petition) whereby the matter which was referred to and was pending before the Labour Court, Ghaziabad has been transferred to Industrial Tribunal-V, Meerut.
3. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has argued that in view of the provisions of Section 6-G read with Section 4-k (Proviso) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, order impugned in the present writ petition was passed on the representation filed by the respondents-Union of the workmen when the matter was pending before the Labour Court. Sri Chaturvedi relied upon the opening sentence of Section 6-G (1) of the Act, which provides that State Government may by order in writing for reasons to be recorded withdraw and transfer a proceeding……..”. The contention of Sri Chaturvedi is that perusal of the order demonstrates that no reasons have been recorded for transfer. Perusal of the impugned order negates the aforesaid argument of Sri Chaturvedi. Reasons have been given in the order, which says that since an application has been filed by the Union of the Workmen and on the aforesaid application after consideration, the State Government was of the opinion that the mattar may be transferred. There is sufficient compliance of Section 6-G(l) of the Act.
4. Sri Chaturvedi has further argued that Section 6-G(1) is pari materia to Section 33B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central). He relied upon the decisiosns of Hon’ble Supreme Court, reported in 1990 (60) FLR 785, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court after discussing the different High Courts’ decisions has held that the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had-been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. He, therefore, submitted that it was necessary for the State Government that before passing the impugned order, the State Government ought to have afforded opportunity to the petitioner-employer. He relied upon the following observations of the aforesaid judgment “We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Government was misled by the representation of the workman. In the result the appeal was allowed and the order of the transfer was quashed.
5. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, the order of the respondent No. 1 dated 6th March, 1999 (Annexure ‘3’ to the writ petition) cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed.
6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the respondent No. 1 dated 6th March, 1999 (Annexure ‘3’ to the writ petition) is quashed. The State Government is directed to pass appropriate order in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it.