BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 21/12/2005 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.K.MISRA AND THE HONURABLE MR.JUSTICE AR.RAMALINGAM Writ Appeal (MD) No.67 of 2005 Ex.Rect(MP)A.Madurai Veeran ... Appellant No.7779447K vs. 1.Union of India, rep.by its Secretary to Government Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. 2.The CCDA (Pensions), Grants-3 Section (Group V), Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh. 3.The Record Officer, Office of the Records, Sena Police Corps, Abhilekh Karyala, Corps of Military Police Records, Bangalore. 4.The Commandant, Corps of Military Police, Try Centre, Bangalore-25. ... Respondents Appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 05.01.2005, made in W.P.(MD)No.742 of 2004. !For Appellant ... Mr.M.Thirunavukkarasu ^For Respondents ... Mr.K.M.Vijayakumar, ACGSC. :JUDGMENT
P.K.MISRA,J
The present appeal is filed against the order of the learned Single
Judge, dismissing the Writ Petition No.742/2004 solely on the ground of want of
territorial jurisdiction. The entire order of the learned Single Judge is
extracted herein.
“The respondents against whom the relief is sought for are 1 to 4. None
of them are within the jurisdiction of this Court. Clause 2 of the Article 226
of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
“The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders of writs to
any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territoires within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence
of such person is not within those territories.”
In the light of the above said clause, this writ petition is dismissed for
want of territorial jurisdiction. No costs.”
2.The only question to be considered in this present appeal is as to
whether the learned Single Judge was correct in dismissing the writ petition
only on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
3.Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India has already
been extracted in the order passed by the learned Single Judge and it is not
necessary to extract the said provisions again. A bare perusal of the aforesaid
clause makes it clear that notwithstanding the fact that the seat of Government
or authority or the residence of the person against whom writ application is
filed is not within the territory of the concerned High Court, the High Court
may exercise the jurisdiction if the cause of action wholly or in part arises
within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
4.In the present case, even though the learned Single Judge has not
given any reason, it can be assumed that the learned Single Judge has proceeded
on the footing that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench). The only question to be
decided in the appeal is as to whether any part of the cause of action has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai
Bench).
5.For the purpose of finding out whether any part of the cause of
action has arisen within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, obviously
the averments made in the writ petition are to be considered. In the present
case, the appellant has filed the writ petition for issuing a writ of
certiorarified mandamus by calling for the records from the file of the third
respondent, namely the Record Officer, Office of the Records, Sena Police Corps,
Abhilekh Karyala, Corps of Military Police Records, Bangalore, and to quash the
order dated 16.02.2004, and consequently to direct the respondents to grant
disability pension to the petitioner with effect from 24.07.1996. The other
respondents in the writ petition are the Union of India represented by the
Secretary, the CCDA (Pensions), Grants-3 Section (Group V), Allahabad and The
Commandant, Corps of Military Police, Try Centre, Bangalore-25.
From the assertion made in the writ petition, it is apparent that
the petitioner was selected for the post of corps Army Military Police on
23.02.1996. While the petitioner was undergoing training, he was medically
discharged on 24.07.1996 under medical category “EEE” for substandard vision.
The Medical Board fixed the disability pension at 20%. However, the third
respondent rejected the petitioner’s claim of disability pension by letter,
dated 19.11.1997. The petitioner had made a representation to the third
respondent, but no reply was received. Thereafter, the petitioner also sent
many representations to other respondents on various dates. Ultimately, by
order dated 16.02.2004, his claim has been rejected by the third respondent.
Again the petitioner filed two representations on 27.02.2004 and 12.04.2004 to
the respondents which are yet to be disposed of. Copies of the representations
dated 25.01.1998, 31.01.2004, 27.02.2004 and 12.04.2004 are available in the
typed set. All such representations have been sent from Virudhunagar within the
territorial jurisdiction of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, which is the
place of residence of the petitioner. The impugned order dated 16.02.2004 is
addressed to the petitioner in his Virudhunagar address. Even the original
letter issued in November, 1997 rejecting the disability pension is addressed to
the petitioner in his Chennai address within the State of Tamil Nadu.
6.These correspondences between the petitioner and some of the
respondents clearly indicate that part of the cause of action has definitely
arisen within the territory of Madras High Court, within Tamil Nadu and
subsequently within the territory of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court. In our
opinion, it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action had arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench). Our
aforesaid conclusion receives considerable support from several decisions,
including that of the Supreme Court in 2000(7) SCC 640 – (Navinchandra
N.Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra).
7.In law, the expression ’cause of action’ means a bundle of facts
which the parties are required to prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a
judgment in his favour. It is not the relation whatsoever to the defence which
may be set up by the defendant. In ILR (1889) 16 Cal. 98 (Chand Kour v. Partab
Singh), it was observed:
“In determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the
court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking upon an inquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court
has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on
the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof
being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.”
8.The aforesaid observation was cited with approval in the decision
of the Supreme Court referred to above. It is of course true that in the
Supreme Court decision question relating to quashing of FIR was in issue and the
High Court had decided that since the complaint had been filed at Shillong, the
Bombay High Court did not have any jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however,
observed:
“27. …. the High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made
in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya
to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not
take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at
Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and
pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares.
The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for
consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the
matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted
earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the
writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High
Court.”
9.In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas observed:
“34.When the Constitution was framed, Article 226, as it originally stood
therein provided that
“every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs…”.
Some of the decisions rendered by different High Courts during the earlier
years of the post-Constitution period have given a wider perspective regarding
the jurisdiction of the High Court and pointed out that a High Court can
exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of tribunals or authorities
situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such tribunal or
authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights
of persons residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High
Court [vide K.S.Rashid Ahmed v. Income Tax Investigation Commission – AIR 1951
Punj. 74, M.K.Ranganathan v.Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. AIR 1952
Mad.659, Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Dy.Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs
AIR 1952 Ass. 91.] It was Subba Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
who observed in M.K.Ranganathan case that:
“If a tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories
affecting such rights it may reasonably be construed that the authority or the
tribunal functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and,
therefore, is amenable to its jurisdiction.”
35.But a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Election Commission,
India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao – (AIR 1953 SC 210) thus:
“The power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the
Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run
beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority
to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the
territories subject to its jurisdiction.”
36.It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated
Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which clause
(1-A) was added to Article 226. That clause was subsequently renumbered as
clause (2) by the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment. Now clause (2) of
Article 226 reads thus:
“226.(2) the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence
of such person is not within those territories.”
37.The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the article was
to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Sake
Venkata Subba Rao and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the
decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts under
Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction
in relation to the territories within which “the cause of action, wholly or in
part, arises” and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is
outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The
amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs
issued by different High Courts.”
10.Before the aforesaid decision was rendered, the question of
territorial jurisdiction has been well considered by a Constitution Bench
decision of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu – (1994) 4 SCC 711. In the said decision, the Supreme Court had indicated
that the High Court should not transgress into the jurisdiction of other High
Court merely on the ground of some insignificant event took place within the
territorial limit of the High Court.
11.We do not think the present case can be characterised one which
falls into the category indicated in the Supreme Court decision. As observed by
Justice Thomas, in such matters liberal view is to be taken, but, at the same
time, the Court should be cautious enough not to transgress into the territorial
jurisdiction of other High Court.
12.We find that almost under similar circumstances, a Division
Bench of the Orissa High Court in a decision reported in 2000(II) Orissa Law
Reviews 126 – (Janardan v. Union), after referring to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and the
decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 1289 (State of Rajasthan and others v.
M/s.Swaika Properties and another), came to the conclusion that the court had
territorial jurisdiction. In the said case, the writ petitioner, a permanent
resident of Orissa, had been appointed as a Constable in the Central Industrial
Security Force and at the relevant time
he was posted in the Central Industrial Security Force Unit at Ranchi within the
State of Bihar. On the basis of the disciplinary proceedings held at Ranchi, he
was removed from service. He had filed an appeal before the appellate
authority, which was again outside the territory of Orissa. After removal from
service, the petitioner had to come back to his permanent place within Orissa.
The order of dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority was communicated
to the petitioner at his permanent residence within Orissa. Thereafter a writ
application was filed before the Orissa High Court and the Division Bench of
the High Court, over-ruling the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for
CISF regarding territorial jurisdiction, held that Orissa High Court had also
jurisdiction as the order of the appellate authority was received by him within
the State of Orissa. The Division Bench observed that the two decisions of the
Supreme Court referred to above did not lay down that as a general proposition
service of notice can never be considered as part of the cause of action, but on
the peculiar facts of the case held that the courts lacked jurisdiction.
13.In our view, the observations made by the Orissa High Court are
also equally applicable to the present case, where most of the correspondences
relating to rejection of disability pension and subsequent rejection of
representation had been made within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras
High Court.
14.In the present case, the petitioner is seeking payment of
disability pension. It would be indeed impossible for him to go to Bangalore or
New Delhi claiming the relief which now he is claiming if a hyper technical
view of the matter is taken.
15.For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and hold that the
Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) has the territorial jurisdiction to deal with
the matter. Since the writ petition was dismissed only on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction, the matter is now directed to be placed before the
learned Single Judge to consider the writ petition on merit. It is needless to
point out that we have not at all examined the merits of the contentions raised
in the writ petition.
gb.
To:
1.The Secretary to Government,
Government of India,
Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.
2.The CCDA (Pensions),
Grants-3 Section (Group V),
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.
3.The Record Officer,
Office of the Records,
Sena Police Corps,
Abhilekh Karyala,
Corps of Military Police Records,
Bangalore.
4.The Commandant,
Corps of Military Police,
Try Centre, Bangalore-25.