JUDGMENT
Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. The Executive Committee of the State Bank of Hyderabad, Head Office at Gunfoundry, Hyderabad and its Managing Director have filed this Writ Appeal assailing the order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated July 19, 1989 allowing the Writ Petition and quashing the order of the appellant authority dated March 20, 1987 confirming the order of removal of the respondent herein passed by the disciplinary authority on March 31, 1986.
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent was working as Branch Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, Nallkunta Branch, Hyderabad and he was incharge of distribution of loans to weaker sections under the 20 point programme. The allegation against the respondent was that while granting loans to weaker sections he demanded 20% of the loan amount sanctioned towards illegal gratification. As a result of which, a charge memo was issued levelling three charges against the respondent. Thereupon, the respondent filed his explanation. As far as charge No. 1 is concerned, there was an allegation of six items of corruption. Out of that, one item relates to the payment of illegal gratification to the respondent by one Balki Baburao (M.W.3). The Enquiry Officer found that payment of Rs. 887/- was established though the charge was for Rs. 1,200/- and held that the other charges were not proved. After considering the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority accepted the finding of the Enquiry officer, as a result of which the respondent was removed from service. Against that, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority also confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority by a reasoned order dated March 20, 1987. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed a Writ Petition. The learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition holding that payment of illegal gratification of Rs. 887/- is not established and the finding of the enquiry officer, which was accepted by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority, is not based on the evidence apparent on the face of the record and also not based on the admissible evidence. On other points also, the learned single Judge held against the appellants. Assailing the order of the learned single Judge, this appeal is filed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr.K. Srinivasa Murthy contended that once a witness states that he paid some amount towards illegal gratification and the same is not contradicted by any other evidence, the same has to be accepted and accordingly the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority accepted the same and imposed the punishment of removal. In this case, M.W.3- Baburao deposed that he paid the amount and his evidence is acceptable. Thus, he contends that the removal from service is based on the evidence on record . He further contends that once the allegations are proved in the enquiry and the same are accepted by the appellate authority, this court will not generally interfere by exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution as an appellate authority. The High Court can only interfere when such finding is based on inadmissible evidence or perverse. In the present case, the evidence of Baburao cannot be said as inadmissible evidence, and therefore, it cannot be said that the removal order is passed without any cogent evidence. Hence the learned single Judge, erred in allowing the writ Petition.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Suresh Kumar, contended that the evidence of Baburao cannot be relied upon as the same was contradicted by one Shaik Mahaboob (M.W. 12) in his statement at the preliminary enquiry he contends that when the evidence is appreciated by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, the appreciation should not be perverse. That appreciation should be according to the principles of natural justice though the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable. The inference and the conclusions to be drawn in pursuance of appreciation of evidence must be reasonable if it is viewed from any angle. In the present case, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, the conclusions drawing by the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are not proper and reasonable. It is further contended that the High Court will not generally interfere into the conclusions and findings reached by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority if they are based on admissible evidence. But, when the said findings are not based on admissible evidence, there is no bar to the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the learned single Judge has rightly interfered and allowed the Writ Petition. Hence there are no merits in the Writ Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
5. In view of the rival contentions put forth, the questions that arise for consideration are;
1) Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution; and
2) In the service law jurisprudence, whether the High Court can interfere when the orders imposing punishment are challenged before it.
6. It is well settled principle of law that this Court under Article 226 of the constitution is not an appellate authority while reviewing a question of fact. Therefore, the High Court cannot review the evidence and reverse a finding of fact based on evidence. Of course, if the finding is not based on any evidence or is based on inadmissible evidence or there is an error of law apparent on the face of record, there is no bar to this Court to interfere. A similar question fell for consideration before the supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Sree Rama Rao (1964-II-LLJ-150). Speaking for the Constitution Bench, justice Shah observed: Page 154
“The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry of where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrive at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the constitution.”
A similar view was taken by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964-II-LLJ-38). To the same effect, decisions were rendered in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972-I-LLJ-1) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. (1983-II-LLJ-1) and State of Ma-harashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991-I-LLJ-269).
7. Keeping in view of the principles laid down in the above judgments, we have to examine the facts of this case.
8. It is the case of the Bank that the respondent received Rs. 1200/- from Baburao towards illegal gratification. But the enquiry Officer found that the respondent received only Rs. 887/- and not Rs. 1200/-. The finding is based on prior statement of Baburao marked as Ex. M.E.-6 at the preliminary enquiry and also in his statement at the enquiry. The other evidence which is relied upon is that of the prior statement of Shaik Mahaboob which is marked as Ex. M.E.-27 and the evidence of the said Shaik Mahabob as M.W. 12. There is also the evidence of the Cashier, P.S. Sarma(D.W.3) on behalf of the charged officer. In an earlier statement given by Shaik Mahaboob in the preliminary enquiry, he stated that on the day when the said Baburao received Rs. 1,000/- from the Bank and who alleged to have paid Rs. 887/- to the Branch Manager (respondent) as gratification, he did not attend the bank as he had to go to his office where he was working as Record Assistant. The relevant portion of the evidence of Shaik Mahaboob reads as follows:
“Then I have written an application for Baburao under signature of Baburao requesting the Branch Manager to sanction an amount of Rs. 1,000/- to pay an advance to the shop and asked Baburao to go to Branch Manager and submit the same. I could not go as it was office time. Afterwards I came to know from Baburao that the B.M. had advanced him an amount of Rs. l,000/-
9. In the cross-examination at the enquiry, it was not elicited by the enquiry officer or the presenting officer that Shaik Mahaboob attended the bank on the crucial day. Naturally, the charge officer kept quite and did not ask Shaik Mahaboob whether he attended the Bank on the crucial day. Baburao, who stated that he paid Rs. 887/- to the Branch Manager (respondent) when he received Rs. 1,000/- from the bank, has further stated in the prior statement M.E. 6 that he received Rs. 1,000/- from the bank and he paid the same to the Branch Manager on that date. He also stated the same thing in the Chief Examination at the enquiry where he was examined as M.W. 3 However, in the Cross- examination, Baburao stated as follows:
“I surrendered the token at the counter and received Rs. l177- from the cashier. I asked Sri Shaik Mahaboob as to why I received only Rs. 1177-. He told me that the balance amount will be passed on to the Branch Manager. Please wait for some time. A short while later Shaik Mahaboob paid me the balance amount out of the loan amount of Rs. 1,000/- and asked me to hand over the entire amount of Rs. 1,000/- to the Bank Manager. I had gone into the Manager’s Cabin and gave him the amount of Rs. 1,000/-. He was alone at that time and took my signature on some form. At that time Sri Shaik Mahboob was waiting outside the Manager’s cabin.”
Baburao was not re-examined on behalf of the Presenting Officer nor was he examined by the enquiry officer to say that Shaik Mahaboob was not present on that day at the bank and that there was no question of his handing over the sum of Rs. 1,000/- into the hands of the charged officer so as to enable him to pay the amount to the Branch Manager.
10. By reading the evidence of Baburao in the chief examination as well as in the cross-examination along with the statement of Shaik Mahaboob in the preliminary enquiry, one has to come to only conclusion that on the day when the said amount was alleged to have been paid to the respondent, Baburao paid Rs. 8877- For that Rs. 1,000/- Baburao has taken Rs. 1177- from the Bank and Rs.887/- from Shaik Mahaboob and in all he has taken Rs. 1,000/- and paid Rs. 1,000/- to the respondent (Branch Manager). But, Shaik Mahaboob stated in his earlier statement that he has not attended the bank on that day as he went to his office. Further Baburao in his cross-examination stated that he has taken Rs. 8877- from Shaik Mahaboob to make the total amount of Rs. l,000/- to be paid to the respondent (Branch Manager). Thus, when Shaik Mahaboob had not attended the Bank on that day, the question of Baburao taking Rs.8877- from Mahaboob does not arise.Thus, the case of Baburao that he paid Rs. 1000/- by taking Rs. 887/- from shaik Mahaboob falls to the ground as the same is not in consonance with the statement of Shaik Mahaboob as well as the statement of Baburao in the cross-examination. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority erred in holding that the charged officer ought to have elicited from Baburao or Shaik Mahaboob that Shiak Mahaboob did not attend the Bank on the crucial day. The burden is on the Bank to prove that the charged officer received the illegal gratification. Therefore, the conclusion arrived by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority shifting the burden upon the charged officer, is not correct. The inference drawn by them that Baburao paid the said amount falls within the arena of perverse appreciation of evidence. It is to be noticed that the burden lies on the bank to prove that the charged officer received the same. In case they establish the fact that the charged officer received, then the burden shifts to the charged officer to disprove the same. It is not possible to come to the conclusion by reading the preliminary statement of Baburao and his cross-examination in the enquiry and the statement of Shaik Mahaboob at the preliminary enquiry that Baburao paid the amount to the charged officer after taking Rs. 887/- from Shaik Mahaboob. Therefore, the finding of the disciplinary authority that Baburao paid Rs. 1,000/- to the charged officer, is perverse.
11. It is settled principle of law that perverse evidence cannot be said to be an admissible evidence. A finding based on perverse evidence has to be stated as a finding based on no evidence or is based on inadmissible evidence. Here it is relevant to refer what is the meaning of ‘No evidence’ from Wade on Administrative Law (Fifth Edition) at Page 287
“No evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding ; or where in other words no Tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence (R.V.Robertys (1909) IKB page 407 @ 423) This ‘no evidence’ principle clearly has something in common that the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is authorised and ultra vires”.
12. A reading of the above makes it clear the finding based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or on evidence which is not legal, is perverse and the same amounts to error apparent on the face of the record and the High Court can interfere while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that strict rules of evidence are not applicable for the departmental enquiries and even hearsay evidence can be taken into consideration. In support of his contention he relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India (1982-I-LLJ-54) and Maharashtra State Board of S & H.S. Education v. K.S. Gandhi . There is no doubt about the principle laid down in the above judgments. But, when the evidence is scrutinised, the inquiring authority and the appellate authority have to appreciate the evidence to come to the conclusion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent officer and such conclusion must be reasonable. If the appreciation of evidence is perverse or the authorities erred in not properly appreciating the evidence and omit to take into consideration the legal principles in appreciation of the same i.e., laying burden of proof on the delinquent officer or not taking the important contradictions and omissions in the evidence into consideration, the same amounts to perverse appreciation of evidence and the High Court can interfere in such circumstances. In this view of the matter, the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary authority and the appellate authority while exercising the power of judicial review when the order imposing punishment are perverse. We therefore, hold that the learned single. Judge has rightly considered all the aspects of the matter in depth in allowing the writ petition. Hence, it does not warrant interference in appeal.
14. In the result, the writ appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs.