JUDGMENT
Arun Kumar Goel, J.
1. When C.M.P. No. 1089 of 2003 came up for consideration, the learned counsel for the parties submitted that only substantial question of law involved in this appeal is, “whether the provisions of Workmen’s Compensa tion Act, 1923, as they stood on the date of accident or on the date of decision would apply”? They further submitted that instead of disposing of the C.M.P., main matter may be examined and disposed of.
2. The respondent Kewal Ram being a workman working under the appellants is not disputed. His having sustained perma nent partial disability as a result of injury which he suffered during the course of his employment with the appellants is also not disputed. Date of accident is 22.5.1993. In law, therefore, the amount of compensation became payable to him on 21.6.1993.
3. Admittedly, compensation was deposited only after it had been assessed by the Commissioner below. This was before filing of this appeal to comply with the requirement of Section 30 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 to maintain the appeal.
4. Whether unamended provision of law on the date of accident or as it stood after amendment on the date of passing of the award, would govern decision of a case is no more res Integra in view of the Division Bench judgment of this court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd, v. Nako, 1996 ACJ 516 (HP). What was held in this context by the Division bench and covers the present case, is extracted hereinbelow:
“(8) We may refer to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 215, regarding the retrospective operation of statutes in the following terms:
‘Upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication.’
Applying the above settled law of interpretation, we hold that as the accident took place prior to the amendment of Schedule IV of the Act, the compensation has to be assessed according to the unamended Schedule. We say so as if retrospective operation is given to the amended Schedule, it will take away the rights of the parties, namely, the owner as well as the insurance company, in this regard. Therefore, Commissioner erred in law in assessing the compensation under the amended Schedule IV.
(9) Similar view has been expressed by various High Courts, namely, Punjab and Haryana High in Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Moola Singh, 1970 ACJ 401 (P&H); Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in Uttam v. Corporation of the City of Nagpur, 1981 (1) ILR (Bombay Series) 789; Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Trans. Corporation v. Abdul Hameed, 1985 ACJ 832 (Allahabad) and Kerala High Court in Kochu Vein v. Purakkattu Joseph, 1984 ACJ 630 (Kerala).
(10) Learned counsel for the claimants has urged that as this is a welfare legislation, it has to be given retrospective effect and in support has placed reliance on a single Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mines Manager v. Waheedul Hague Abbasi, 1994 ACJ 334 (MP). In para 8 of the judgment, the learned single Judge expressed his view that as Amending Act 22 of 1984 is a piece of welfare legislation, it should be given retrospective effect to the benefit of the employee in determining his entitlement to compensation in a pending matter. We are unable to accept, with respect, the views expressed by the learned single Judge, as such a general view regarding beneficial legislation cannot be taken and the question whether a beneficial legislation is retrospective or not would depend on the language of the statutes from which legislative intention is to be gathered.
(11) In the present appeals, we have already stated that if the retrospective effect is given, it will take away the vested rights of the owner as well as the insurance company, which cannot be done unless the language of the Act is clear,”
5. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in a beneficent legislation, amended provision need to be given retrospective effect. In view of the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this court, this plea cannot be accepted. As this plea was specifically repelled in the above decision in its para 10.
6. Consequently, taking the monthly wage of the respondent at Rs, 1,000 and keeping in view his age, when 50 per cent of wage is multiplied with the relevant factor, i.e., 146.20, it comes to Rs. 73,100. Disability being 20 per cent, compensation comes to Rs. 14,620 (Rs. 73,100 x 20/ 100). It is not known as to how interest at 12 per cent has been allowed, that too from the date of accident by the learned Commissioner below. On the date of accident, interest payable on compensation was 6 per cent per annum. As such, there is no legal sanction behind the rate of interest at 12 per cent. In view of the provision of Section 4-A of the Act (supra), on the sum of Rs. 14,620 the respondent is entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, on and with effect from 21.6.1993, till the date of payment or deposit, whichever is earlier.
7. Lastly, Mr. Sharma submitted that appellants were well aware regarding the factum of accident, extent of a permanent partial disability, as also the monthly wage of his client. Still they chose to contest the case for almost 10 years. Instead of acting as a model employer, functionaries of the State dragged on the litigation for almost a decade as cantankerous litigant. There-fore, his client is entitled to penalty, i.e., 50 per cent of awarded compensation. This position was contested by Mr. Chandel. He submitted that there is neither any cross-appeal nor any cross-objections filed by the respondent for claiming the penalty. Why the amount was not paid/deposited by his clients on known fact, Mr. Chandel could not explain.
8. After having examined the overall facts and circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that there is no justification either in law or on the admitted facts for non-deposit/payment of compensation by the appellants. Thus, Section 4-A (3) (b) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is clearly attracted so far levy of penalty is concerned. Further, on the basis of the discussion in the preceding paras of this judgment, it is felt that in addition to sum of Rs. 14,620 + 6 per cent interest, respondent is also liable to pay 50 per cent penalty on the awarded compensation, i.e., Rs. 14,620.
9. In case compensation was paid to the respondent or deposited with the Commissioner below, the liability to pay interest as well as penalty could have been legitimately avoided. As already noted, after contesting the case for almost a decade, the amount was deposited on 3.9.2003 for maintaining the present appeal.
10. This is not the first case of its type that has come to the notice of this court where State and its functionaries have been found remiss to protect its interest. On the facts of a particular case and law governing the same, a Us may be contested. But the contest should not have to be there for the sake of contest, only because a case has been instituted. Functionaries of the State are expected to properly examine the matter and then take action in its best interest. This observation is being made for being kept in view by the State so that its interest is well protected.
11. No other point is urged.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, while partly allowing this appeal, impugned order of Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, HP PWD, South Zone, Winter Field, Shimla-171003, in Case No. LAO-SLN-129(5)/93, dated 6.5.2002, titled as Kewal Ram v. Executive Engineer, HP, PWD, (B&R), Solan Division, is modified in the following terms;
(a) that the respondent is held entitled to compensation of Rs. 14,620 only;
(b) on this amount, respondent is held entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on and with effect from 21.6.1993 to the date of deposit/pay- ment, whichever is earlier;
(c) he is also held entitled to 50 per cent penalty on the sum of Rs. 14,620;
(d) copy of this judgment will be circulated by the Registry to all the Commissioners under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 in the State of H.P. for their guidance; and
(e) a copy of this judgment be also sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government.
13. Out of the amount deposited with the Commissioner below, it is ordered that compensation plus interest on it and 50 per cent penalty will be released in favour of the respondent, whereas the remaining amount will be refunded to the appellants. Learned counsel for the parties submitted that account numbers will be furnished before the Commissioner below within 2 weeks from today whereafter the amount with up to date interest in terms of this judgment shall be remitted to the parties.
No costs.