JUDGMENT
K.T. Thomas, J.
1. A short but interesting legal question has been raised by Smt. K. P. Santhi, a junior advocate, who argued the case for the appellant. The question is whether a magistrate can acquit an accused under Section 256(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Code”), when the complainant in the case is a company or a firm ? According to learned counsel, no magistrate can, in such a case, acquit the accused under Section 256(1) of the Code due to the absence of complainant. If the said contention can be upheld this appeal has to be allowed even without getting into the merits.
2. The appellant herein is Falcon Tyres Ltd., which is a public limited company (hereinafter referred to as “the company”). A complaint was filed in the magistrate’s court in which the company has been shown as the complainant. The company was to be represented in the case by its manager. It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent has committed the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint reached the trial stage in the lower court, but on July 6, 1991, the learned magistrate recorded that the complainant was absent. Therefore; he acquitted the accused under Section 256(1) of the Code. The appellant obtained special leave to file this appeal.
3. Section 256(1) of the Code reads thus :
“Non-appearance or death of complainant.–(1) If the summons has been issued on a complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day :
Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.”
The contention is that if the- complainant is a juristic person such complainant cannot be physically present in court and hence there is no possibility of the complainant being absent. Section 256(1) of the Code is intended to apply only to cases where a complainant is capable of presenting himself physically, contended counsel.
4. Though the word “complaint” is defined in the Code, the word “complainant” has not been defined. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “complainant” has been defined as one who, in practice, applies to the court for legal redress or one who prefers accusation against suspected persons. Nonetheless, some assistance can be drawn from the definition of the word “complaint” in Section 2(d) of the Code. Complaint is “any allegation made either orally or in writing to a magistrate . . .”. So one of the postulates for a complaint is that it should be made to a magistrate. It is only through a physical act that any allegation can be made or brought to a magistrate. It is clarified in the Explanation to the definition clause in Section 2(d) of the Code that a police officer is a complainant if he makes a report regarding the commission of a non-cognizable offence. “In such a case “the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant”. Here also, only a human being can bring the complaint to a magistrate.
5. Section 190 of the Code empowers a magistrate to take cognizance of the offence Upon receipt of a complaint. Section 198 of the Code says that the complaint, for certain offences, should be made “by some person aggrieved by the offence”. Section 198A of the Code shows that a complaint for the offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, can be filed only by “the person aggrieved by the offence or by her father, mother, brother, sister or by her father’s or mother’s brother or sister or, with, the leave of the court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption”. Section 199 of the Code says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, “except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence”.
6. In all such cases there can be no doubt that a complainant must be a human person and not a juristic person.
7. In this context the requirement contained in Section 200 of the Code has to be pointed out. Under the said section a magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint has to examine the complainant upon oath. It is a mandatory provision except in the cases shown in the proviso to the section and such exceptions do not cover a case where the complainant is a company. Section 250 of the Code which empowers the magistrate to direct a complainant or informant to pay compensation to the accused persons in certain circumstances contains provision for enforcing such direction. It is in Sub-section (3) which says that the magistrate can further order that in default of payment, “the person ordered to pay such compensation shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days”. This is yet another indication that the complainant must be a human person. Sections 249 and 256 of the Code are provisions dealing with consequences of the complainant being absent in court. Section 249 of the Code empowers the magistrate to discharge the accused if the complainant is absent in warrant cases instituted on complaint. The corresponding provision in summons cases is Section 256 in which the magistrate is empowered to acquit the accused for absence of the complainant.
8. The above survey of the relevant provisions would sufficiently indicate that only a human person can be a complainant. Of course, in some enactments the court is given power to take cognizance of offences mentioned therein on the basis of a complaint made by the Government or local authority or board, etc. But even in such cases the Government or the local authority or board has to be represented by a human person.
9. Smt. K. P. Santhi then invited my attention to a decision of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Municipal Council v. Prabhu Narain, AIR 1968 Raj 297. In that case a food inspector filed a complaint against a certain accused alleging offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. When the trial court acquitted the accused, the local authority preferred an appeal. P. N. Shinghal J. (as he then was) considered the scope of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and held that the local authority cannot be regarded as the complainant. As the context is totally different, I doubt whether the said principle can be used in the context of Section 256 of the Code. In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. T. N. Madhavan Pillai, AIR 1956 TC 189, Koshi C. J., speaking for the Division Bench, pointed out that only a human person can represent the company when a criminal complaint was launched by the company.
10. The resultant legal position emerging from the above discussion is that for the purpose of the Code a complainant is a human person. Even if the complaint describes a company as the complainant, the real complainant is the person who represents the company for filing such
complaint. Hence, learned magistrate has jurisdiction to act under Section 256(1) of the Code even in a case where a complaint was filed on behalf of the juristic person.
11. On the merits–when the case was called in the trial court on July 6, 1991, the complainant and accused were absent. Counsel for the complainant was also absent and no petition on his behalf was filed. But the accused’s counsel represented that the matter was settled. That fact was noted by the learned magistrate in the “proceedings sheet” and he acquitted the accused under Section 256(1) of the Code. According to the appellant, he had to go to Mangalore, on July 6, 1991, and he informed his advocate in advance and the advocate had promised to do the needful. But the said, advocate did not do anything on that day and he did not even appear. As the said advocate is not a party in the proceeding, I am not expressing any opinion on the said allegation against him. Be that as it may, I am inclined to agree with learned counsel for the appellant here that the magistrate would perhaps have chosen to acquit the accused more on the basis of the wrong representation made on behalf of the accused that the matter was settled out of court. Hence I am disposed, on the facts of this case, to give one more opportunity to the complainant to prosecute his case.
12. In the result, I allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal and I direct the learned magistrate to proceed with the complaint.