Bombay High Court High Court

First Appeal No. 171 Of 1997 vs Unknown on 14 July, 2010

Bombay High Court
First Appeal No. 171 Of 1997 vs Unknown on 14 July, 2010
Bench: A.P. Bhangale
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             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

                   NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR




                                                                   
                                           
    First Appeal No. 171 of 1997

    Appellant :    Bank of Baroda, through its Sitabuldi




                                          
                   Branch, Nagpur

                   versus

    Respondents:   1) M/s J.K. Chemicals, a partnership firm,

through its Partner Hyder Alia Jafar Ali,

Near Vithal Garage, Mankapur, Nagpur,

presently residing at 7, Mount Road Extn.,

Sadar, Nagpur

2) Hyder Ali s/o Jafar Alia Gulam Hussain,

aged about 42 years, occ: business, resident

of 7, Mount Road Extension, Sadar, Nagpur

3) Hussain Ali Jafar Ali Gulam Hussain, aged

about 40 years, occ: business, resident of

7, Mount Road Extension, Nagpur

4) Shankar Nichhaldad Khemchandani, aged

Major, occ: business, resident of 9, Sindhu

Sagar, Clark Town, Kadbi Chowk, Nagpur

5) Omprakash Amarchand Bhandari, aged

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Major, occ: service, resident of Rusi Jamaji

House, Kadbi Chowk, Nagpur

Mr C.S. Samudra, Advocate for appellant

Respondents served.

                                         Coram :    A.P. Bhangale, J

                                         Dated :    14th     July 2010




                                        
    Judgment.              

1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated

26th August 1996 passed by 6th Joint Civil Judge, Senior

Division, Nagpur dismissing the suit of appellant-Bank as

against respondents no. 4 and 5, appellant-Bank has filed the

present appeal. Appeal is filed also against the refusal of

the trial Court to award agreed rate of interest on the

outstanding amount. Parties shall hereinafter be referred

to as per their original status in the suit.

2. Plaintiff-Bank filed suit against the defendants

for recovery of Rs. 7,85,655.50. It was averred that various

loans as described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint were

granted and disbursed to defendants no. 1 to 3 and defendants

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no. 4 and 5 stood guarantee for borrowers (defendants 1 to

3). Since the defendants failed to pay the loan amount, a

call notice was issued to them to pay off the outstandings.

Since inspite of notice defendants did not settle the dues,

plaintiff-Bank filed the suit.

3. Defendants no. 1 to 3 by their Written Statement,

denied the claim of plaintiff-Bank. They alleged that it was

the plaintiff-Bank which was responsible for closure of their

unit. Defendants no. 4 and 5 denied their liability. They

denied having stood guarantor for defendants no. 1 to 3.

4. Learned trial Court on appreciation of oral and

documentary evidence decreed the suit of plaintiff-Bank as

against defendants no. 1 to 3 only. It has been held that

the plaintiff Bank failed to prove that defendants no. 4 and

5 stood guarantee for borrowers and consequently, suit has

been dismissed against those defendants. Learned trial Court

has ordered that the principal amount of Rs. 3,90,000/- shall

carry future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the

date of suit till its realisation.

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5. Heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-Bank.

Learned trial Court observed that when defendants no. 4 and 5

had denied their signatures on the loan papers, it was the

duty of the Bank to call for report of the hand-writing

expert in order to prove the signatures of defendants no. 4

and 5. Request made on behalf of the Bank to tally the

signatures of defendants no. 4 and 5 on the Vakalatnama filed

on their behalf, was declined by the trial Court on the

premise that the Court was not hand-writing expert.

6. Plaintiff-Bank examined Kashinath Patankar who

proved deeds of guarantee (exhibit 72, 90 and 98) executed by

defendants no. 4 and 5 on various dates. He deposed that

contents of deeds of guarantee were read over and explained

to defendants no. 4 and 5 by him and they admitted the

contents to be true. In his cross-examination this witness

is consistent with his evidence in examination-in-chief. He

has denied all adverse allegations and maintained that

defendants no. 4 and 5 stood guarantor for borrowers.

Defendant no. 4 examined himself on oath and denied the

averment of the plaintiff-Bank that he was one of the

guarantors to loan transactions. He denied his signatures on

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the guarantee forms. Defendant no.5 also examined himself

and he has also denied that he stood guarantor for borrowers/

defendants no. 1 to 3. Both these witnesses have maintained

their denial in the cross-examination.

7. Explanation to Section 47 of the Evidence Act reads

that a person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting

of another person when he has seen that person write or when

he has received documents purporting to be written by that

person in answer to documents written by himself or under his

authority and addressed to that person or when in ordinary

course of business, documents purporting to be written by

that person have been habitually submitted to him. In D.

Pandi v. Dhanalakshmi Bank Limited reported in AIR 2001

Madras 243, it has been held that where the evidence of the

Bank Manager as to the presence of defendant-guarantor at the

time of sanctioning of loan is probable and reliable and

where defendant has not examined anyone to corroborate his

claim except ipse dixit of his oral evidence, the order

holding defendant liable for suit claim was proper. In the

present case, the Bank has examined the officer concerned who

has deposed that the defendants/guarantors after

understanding the documents of guarantee had signed the same

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in his presence. The evidence on behalf of the Bank is

probable and reliable.

8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-Bank has relied

on Girija Prasad v. Sardar Labh Singh reported in AIR 1977

Patna 241 wherein it is observed with reference to Section 47

of the Evidence Act that the creditor who himself had seen

the debtor writing the disputed signatures on the credit

memos was held a person who was acquainted with the hand-

writing and it may be proved without subjecting it to expert

opinion. The trial Court has heavily come on the Bank’s

failure to examine hand-writing expert. It is true that in

order to find out the genuineness of the signature, it is but

proper for the Court to get the opinion of the expert.

However, I am of the view that Section 73 of the Evidence Act

enables the Court to compare the disputed signature with the

other admitted or proved signatures. No doubt, the Court can

also direct the concerned person in Court to write any words

or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare

the words or figures so written with any words or figures

alleged to have been written by such person. In the present

case the trial Court should not have hesitated to compare the

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signatures of defendants-guarantors on Vakalatnama, Written

Statement etc. with the documents of guarantee.

9. Be that as it may, plaintiff is a nationalised

Bank. There are no malafides alleged by defendant no. 4 or

defendant no. 5 against any of the Bank officers. A definite

procedure has to be followed by a nationalised bank while

granting and disbursing loan amount to its borrower and in a

given case why its officers should allow creation of false

signatures of defendants no. 4 and 5 as guarantors, is not at

all explained muchless satisfactorily. Loan cases, before

they are sanctioned, see many hands and they are not dealt

with in a proprietory manner. It is not a case of

defendants no. 4 and 5 that undue favouritism was done to

borrowers and their signatures were put on the documents

concerned in a concocted manner. Viewed from any angle,

therefore, trial Court’s finding exonerating defendants no. 4

and 5 as guarantors cannot be sustained and will have to be

set aside. Consequently, it will have to be held that

defendants no. 4 and 5 as guarantors are jointly and

severally to pay decretal amount along with defendants no.1

and 2 to the plaintiff-Bank.

10. Learned trial Court has awarded future interest at

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the rate of 6% per annum and that too on the principal

amount. There is no reason assigned by it as to why it has

deviated from the agreed terms and conditions arrived at by

and between the parties under the loan agreement. In the

opinion of this Court, the trial Court has erroneously

adjudged the “principal sum”. In Central Bank of India v.

Ravindra and ors reported in AIR 2001 SC 3095, the Apex Court

has held that while decreeing a suit if the decree be for

payment of money, the Court would adjudge the principal sum

on the date of the suit. In other words, the principal sum

adjudged would be the sum actually loaned plus the amount of

interest on periodical rests which according to the contract

between the parties or the established banking practice has

stood capitalised. Now, turning to the question as to what

extent the interest should be awarded on the principal sum

adjudged on the date of suit, the Apex Court in Central

Bank’s case (supra) has held that Section 34 of the Code of

Civil Procedure is general in its application to all money

suits and award of interest pendente lite and post-decree is

discretionary with the Court as it is essentially governed by

Section 34 dehors the contract between the parties. In a

given case if the Court finds that in the principal sum

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adjudged on the date of the suit the component of interest is

disproportionate with the component of the principal sum

actually advanced, the Court may exercise its discretion in

awarding interest pendent lite and post-decree interest at a

lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest.

However, the discretion shall be exercised fairly,

judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary or

fanciful manner. Loans were advanced long back in the year

1987 and looking to the plea of the borrowers that their

Project failed coupled with the principal sum actually

advanced, in my opinion, award of interest at 12% per annum

from the date of filing of suit till realization would

subserve the ends of justice.

11. In the result, impugned judgment and order dated

26.8.1996 passed by the 6th Joint Civil Judge, Senior

Division, Nagpur in Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1990 is

modified thus :

All the respondents/defendants shall jointly and

severally pay a sum of Rs. 7,85,655.50 to the appellant/

plaintiff Bank together with interest thereon at the rate of

12% per annum from the date of suit till its realisation.

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Operative part of the judgment of the trial Court in clauses

(iii) to (viii) is maintained with modification that the same

would be effective against respondents/defendants no. 4 and 5

also.

Appeal is allowed partly in the above terms with

proportionate costs.

A. P. BHANGALE, J

joshi

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