JUDGMENT
Devinder Gupta, C.J.
1. These two appeals arising out of W.P.No. 3794 of 2003 are directed against the order of the learned Single Judge declaring the action of the respondents 1 to 3 in awarding tender dated 27.11.2002 in favour of the 4th respondent as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional.
2. While W.A. No. 1162 of 2003 is filed by the Food Corporation of India through its Managing Director, New Delhi, Zonal Manager, Chennai and Senior Regional Manager, Hyderabad who were arrayed as respondents 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition, W.A.No. 1163 of 2003 is preferred by Muralikrishna Vaddera Labour Contract Cooperative Society Limited, Pragathinagar, Nellore – arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the WP. The Nellore District F.C.I. Godown Workers Labour Contract Co-operative Society Limited, Nellore who was the petitioner is respondent No. 1 in both the appeals.
3. Parties are being referred to as they were arrayed in the Writ Petition.
4. By the impugned order dated 23.6.2003, the learned Single Judge proceeded to allow the writ petition holding the action of respondents 1 to 3 in awarding contract in favour of 4th respondent as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. It was held that the award of contract in favour of 4th respondent is not only contrary to decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 520 of 1995 dated 23.7.1998 but also in violation of the constitutional mandate under Article 43 of the Constitution of India. Feeling aggrieved, respondents 1 to 3 and respondent No. 4 preferred these appeals.
5. Before we proceed further, we have to keep in view the principles of judicial review as applicable to the exercise of contractual power by the Government or other public bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. The Supreme Court time and again held that there are inherent limitations in exercise of power of judicial review. The Government and other public authorities are guardians of public finances and they are expected to protect the financial interest of the State. But the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There cannot be any question of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution if the Government or other authorities try to get the best person or the best quotation. Right to choose cannot be considered to be arbitrary exercise of power. Of course if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.
6. In order to reach the conclusion whether the authority has acted reasonably and properly, it is open to the Court to review the decision maker’s evaluation of the facts. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way cannot be upheld.
7. The judicial function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration. Judicial review of administrative action depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Its dimension is never closed and must remain flexible. (See Fertiliser Corporation, Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344).
8. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, , it was held that while exercising the power of judicial review, duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of illegality and its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law;
3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice;
4. Reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached; or
5. Abused its powers.
9. It is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. The Court then classified the grounds on which an administrative action is subject to control of judicial review, namely, (i) illegality, which means the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it; (ii) irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness and (iii) procedural impropriety.
10. Review of administrative discretion was propounded in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 = (1947) 2 All ER 680, and it was summarised in R v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, Ex Chetnik Development Ltd., (1988) AC 858, as under:
‘The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether or not they have taken into account matters which they ought not to have taken into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matter which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the local authority had kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the Court can interfere. The power of the Court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which Parliament has confided in them.’
11. The aforementioned summary by Lord Greens in Tower Hamlets case has been applied in subsequent decisions. This principle is classified as Wednesbury unreasonableness by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case and a second ground for judicial review of administrative action. Supreme Court also laid down principles deduced from various decisions referred to in the judgment about the limitations of the Courts in exercising the power of judicial review, namely,–
(1) The modem trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
(2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.
12. It is in the light of these principles we heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the legality of the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
13. Facts need not be stated in detail as they arise in a small compass. Respondent No. 1 – Corporation maintains storage depots at various places throughout the country for storing food grains. One such depot is located at Kakatur, Nellore District. The writ petitioner was awarded contract for loading, unloading, handling of food grains of Food Corporation of India on 14.6.2001 for a period of two years, which expired on 13.6.2003. During the course of arguments, it was pointed out that the petitioner had worked for about eighteen years with the FCI till June, 2003. As the period of contract was expiring, therefore, 3rd respondent on 27.11.2002 issued tender notice for appointment of contractor for loading, unloading, handling and transport at its storage depot at Kakatur. In all four tenders were filed. Both the petitioner and fourth respondent submitted their tenders, which were opened on 20.12.2002. All the four tenderers quoted their rates far below the schedule of rates. Petitioner quoted 50% below the schedule of rates. 4th respondent quoted at 99.90% below the schedule of rates and the other two tenderers quoted at 99% below the schedule of rates. Rates quoted by the 4th respondent being the lowest, the same was accepted by the 1st respondent and contract was awarded to it. Petitioner questioned the action of the respondents 1 to 3 in awarding the contract in favour of respondent No. 4 on the ground that it is not reasonably practicable to execute the contract at such low rates, as quoted by respondent No. 4, without sustaining huge loss. It was alleged that the 4th respondent society has no previous experience in handling the transport of food grains with FCI or any organisation carrying similar type of work. 4th respondent has experience in undertaking only minor works relating to laying of Black Tar Roads, small masonry works etc. Acceptance of rates quoted by the 4th respondent for contract of handling and transporting constitute exploitation of labour and is in violation of labour legislation in relation to minimum wages. Petitioner referred to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 13707 of 1994, which was affirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 520 of 1995 and 780 of 1998 by order dated 23.7.1998 and contended that in spite of the said decisions of this Court in which FCI was party, respondents 1 to 3 have not acted properly. Therefore, the very action of respondents 1 to 3 in having awarded contract in favour of respondent No. 4 at 99.90% below the schedule of rates was arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional since this Court had not approved such an act on an earlier occasion.
14. The Corporation contested the Writ petition, inter alia, on the grounds that on account of competition between the two rival tenderers rate was quoted at 50% below the schedule of rates by petitioner and respondent No. 4 at 99.90% below the schedule of rates, therefore, Corporation preferred lowest tender and in doing so every possible precaution was taken by the Corporation to safeguard its interest and also after satisfying that the 4th respondent would comply with the statutory requirements of making payment of minimum wages to the members of the 4th respondent society. Taking notice of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court relied upon by the petitioner, Corporation had also called for additional security from the 4th respondent as a measure of security to safeguard the interests of the members of the 4th respondent society, in the event of the failure of the society paying minimum wages to it’s labourers and a clause of forfeiture was also incorporated in the Conditions of Agreement. Therefore, considering the rates quoted by respondent No. 4 below schedule of rates an undertaking was obtained which sufficiently safeguard the interests of the members of the 4th respondent society in the matter of payment of labour charges in accordance with statutory obligations and in such like situation when all safeguards were taken by the Corporation in pursuance of the observations made in the earlier litigation there was hardly any public interest involved since dispute was purely between two rival tenderers. There was no element of arbitrariness or public interest involved in awarding contract to the 4th respondent and the Corporation followed fair and transparent procedure. Respondent No. 4 also contested the petition on similar grounds. Learned Single Judge turned down the submissions on behalf of the Corporation and the 4th respondent proceeded to allow the writ petition as aforementioned.
15. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and were taken through the entire record. Original file has been made available for our perusal by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Corporation. The manner and method of evaluating the tenders received as also the manner and method adopted in arriving at the conclusion to award contract to the 4th respondent are fairly dealt, with in the file. We have perused the entire record.
16. Learned Single Judge proceeded to allow the writ petition mainly relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 520 of 1995 holding that the judgment of the Division Bench had become final insofar as the Corporation is concerned. In the said decision Division Bench had declared that the action of the Corporation in an earlier award of contract for handling and transport of food grains at its Dowlaiswaram Depot for a period of two years from 17th July, 1994 to 16th July, 1996 in favour of a party who had quoted rates at 99.99% below schedule of rates was not bona fide and such acceptance of offer by Corporation amounts to disregarding the constitutional directive under Article 43 of the Constitution of India which enjoins living wages to be paid to the workers. Learned Single Judge in the impugned order observed that the Division Bench had laid down that a practice where prices offered on the face of it are unconscionable should be looked down as illusory and not bona fide. Acceptance of such quotations was held to result in exploitation of labourers and encouragement of unfair labour practice and the Corporation was held guilty of practising and encouraging a system akin to bonded labour prohibited under the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 by taking undue advantage of the unfair competition between the two societies and granting contract on the basis of unconscionable bargains and at an unthinkable low and most unreasonable rate of remuneration for the work to be done. Learned Single Judge also pointed out that in the decision which was under challenge before the Division Bench in W.A. No. 520 of 1995 it had been held that in accepting prices quoted at 99.99% below the schedule of rates, only a sum of Rs. 300/- was paid to labourers employed for the entire work contract worth Rs. 30 lakhs which was not very attractive and lucrative. Therefore, Corporation was directed to deposit with the Collector the difference between fair wages and the wages paid namely Rs. 29,99,770/-for each contract period together with interest at 12% for being paid to the labourers directly who actually performed the work. While relying upon these observations of the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition and the observations made by the Division Bench in the Writ Appeal, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order proceeded to examine the respective stands of the parties, more particularly, the stand taken by the respondents Corporation that Clause VII(c) of the terms and conditions of contract requires the contractor to comply with all labour regulations/enactments made by State Government/Central Government from time to time in regard to payment of wages to workers, wage period etc. and Clause VII(d) which provides that notwithstanding the fact whether the enactments or any statutory modifications as referred to in Clause VII(c) are applicable or not to the employees/workers employed by the contractor he shall pay the wages as detailed in Clause VII. Contractor is also required to maintain necessary records and registers like wage book, wage slip etc. Learned Single Judge also took notice of the undertaking furnished by respondent No. 4 of furnishing security deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs to comply with all statutory obligations and not to lay any claim against respondents 1 to 3 and would authorise the Corporation to forfeit security deposit/additional deposit in the event of breach of contract and abide by the terms and conditions of the contract and not to file any suit against FCI on the agreed terms. Learned Single Judge did not find such safeguards taken by the Corporation to be in the best interest of the Corporation since according to the learned Single Judge none of the clauses in the agreement provide for termination of contract or forfeiture of deposits for failure of the contractor to comply with the statutory obligations and then proceeded to further observe that Corporation ought to have examined the approximate income of the 4th respondent likely to be earned out of contract on the basis of the volume of work involved in the concerned depot and ought to have recorded its satisfaction that the rate offered at 99.99% below the schedule of rates would not adversely affect the interest of the workers. Learned Single Judge also noticed the stand of the 4th respondent that prices offered by them was workable as also that labourers would be paid all wages payable under the Minimum Wages Act and would comply with all other statutory benefits admissible to its workers as also the statistics provided by the 4th respondent that neither there was any possibility of any chance that workers will not be paid their wages or that they will be paid less than what is payable to them under the statutory obligations. After having noticed these aspects, learned Single Judge while proceeding that it was for the Corporation to assess all the said aspects and to express its satisfaction whether the price offered would ensure living wages to the members of the 4th respondent society and since the Corporation had not recorded its satisfaction, the contract awarded in favour of 4th respondent was not only contrary to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court but was also in violation of the constitutional mandate under Article 43 of the Constitution of India.
17. We have carefully considered the submissions made at the bar. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge, with due respect, suffers from infirmities and there is an error committed in the approach to deal with such matters by the learned Single Judge who proceeded on premise that none of the clauses of the contract provide for termination of contract or forfeiture of deposit for the failure on the part of the contractor to comply with the statutory obligations and the Corporation has ignored the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 520 of 1995 while awarding the contract to the 4th respondent. We are not in agreement with this reasoning of the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge, in our considered opinion, wrongly applied the decision of the Division Bench of this Court to the facts of the case in hand which we will deal with in the later part of the judgment. Learned Single Judge also failed to notice another important aspect namely the note which was appended to the notice inviting tender and the instructions to tenderers which clearly informed the tenderers that schedule of rates have been revised by 300% of the existing schedule of rates with effect from 1st March, 2002, therefore, all the prospective tenderers are requested to take note of the revised schedule of rates and quote “reasonable and appropriate rates”. Another aspect which the learned Single Judge failed to take note of is the very act of the petitioner having approached the Court making grievance that the Corporation accepted rates below the schedule of rates, when the petitioner itself had quoted 50% less than the schedule of rates. Even the agent of the petitioner, who was one amongst the other two tenderers had quoted at 99.0% below the schedule of rates.
18. Condition No. 11 of the contract relates to security deposit and condition 11(e) provides for refund and forfeiture of security deposit, which, inter alia, provides:
11(e) The security will be refunded to the contractors on due and satisfactory performance of the services and on completion of all obligations by the Contractor under the terms of the contract and on submission of “No Demand Certificate” subject to such deduction from the security as may be necessary for making up the Corporation’s claim against the contractor,
(f) In the event of termination of contract envisaged in Clause X the Senior Regional Manager have the right to forfeit the entire or a part of the amount of security deposit lodged by the contractors or to appropriate the security deposit or any part, therefore, in or towards the satisfaction of any sum due to the claimed for any damages, losses, charges, expenses or costs that may be suffered or incurred by the Corporation.
19. Condition VII(1) provides for payment of wages to workers and reads thus:
The contractor shall pay not less than minimum wages to the workers engaged by them on either time rate basis or piece rate basis on the work. Minimum wages both for the time rate and for the piece rate work shall mean the rate(s) notified by the appropriate authority from time to time. (Where such wages have not been so notified by the appropriate authority, the wages prescribed by the Senior Regional Manager as minimum wages shall be made applicable). The contractor shall maintain necessary records and registers like wages book and wages slip etc. Register of unpaid wages and register of fines and deductions giving the particulars as indicated in Appendix VI(A).
20. Contract also contain clause of summary termination of the contract on failure to observe any of the conditions of the contract or any of the terms and conditions governing the contract and the right of the Corporation to summarily terminate the contract was without prejudice to any other right or remedies under the contract and to get the work done for the un-expired period of contract at the risk and cost of the contractor and to claim from the contractor any resultant loss sustained or costs incurred in regard thereto. Clause VII(a), 7(c) and 7(d) coupled with the undertaking furnished by respondent No. 4 on the face of it are more than adequate safeguards insofar as the interest of the Corporation as also the interest of the members of the 4th respondent society. Even in the event of failure on the part of 4th respondent to pay minimum wages, in spite of clause of forfeiture provided in the contract, if the wages are not paid, the Corporation had ensured of obtaining additional security in addition to the security already furnished. Considering the quoted rates at 99.99% below the schedule of rates of respondent No. 4, an undertaking was insisted upon by the Corporation, which sufficiently safeguards the interests of the members of the 4th respondent to comply with labour payments and statutory obligations. It was only after the undertaking was filed by the 4th respondent and only on satisfaction of the contents of the undertaking and that the contract was workable, a decision was taken by the Corporation to award contract to the 4th respondent.
21. The learned Single Judge failed to take note of the fact that the earlier writ petition was dismissed. It was not with respect to payment of wages. It was with respect to award of contract by the Corporation in favour of a contractor who had quoted 99.99% below the schedule of rates. The award of contract was upheld. Only the conduct of Corporation was deprecated for which various directions were issued by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench on the basis of the material produced on record that wages had not been paid to workmen according to statutory obligations. Under those circumstances Corporation was held guilty of encouraging bonded labour. In the instant case, situation was not like the situation in earlier litigation. Challenge had been made only at the stage of award of contract. There were no safeguards adopted by the Corporation in the earlier case and for that reason the Corporation was asked to deposit the amount with the Collector to ensure payment to those labourers who had not been paid minimum wages. In the instant case, not only a stipulation to ensure compliance of statutory obligations for payment of minimum wages etc., is provided but provision has also been made to ensure that in the event of non-payment of wages at any stage of the contract and complaints being received in that regard, Corporation reserved its right to terminate the contract. In order to ensure compliance adequate safeguards have been taken by obtaining additional security from the 4th respondent. Further, in the present case, the schedule of rates was revised by 300% on the existing schedule of rates with effect from 1st March, 2002, which the learned Single Judge did not take notice. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No. 520 of 1995 has no application to the facts of the present case.
22. We pointedly asked the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that what other additional safeguards ought to have been taken by the Corporation, which were held to be not sufficient in the earlier round of litigation, where the Corporation had entered into an agreement for similar type of work. He was unable to point out anything except reiterating his stand that on the rates quoted by the 4th respondent contract were unworkable. We again questioned learned Counsel for the petitioner as to how it was open for the petitioner to urge before us that rates quoted by the 4th respondent were unworkable when the petitioner itself had quoted 50% below the schedule of rates. He was unable to answer the query. We pointed out to the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner, which also on the face of it suggest that it was a case where filing of petition was nothing but because of business rivalry. In the additional affidavit, the petitioner had pointed out that rates quoted were not at all workable and any amount quoted less than the schedule of rates would not amount to a workable contract. Be it noted that the petitioner was in the field executing similar type of contracts with the Corporation for the last 18 years. By the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondent, the petitioner lost the contract which appears to have led the petitioner in filing the writ petition with the sole object that respondent No. 4 should not be awarded contract for one reason or the other. It was not within the competence of this Court to have entered into the question as to what extent of profit would be derived by the contractor who had quoted the rates less than the schedule of rates since safeguards which are required to be taken in such like situation by any prudent person like the Corporation have been duly taken.
23. In Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta, , the Supreme Court held that question of contractual obligations cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. In this case, the Food Corporation of India entered into an agreement with the respondent therein on 14.8.1967 entrusting him the work of clearing, transporting, storing and distribution of food grains on behalf of the Corporation. The Corporation by notice-dated 25.6.1987 terminated the agreement with effect from 31.8.1987, which the respondent challenged before the High Court of Calcutta. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition setting aside the notice issued by the Corporation. The Corporation carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court, The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the notice especially when terms of the contract permitted the termination of the agreement by either of the parties. It was held that the High Court should not have gone into the question of contractual obligation in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, in the instant case, when the terms and conditions provide for summary termination in the event of non-compliance of the statutory obligations and other conditions, there was hardly any scope for interference in quashing the contract when terms of the contract obligated the 4th respondent that he was bound to pay minimum wages and comply with other statutory requirements.
24. In State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd. , the Supreme Court held that there cannot, be any interference in contractual matters in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In the said case, writ petition had been filed by a public sector corporation for a mandamus restraining the Government from making deduction from the amount due on the ground that tax rule had been reduced by composition order passed by Sales Tax Commissioner. Stipulation in the contract was for deduction of sale tax at the time of payment and for price adjustment in the event of change in tax rate. The Supreme Court held that question of interpretation of composition order does not make writ petition tenable. In view of the ratio of this decision also no interference was called for in award of contract by the Corporation. Respondent No. 4 in the undertaking furnished has agreed that it would not initiate any proceedings against the Corporation in the event of Corporation exercising its right to terminate the contract or the Corporation declining to release any amount in case of non-compliance of the provisions of the contract as regards payment of minimum wages to labour. We are unable to appreciate that on what basis, at this stage a conclusion could be drawn that it will not be possible to execute the work on the quoted rates or that adequate safeguards to ensure compliance of various statutory obligations by the 4th respondent-contractor had not been taken.
25. In West Bengal Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. , it was held that normally contract is awarded to the lowest tenderer which is always in the public interest and the principle underlying in award of contract to lowest tenderer applies when all things are equal. It is equally in public interest to adhere to the rules and conditions subject to which bids are invited. Merely because a bid is the lowest the requirements of compliance of rules and conditions cannot be ignored. In the instant case, bids were invited. The tenderers were duly informed that the Corporation had since revised the schedule of rates by 300% above the existing schedule of rates with effect from 1st March, 2002. As such, the bidders were requested to take note of the revised schedule of rates and to quote reasonable and appropriate rates. The petitioner who was also one of the bidders, after taking into consideration the nature of work involved and the revised schedule of rates also thought it fit to quote 50% less than the schedule of rates and one of its agents also considered that it was possible to profitably execute the contract at 90% less than the schedule of rates. As such, in case respondent No. 4 also thought it fit and proper that it would still be profitable for it to execute the work by quoting 99.90% less than the schedule of rates which was revised by 300% above the existing schedule of rates with effect from 1st March, 2002, there was no scope for interference by this Court in such contractual matters in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
26. Having perused the material on record and the original file produced, we are satisfied that there was neither arbitrariness nor unreasonableness in the decision making process. We hold that the Corporation has taken adequate and necessary safeguards to protect its interest as well as the members of the 4th respondent society. Nothing more was required to be done by the Corporation. On the touchstone of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case (supra), in our considered opinion, it was not a fit case even to entertain the writ petition filed by a person-making grievance on grounds as raised in the petition which were not available to it since the petitioner itself had quoted 50% less than the schedule of rates. The petitioner failed to establish that its rights were infringed by the action of the Corporation in awarding contract to the 4th respondent, who happens to be the lowest bidder. We do not find any illegality or irrationality or any procedural impropriety in the decision, making process of the Corporation in arriving at the conclusion that the 4th respondent should be awarded contract. The Court has always to keep the larger public interest in mind in such like matters. Unless the decision making process is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable or the authority committed any procedural impropriety, its decision cannot be called in question. There is neither an element of public interest involved nor any mala fides are attributed. The rivalry between the two intending bidders is the root cause of this litigation. The Supreme Court in Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., observed:
When a writ petition is filed in the High Court challenging the award of a contract by a public authority or the State, the Court must be satisfied that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition. If, for example, the dispute is purely between two tenderers, the Court must be very careful to see if there is any element of public interest involved in the litigation. A mere difference in the prices offered by the two tenderers may or may not be decisive in deciding whether any public interest is involved in intervening in such a commercial transaction. It is important to bear in mind mat by Court intervention, the proposed project may be considerably delayed thus escalating the cost far more than any saving which the Court would ultimately effect in public money deciding the dispute in favour of one tenderer or the other tenderer Therefore, unless the Court is satisfied that there is a substantial amount of public interest, or the transaction is entered into mala fide, the Court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputes between two rival tenderers. (emphasis is ours)
27. Filing of the writ petition, thus, in our view, was nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. In view of the above, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
28. In result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Writ Petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Member Secretary, A.P. State Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad.