JUDGMENT
A.S. Naidu, J.
1. The Food Corporation of India has filed this Miscellaneous Appeal being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhawanipatna in M. J. C. No. 88 of 1997 refusing to restore . the Money Suit No. 133 of 1989.
2. The Food Corporation of India, in short, the Corporation’ as plaintiff, filed Money Suit No. 133 of 1989 in the court of the then Subordinate Judge, Bhawanipatna, presently redesignated as Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhawanipatna for realisation of Rs.3,27,189.65 from the respondents, who were defendants in the court below. It is alleged that the said suit was posted to 16-11-1995 for ex parte hearing. However, on the said date, due to certain inadvertent and compelling reasons, the plaintiff could not appear and filed a petition for time. Learned court below rejected the petition for time and dismissed the suit for default. On 31-3-1997 a petition was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the suit which was registered as M. J. C. No. 88 of 1997 along with a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay Learned trial court by order dated 4-10-1999 dismissed the said M.J.C. and the said order is impugned in this appeal.
3. Admittedly, the suit was dismissed on 16-11-1995 and the petition under Order 9 Rule 9, C. P. C. was filed on 31-3-1997 i. e beyond the period of limitation. The appellant-petitioner filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act stating therein that the delay has occasioned due to official non-communication of the order of dismissal as well as the
preoccupation of the Managing Director. Objection was filed by the opposite parties repudiating the plea taken.
4. The plaintiff-Corporation in order to substantiate the stand taken by it, examined one witness and exhibited one document. The Assistant Manager of the Corporation, examined as o.p.w.l, on solemn affirmation stated that the delay had been occasioned due to inadvertent reasons and that there was neither deliberate laches nor any intention to harass the opposite party-respondent.
5. On behalf of the opposite party respondent, neither any witness was examined nor any document was exhibited.
6. Learned trial court dismissed the petition under Order 9 Rule 9, C.P.C. solely on the ground that as huge amount was involved, the Corporation ought to have been more vigilant about the matter in order to save public money going astray.
7. Heard Miss. Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent at length.
8. Admirtedly, the suit was filed by the Corporation for realisation of Rs.3,27,189.65 from the defendant-respondent. This amount is claimed to be the loss sustained by the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the Government due to the alleged laches of the defendant-respondent. Thus, huge amount of public exchequer is involved in the present suit.
9. The power to condone delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit. The Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji reported in A. I. R. 1987 Supreme Court 1353 held that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that :
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties,
3. ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
10. It is common knowledge that most of the cases filed by the State or instrumentalities of the State are barred by limitation. This Court generally adopts liberal approach while considering the question of condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the lis on merits. When the instrumentality of the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos,
delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies, proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing tbe files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of attitude is not permissible. If the petitions brought by the State are lost for such default no petson is individually affected but what in tbe ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. (As observed by the Supreme Court in the case. State of Bihar v. Kameahwar Prasad Singh : A. I. R..2000 S. C. 2306).
11. This Court as well as the Apex Court in catena of decisions held that the purpose of limitation Act was not to destroy the rights but it is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for tbe general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would, transform into good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given for condonation of delay does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. (See A. I. R. 1998 S. C. 3222 : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Kishnamurthy). In the said reported decision, the Apex Court has held as follows :
"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation
Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain othet cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient. It is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even un-trammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court.”
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in the parameteria of the decisions noticed in the preceding paragraphs and with the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned. I, in the given circumstances of this case hold that sufficient cause has been made out by the appellant, which has persuaded me to disagree with the reasonings given the learned court below refusing to condone the delay in filing the petition. It is need not be said that dismissing a petition on technical grounds of limitation, would not, in any way advance the interest of justice, but admittedly would result in failure of justice inasmuch as the impugned order is likely to affect the State Exchequer. It is needless to sa’y that the paramount consideration of the Court is to safeguard the interest of all the litigants specially when it cannot be presumed that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides which ingredients are totally absent in the present case. Litigants do not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. It is well settled law that
when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for other side cannot claim to have vested right for the injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.
13. In view of the discussion made above, I feel that this is a fit case where the learned court below should have condoned the delay in filing the petition under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. and accordingly I allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct restoration of Money Suit No. 133 of 1989 pending in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhawani-patna subject to the condition that the appellant Corporation pays a sum of Rs. 3,000/-rupees three thousand only) as cost which would be just and equitable, to the respondent-opposite party. The aforesaid cost shall be paid within first week of the reopening of the court after Sumer Vacation. I further, direct that the suit being of the year 1989, the learned Court below shall do well to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible preferably by end of October, 2001.
14. Appeal allowed.