ORDER
Kanakaraj, J.
1. This is a petition to excuse the delay of 31 days in the presentation of the civil revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter called “the Act”). According to the petitioner the order of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 20 of 1992 was made on 7.4.1993. The civil revision petition was filed on 5.6.1993. Though the petitioner says in the affidavit that there are only 30 days delay in filing the revision petition, after the office returns, he admits that the delay is 31 days in filing the revision petition. Lest there should be any doubt on this aspect of the case, lam giving below the calculation of the delay:
Date of Order on 7.4.1993
Date of Application made on 12.4.1993 4 days (April)
Certified copy made ready on 9.6.1993 21 days (June)
C.R.P. filed on 5.8.1993 31 days (July)
5 days (August)
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Total 61 days
Less period of Limitation 30 days
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Delay of 31 days
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2. The office note refers to certain earlier judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 25(2) of the Act. The purport of these decisions is to the effect that the period of limitation provided under the Act is absolute and the delay if any, can be excused only upto a further period of one month and for a single day more. That proposition is not disputed befpre me but it is contended that one month comprises of 31 days. I, therefore, directed the miscellaneous petition to be numbered and ordered notice. The respondent has filed a counter-affidavit, stating that one month comprises of only 30 days.
3. This interesting question has been argued by both parties with reference to certain authorities. On behalf of the petitioner reliance is placed on Omkar v. Jagmohan Singh . Interpreting Order 41, Rule 22(1), Civil Procedure Code read with Sections 3(35) and 9 of the General Clauses Act, the court came to the conclusion that there was only ‘one month’ from 14.1.1981 to 13.2.1981 and the cross-objections were filed just in time. The court did not decide the issue whether ‘one month’ comprised of 30 days or 31 days. V.S. Mehta, In re. , the question was whether three months referred to in Section 106 of the Factories Act means three calendar months or 90 days calculated at the rate of 30 days per month. Referring to the General Clauses Act, the court held that the terms “within three months of the date” meant only three calendar months. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tamil Lahiri v. K.N. Tagore. The period of six months in Section 533-A of Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 was considered by the Apex Court and they referred to Bengal General Clauses Act and held that the expression “six months” must be construed to mean and as calendar months and not 180 days.
4. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of this Court in Varna Deva Desikar v. Murugesan Mudali (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 75. Section 40 of the Madras Rent Recovery Au prescribes that appeal by way of summary suit against an order of attachment should be filed within one month as per Section 40 of the Act. This word ‘one month’ was construed as 30 days because of a subsequent section which used the word “30 days” in respect of summary suits.
5. I am of the opinion that the above decisions do not conclusively establish that the expression ‘month’ usually means a period of 30 days or a period of 31 days. The proper way to approach this question is to proceed from the General Clauses Act and since we are concerned with the word ‘month’ in Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act, I will quote the definition of the word ‘month’ in the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act which is as follows:
month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.
I have already referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court where they say that the British Calendar means the calendar which was introduced in the year 1582 by Pope Gregory XII. The Gregorian Calendar stipulates that each ordinary year consists of 365 days and each leap year consists of 366 days. By way of historical interest one can say that prior to the above Gregorian calendar what was in usage was the Julian Calendar introduced by Julius Caesar in Rome in 46 B.C. It is, therefore, necessary for us to go into the definition of the word ‘month’ as given in various dictionaries which refer to a lunar month or the average period of revolution of the Moon around the Earth. Confining ourselves to the word “Calendar Month” it will be approximately equal to 12 divisions of a year comprising of 365 days.
6. The above approach does not completely solve the problem. In the permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, it is stated that the term ‘month’ in a statute ordinarily denotes the period terminating with day of succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. This is the method adopted in the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in interpreting the period of one month, three months, or six months respectively. I might at once say that this is the method adopted even by the Registry in calculating the period of delay. For instance, in the method of calculation which I have quoted earlier, the period of delay for the whole month to July is taken as 31 days whereas the period of delay in the month of June is taken as 21 days adopting the period of month as 30 days. Therefore, when the period of calculation extends over a number of months the court always adopts the British Calendar month for the purpose of calculating the period. But we are faced in this case as to whether the word ‘month’ used as a measure in Section 25(2) of the Act should be equated to 30 days or 31 days. In the very same permanent Edition of words and phrases it is stated that ‘month’ as contained in the proviso of the 8th section of the General Railway Law is used to express the same time as the words 30 days in the body of the section. This is more or less in accord with the judgment of this Court in Varna Deva Desikar v. Murugesan Mudali (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 75. A reference to the Halsbury’s Laws of England does not also improve the situation. For instance it is stated in the 4th edition of Halbury’s laws of England at page 147 that the method of calculation of the period one month in the last day of the succeeding month, less one day. This method of calculation of a calendar month has already been adverted to by me. To complete the reference to English dictionaries, one may refer to the standard Dictionary by Funk and Wangalls. After referring to a lunar month, the definition says that the month is equal to “one of the 12 parts into which the calendar year is divided, called a calendar month; loosely, thirty days or four weeks”. In my opinion this definition affords the best method of calculating the period of one month as the 12 parts of a year and a year under the Gregorian Calendar is 365 days. Venkatramaiya’s Law Lexicon Vol.11 at page 935 is as follows:
In the context the expression “month” meant a period of 30 days. In the Oxford Dictionary also, the following meaning is given for the expression “month”, “A space of time, reckoned from any moment, and either extending to the corresponding day of the next calendar ‘month’ (in which case space of time is called ‘a calendar month’).
7. The above quotation clearly indicates that it is only when the period of time extends to the next month, the importance of the calendar month is felt and the question of referring to the British Calendar is indicated. But when the word ‘month’ is used merely as an unit of measure. I am of the opinion that it can only refer to 30 days and not 31 days. I have already referred to the definition contained in the standard Dictionary by Funk and Wangalls and also Permanent Edition of words and phrases, in this regard. But the observations of Venkataramaiya’s Law Lexicon, above quoted, confirm my view.
8. Consequently, I hold that the word ‘month’ in Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 will comprise of only 30 days and not 31 days. Inasmuch as the petitioner has not disputed the period of delay as 31 days and inasmuch as this Court has held that the period of delay cannot be extended by reference to the Limitation Act or any other statute it follows that the delay of 31 days in this case cannot be excused. Consequently, miscellaneous petition is dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs.