JUDGMENT
N. Dhinakar, J.
1. The petitioner is the accused in C. C. No. 109 of 2001 on the file of Judicial Magistrate No. II, Metturdam, and the proceedings against him were initiated by the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 276C and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment year 1996-97.
2. In the complaint filed by the respondent, it is stated that the petitioner is a salaried employee and is assessed to income-tax and that for the assessment year 1996-97, he filed his return of income on May 16, 1997, declaring an income of Rs. 85,812, after showing a loss of Rs. 15,550 under the head “House property”. This loss of Rs. 15,550 is computed by the petitioner by claiming payment of interest on borrowals for construction of house property. The return of the petitioner was processed under Section 143(1) and a refund of Rs. 4,587 was granted on June 20, 1997. The complainant has further averred that on subsequent enquiry, it was found that the accused/petitioner did not own any house property at all, but had claimed bogus interest payments on bogus borrowals and the loss of Rs. 15,550 shown is also a bogus one and he has fraudulently obtained tax deducted at source refund amount of Rs. 4,587. It is further stated that later, the accused/petitioner admitted his bogus claim and returned the said claim under a challan dated March 3, 1999, to the Government and a show cause notice was issued to the accused/petitioner asking him to show cause as to why prosecution proceedings should not be initiated for the fraudulent claim made by him. The complainant has therefore, filed the complaint for offences under Sections 276C and 277 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1996-97, after obtaining sanction.
3. The trial commenced and P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on the side of the complainant. Later, when the case was posted for judgment, the petitioner has filed a petition with a prayer that the court has to reopen the case for further cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and for examination of the defence witnesses on the petitioner’s side. This was dismissed.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Magistrate ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to recall P.Ws. 1 and 2 to cross-examine them. I have perused the order and heard learned Senior Special Public Prosecutor for income-tax cases.
5. On going through the materials, I find no force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. It could be seen even from the petition filed by the petitioner that at the time of cross-examination, he has left out some important facts due to oversight and therefore, they have to be recalled and cross-examined. He has also stated that further cross-examination is required regarding the document filed by P.W. 1 and other important records issued by the officers of the Income-tax Department to the petitioner and his employer. The grievance of the petitioner is, therefore, not that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and that new facts had come to light after the case was closed on the contrary, the petition itself shows that he did not cross-examine P.Ws. 1 and 2 on certain points due to oversight and that further the petitioner had ample opportunity to cross examine P.W. 1 as the documents were filed at the time of chief examination and the petitioner, having not chosen to do so, cannot, at a later stage, request the court to recall the witnesses without any sufficient ground, especially when the prosecution was closed and the case was posted for judgment.
6. Further, the petitioner did not even say in the petition, that he was not permitted to examine any defence witness. The petitioner not having utilised the opportunity to examine any defence witness, cannot, at a later stage, request the court to give him opportunity to examine some defence witnesses. It looks as though the present petition was filed only to protract the proceedings and it could be seen from the order of the learned Magistrate that judgment in the connected cases was already pronounced on October 30, 2001, and the petitioner, in my view, therefore, was only trying to postpone the evil day by filing a petition at a belated point of time only to protract the proceedings. The petition has no merit and it is, therefore, dismissed.