ORDER
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. There are about 3,300 petitioners in all these writ petitions hailing from different districts in the State. Most of the petitioners are those who applied for the posts of “Special Teachers” pursuant to the advertisements issued by various Zilla Parishads in the year 1989. We are consciously using the word ‘most’ for the reason that there is a controversy whether Special Teachers posts were advertised at all in some of the districts. The petitioners seek a writ or order directing the respondents “to appoint the petitioners as Teachers to available posts of Special Teachers based on their earlier eligibility – as per G.O. Ms. No.716, (Panchayat Raj Department) dated 13-11-1981”. Interim orders were sought for to appoint them as Teachers forthwith. Reliance is sought to be placed on the orders passed by this Court while granting interim orders and we shall advert to them a little later. It may be stated that the advertisements were not only in respect of the ‘Special Teachers’ but also to other categories of teachers viz., SGBTs etc.
2. By G.O. Ms. No.429 (Education (I) Department, dated 13-10-1983, the State Government decided to create the posts of
‘Special Teachers’ and ‘Special Language Pandits’. The Special Teachers were to be allotted to the Single Teacher Schools and the Special Language Pandits to the Upper Primary Schools. The qualification prescribed for Special Teachers are: (i) Minimum General Educational qualification prescribed in the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules; (ii) A trained Teacher’s Certificate of Secondary Grade or an equivalent thereto or the Certificate of Teacher Training Institute (Intermediate trained). For Special Language Pandits, the qualification prescribed was ‘oriental title’ in the language concerned with training qualification. The G.O. stipulates that the teachers appointed against these posts shall be paid a fixed salary of Rs.398/- per month without eligibility for other allowances. It was also stipulated that the appointments were on tenure basis for a period co-terminus with the academic year. The age limit for appointment, rules of reservations, the authorities for conducting the tests and interviews were also prescribed by the said G.O. At this stage itself, one important stipulation laid down in G.O. No.429 deserves notice:
“The procedure for selection as laid down in G.O. Ms. No.716 (Panchayat Raj) dated 13-11-1981 shall be followed by the District Selection Committees regarding calling of candidates from Employment Exchanges written examination, interview etc.”
On the same day i.e. 13-10-1983, G.O. Ms. No.430 was issued creating 14,621 posts of Special Teachers and 2,117 posts of Special Language Pandits. Additional sanction of posts was made by the subsequent G.Os. Orders were issued later on that the Special Teachers and Special Language Pandits who are selected, are eligible for absorption against regular vacancies of teachers if they are fully qualified to hold the posts. In G.O. Ms. No.68 (Education – EE Department) dated 28-2-1989, die Government, after reviewing the policy in regard to Special Teachers, ordered that all the existing vacancies of the special Teachers
may be filled up immediately and the posts of Special Language Teachers and Special PETs should not be filled up. It was also directed that the Special Teachers work should be watched for a period of three years and only those whose performance was satisfactory will be considered for absorption against appropriate posts carrying regular scales of pay subject to availability of vacancies and Rules governing recruitment to the posts. This decision was taken in the aftermath of the litigation which went upto Supreme Court in which the Special Teachers sought payment of salary on par with regular teachers on the principle of “equal pay for equal work”.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that they were selected after the written test and interview and their names find place in the merit list prepared by the Selection Committees and therefore, they are entitled for appointment as Special Teachers irrespective of expiry of the period of one year from the date of preparation of the list. For this purpose, the petitioners rely on Rule (para)-17 of Annexure-II to G.O. Ms. No.716 dated 13-11-1981 which reads as follows:
“The list of candidates referred to in para-14 above shall be valid till another list for the succeeding year is prepared.”
It is the contention of the petitioners that the procedure for selection prescribed by G.O. Ms. No.716 is made applicable in terms of G.O. Ms. No.429 which created the posts of Special Teachers and the above extracted Rule squarely applies and the respondents concerned are bound to issue appointment orders without invoking the plea of expiry of currency of the panel or list. The respondents submit that with the advent of G.O. Ms. No..231 (Panchayat Raj Dept) dated 31 -3-1989, which was issued in exercise of statutory power under the proviso to Article-309 read with relevant provisions of the Acts governing Panchayat Raj institutions, the only procedure applicable is the one laid down in the said G.O. and G.O. Ms. No.716 has been and must be deemed to
have been superseded. At this juncture, we may note that Rule (para) 9(g) of G.O. Ms. No.231 lays down “that the panel approved by the District Selection Committee shall be valid for a period of one year from the date of its approval”.
4. Thus, the contentious issue which has been prominently raised in these writ petitions is whether Rule-17 of G.O. Ms. No.716 or Rule-9(g) of G.O. Ms. No.231 applies. We should, therefore, take stock of the relevant rules governing the selection and preparation of lists and allotment of candidates as per the G.Os. As already noticed, G.O. Ms. No.716 has no direct application to the recruitment of posts of Special Teachers. G.O. Ms. No.429 under which Special Teachers posts were created, by an executive order enjoins that the procedure for selection as laid down in G.O. Ms. No.716 has to be followed. G.O. No.716 is a statutory notification issued in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution read with the relevant provisions of A.P. Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act (since repealed). Thus, the rules of selection and allotment were engrafted into the subject of appointment of Special Teachers. It may also be noticed that in G.O. No.231 on which the respondents are placing reliance, there is no mention of the posts of Special Teachers as seen from Annexure-I to the G.O.
5. Coming to the relevant provisions in the two G.Os, both G.O. Ms. No.716 and 231 provide that the appointing authority shall furnish every year in the first week of July the estimated number of vacancies likely to arise over a period of 12 months to the District Collector/District Development Officer together with the particulars of vacancies reserved for socially and educationally backward classes. The District Collector/District Development Officer as the case may be shall address the Employment Exchange with a request to sponsor the names of eligible candidates. As regards the minimum marks, G.O. Ms. No.716
enjoins that the candidates securing 30 marks become eligible for interview. In the case of SC, ST and EC candidates, the requirement of minimum marks for interview is dispensed with. A candidate shall be deemed to be qualified if he gets 40 marks in both written and oral tests. In the case of SC, ST and EC candidates, even if this minimum marks is not obtained, candidates who have secured higher marks shall be appointed in the order of their merit. G.O. Ms. No.231 enjoins that a candidate should secure a minimum of 40 marks both in written and oral tests to become eligible for selection as Teachers against open competition. For SC and ST candidates, the minimum qualifying mark is 20 and for BC candidates, the minimum is 25. As per G.O. Ms. No.231, the selection of candidates is limited to the number of vacancies notified. Moreover, the selected candidates to the extent of 50% of the notified vacancies shall be kept in ‘Waiting List’. There is no such provision in G.O. No.716 which indicates that the selection should be confined to the number of vacancies notified or estimated. Then, the following rule which is a common feature in both G.Os deserve to be noticed.
“The Collector shall arrange a list of candidates who have secured 40% of marks in written and oral test in the order of merit and allot candidates strictly in the order of merit as recorded in the selection list subject, however, to the rule of special representation in paras 9 and 12”.
The only changes in G.O. Ms, No.231 are: Instead of ‘District Collector’, ‘District Development Officer’ is mentioned and instead of paras 9 and 12, ‘Rule-9’ is mentioned. Another Rule which is common is that the Dt. Collector or Dt. Development Officer, as the case may be, shall within a week of finalisation of selection, allot candidates to the appointing authorities concerned, who shall issue orders of appointment subject to verification of antecedents etc.
6. As far as the currency of the list is concerned, we have already noticed the material
difference and for the sake of convenience, we shall extract the two Rules. Para-17 of Annexure-II to G.O. No.716:
“The list of candidates referred to in para-14 above shall be valid till another list for the succeeding year is prepared.”
Para-14 requires the District Collector to allot candidates to the appointing authorities within a week of finalisation of the selection.
7. Para 15 of Annexure to G.O. No.231 lays down:
“The list of candidates referred to in para-12 above shall be valid for one year only from the date of its approval.”
Para-12 requires the District Development Officer to allot candidates to the appointing authorities within a week of finalisation of selection.
8. The composition of Selection Committee as per two G.Os had undergone changes from time to time and it is not necessary to refer to them. But one fact has to be noted here. G.O. Ms. No.369 (Panchayat Raj) dated 17-6-1987 purports to supersede the notification issued in G.O. No.716 and G.O. No.393 dated 24-6-1987 supersedes the notification issued in G.O. No.369. But, it is seen that in G.O. Ms. Nos.369 and 393, the change effected is only with regard to composition of the District Selection Committees. Ad hoc Rules to that effect were framed. It is the contention of the Counsel for the petitioners that the entire GO. No.716 including the procedure for selection was not intended and meant to be superseded by G.O. Nos.369 and 393.
9. Now, we shall refer to the events that have taken place after the selection process was gone through in the year 1989-90 by various District Selection Committees. Some of the petitioners herein filed applications -RPs No.23505 of 1989 etc., before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal complaining against the inaction of the respondents in not appointing
them as ‘Special Teachers’ despite their valid selection. On the pleadings and contentions urged before the Tribunal, four points were framed for determination. Points 1 and 4 are relevant for our purposes:
1. What is the currency of the select lists prepared for the purpose of ‘Special Teachers’? Whether it is current till the next list is prepared as urged for the applicant or for one year from the date of approval as urged for the respondents.”
4. To what relief the applicants are entitled?
As regards the first point, the Tribunal answered the question in favour of the applicants holding that the provisions made in G.O. No.231 cannot govern the selection to the posts of ‘Special Teachers’ and that the mode of selection stipulated in G.O. No.716 exclusively governs their selection. It was also made clear that this conclusion does not hold good as regards the select lists prepared by DSCs for all other posts.
10. The relief granted insofar as it is relevant to the present writ petitions is as follows:
“We declare that the currency of the Select Lists for the posts of Special Teachers prepared by the DSCs was governed by Rule-17 of G.O. Ms. No.716.
We declare that those selected and kept in the Select lists prepared prior to 14-8-1989 except those that are deleted or de-listed before or hereafter are entitled for appointments on the basis of rankings assigned to them in the select lists for the number of resultant vacancies which exist in that District to the number of posts allocated to that district and not more than that and that any excess appointments made in any district can be terminated following the principle of ‘last come first go’.
We direct the respondent to modulate the claims of the applicants for selections and
appointments in accordance with our declarations and observations made in this order with expedition.”
11. We consider it appropriate to mention at this juncture that the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the directions extracted above, and we must say that this order of the Tribunal is the sheet-anchor of the petitioners case. Although the first direction extracted above is very clear, we are constrained to observe that the second and most crucial direction is couched in somewhat ambiguous terms giving rise to varying interpretations by both sides.
12. After the said judgment of the Tribunal rendered on 22-8-1990. The State Government issued G.O. Ms. No.301, Education (EE) dated 21-11-1990 partly to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal. Para-5 of the G.O. gives an indicia as to how the Government understood the order of the Tribunal. This is what is recited in the G.O.:
“The Tribunal has ordered while passing orders in RP Nos.23505 to 23514 of 1989 and batch, that those selected and kept in the waiting lists are entitled for appointment on the basis of ranking assigned to them in the select lists.”
The following instructions were issued by the Government in G.O. No.301:
“6. Government after careful review of ‘the entire issue of Special Teachers in the light of the several representations received, direct, that:
(i) in partial modification of the orders issued in the G.Os read above, all vacancies of Special Teachers for which the District Selection Committee selected candidates during 1989 and kept them in the waiting list panel, may also be filled up until the waiting list panel candidates are exhausted and
(ii) the panels insofar as recruitment of teachers is concerned prepared in
accordance with the instructions contained in G.O. Ms. No.231, Panchayat Raj Department, dated 31-3-1989 shall be operative till all the candidates in the waiting list panel are exhausted as against the panel validity of one year from the date of empanelment as per existing guidelines.
7. Government further direct that once the existing District-wise panels are exhausted the scheme of Special Teachers and Special Language Pandits/Special PETs introduced in G.O. Ms. No.429 Education dated 13-10-1988 shall be discontinued and that there shall be no future recruitment of Special Teachers.”
This was followed by another G.O. No.678, dated 28-11-1990 issued by the Panchayat Raj Department purporting to amend the ad hoc rules in G.O. Ms. No.393 (Panchayat Raj) dated 24-6-1987. The amendment reads as follows:
“Provided that the panel prepared for Special Teachers shall be valid and operative until all the candidates in the panel are exhausted.”
13. There seems to be some faux pas here. There is no para 9(g) in G.O. No.393 nor is there any annexure to the said G.O. Para9(g) or G.O. No.231 is the provision which the Government was obviously referring to the Government (Panchayat Raj Dept.) by its Memo dated 11-9-1992 (vide page43 of Volume-I of the Material Paper Book) clarified that as per G.O. Ms. No.301, the panels prepared shall be operative till all the candidates in the waiting list are exhausted. It was also stated therein that the panel prepared by the District Selection Committee shall hold good till a new Committee prepares a new panel.
14. The next event to be noticed is that the Government (PR Dept) issued G.O. Ms. No.568 dated 21-12-1992 directing the District Collectors to convene the meeting of the District
Selection Committee for recruitment including recruitment to the posts of teachers in Mandal Praja Parishads and Zilla Parishads. The Government further directed that the ‘qualified teachers’ be allowed to appear in one more special selection test duly extending the concession of relaxation of age and allowing weightage of 7 marks in the written test and 5 marks in the oral test. The amendment to the said G.O. extending the special concession to qualified teachers was withdrawn on 23-2-1994 on a further consideration. Meanwhile, from January, 1993 onwards, most of the petitioners herein filed writ petitions No.518 of 1993 etc challenging G.O. Ms. No.568 dated 21-12-1992 and to give effect to the selections made in the year 1989 and also sought a direction not to go in for a fresh selection. They also sought for a prayer to declare the Administrative Tribunals Act as unconstitutional. The challenge to the said Act was obviously made for the reason that there was a bar against the High Court entertaining the Writ petitions etc., pertaining to the service matters of the employees of the State Government including Panchayat Raj institutions. The first petitioner in the first WP No.17104 of 1993 was also the first petitioner in first WP No.518 of 1993 dealt with by the Full Bench. Incidentally, he was also one of the petitioners in RPs filed before the Administrative Tribunal in the year 1989. A batch of writ petitions including those filed by the applicants for Special Teachers were disposed of by the Full Bench by a landmark judgment in Sakinala Harinath v. Stale of Andhra Pradesh, declaring Article 323-A(2-d) of the Constitution of India as unconstitutional to the extent it empowers the Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Consequently, it was further declared that Section 28 of Administrative Tribunals Act is also unconstitutional. In other words, the Full Bench held that the power of judicial review inhering in the constitutional Courts remained unaffected notwithstanding the exclusion of jurisdiction by the Parliament. At the same time, the Full Bench made the following crucial
observations, while declining to go into the merits of the individual grievances:
‘ ‘As the vires of no statute is questioned in any of the writ petitions, we are of the view that the petitioners should approach the Andhra Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for redressal of their grievances; when the petitioners have an effective alternative remedy, we are not inclined to adjudicate the individual merits of any case. If the petitioners approach the Administrative Tribunal, it shall entertain their representations and dispose of them in accordance with law.”
The judgment of Full Bench was delivered on 26-10-1993. The Full Bench judgment was questioned by the Union of India and the State of Andhra Pradesh before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted stay of operation of the judgment. Eventually, in the year 1997, in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, PAR 1997 SC 1125 the Full Bench judgment was substantially upheld by the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench. We will refer to that case a little later. The Full Bench judgment had left no choice to the petitioners – at least to most of them whose writ petitions were disposed of by the Full Bench, except to approach the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal for redressal of their grievances. But, undaunted by the explicit observations and categorical holding by the Full Bench, the petitioners started another round of litigation in this Court by filing the present writ petitions and that has been done barely within a month after Full Bench disposed of the matters. The ostensible justification for filing the writ petitions instead of moving the Administrative Tribunal and thereby by-passing the remedy, which was considered to be proper and appropriate by the Full Bench, is to be found in the following statement in the affidavit filed in support of writ petitions:
“….. when arguments were addressed the learned Judges of the Full Bench expressed
the view that they would take up only the constitutional question involved but not decide merits of the individual cases. In the result the constitutional question was considered and answered by holding that ….. But unfortunately the main cases themselves were disposed of without considering the merits of the cases and whether there is really an alternative remedy and whether an approach to it is merely an empty formality and foregone conclusion and whether the so-called alternative remedy is illusory and whether Articles 14 and 16 are directly violated or not and that issue is left open”.
A little later, it is further stated: “it is significant to note that when once a point is already covered by an earlier decision no purpose can be served by approaching the same body and same cannot be said to have been effective or alternative remedy…..” It is on this logic, which is in direct conflict with the observations made by the Full Bench, the present writ petitions came to be filed bringing in its wake controversies turning on the interim reliefs granted or declined to be granted by this Court. To complete the narrative, a brief reference to the interim orders granted by this Court and the observations made by the learned Judges while disposing of the writ appeals preferred against the said interim orders, needs to be made. Pending the writ petitions filed in November. 1993, 911 petitioners in Writ Petition NOT. 17104,17105 and 17106 of 1993 got the interim orders. On 12-11-1993 directing the respondents to appoint them on ad hoc basis as Special Teachers subject to the result of the writ petition with a further stipulation that they should forthwith vacate their appointments without raising any dispute in case they fail in the writ petition. It was further made clear that only those petitioners who have secured qualifying marks and whose names are found in the select list shall be given appointments in the order of merit subject to availability of vacancies. This order passed by Subhashan Reddy, J was substantially confirmed by S.R. Nayak, J in an elaborate
Order passed on 8-9-1994. The two important directions granted by the learned Judge in those three writ petitions by way of interim relief are extracted below:
(i) The respondents – State and Panchayat Raj Institutions are directed to prepare a select list of all those writ petitioners who have secured 40% of the marks in both written and oral tests strictly in accordance with Rule 13 of G.O. Ms. No.716, dated 13-11-1981 and appoint all those writ petitioners who find a place in such select list as Teachers subject to the same terms and conditions specified in the interim order of this Court dated 12-11-1993 made in WPMP 21607, 21608 and 21609 of 1993.
(ii) The respondents-State and Panchayat Raj Institutions are further directed not to make any direct recruitment for the posts of teachers unless and until they comply with me direction No.(i) issued supra;”
Subject to the above modification, the other conditions stipulated by Subhashan Reddy, J were reiterated. While disposing of WPMPs, the learned Judge underscored the respondent’s obligation to give effect to the interim directions issued by the Court on 12-11-1993 notwithstanding the stay of operation of the judgment of Full Bench. The learned Judge S.K. Nayak, J. refuted the arguments advanced on behalf of the Government that the preparation of the select list and currency for the posts was governed by G.O. Ms. No.231, but not G.O. No.716, the common orders passed by S.R. Nayak, J. were the subject-matter of writ appeals. The Division Bench closed the writ appeals on the undertaking of the Counsel for the State Government that 912 posts of Special Teachers will be kept vacant until the disposal of the main writ petitions. Review petitions were filed against this order dated 21-1-1995 contending inter, alia that no purpose will be served by keeping 912 posts vacant and that the decision of
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court may not be rendered in the near future. The Bench, while observing that they would not have closed the writ appeals, recording the assurance of the Government’s Counsel had they been apprised of the feet that the G.O. which formed the basis for such assurance was suspended by the Administrative Tribunal, allowed the review petitions and disposed of the writ appeals with the following directions:
“The State Government shall appoint the petitioners in WP Nos.17104, 17105 and 17106 of 1993 within four weeks from today as Special Teachers” on a monthly fixed remuneration of Rs.398/- and their appointments will be subject to review in the light of the decision that will be rendered in the writ petitions.”
The writ petitions were directed to be posted after decision in CA No. 169 of 1994 and batch (Chandra Kumar’s case, supra). Although in the writ appeals, the Court was concerned with the propriety, correctness or otherwise of the interim orders passed by the learned single Judge, certain views were expressed by the learned Judges on the merits of the controversy. The Division Bench mainly stressed on the fact that the order of the Administrative Tribunal passed in the first batch – RP No.23505 of 1989 etc became final and the same was binding on the State Government. It was not open to the State Government to rely on the subsequent decision of the Tribunal in OANo.2400of 1994. I may be noted here that the Division Bench, apart from enunciating this principle, did not go into the exact scope and implications of the directions issued by the Tribunal in its order dated 22-8-1990 in RP No.23505 of 1995 and batch. We are informed that pursuant to the order of the Division Bench, almost all the petitioners in the three writ petitions were given appointment orders and they are now working as Special Teachers. It is however pertinent to mention here that the petitioners other than those covered by WPsNo.17104, 17105 and 17106 of 1993 could not get any interim relief in the
hands of the learned single Judge for the reason that by the date the WPMPs came up for hearing, the Supreme Court’s order staying the operation of the Full Bench judgment was in force and that, according to the learned Judge, impliedly placed a restraint on the jurisdiction of this Court to grant relief in service matters.
15. Having given an account of events
that have steered the course of litigation for nearly a decade, we shall now set out the substance of the respective contentions advanced before us, some of which have been
broadly indicated earlier.
16. The arguments of the learned senior Counsel for petitioners, Sri S.Ramachandra Rao run on these lines: It is G.O. No.716 which governs the currency to the panel or select list but not G.O. No.231. That it is so is evident from the decision of the Tribunal rendered on 22-8-1990, the finding of the learned single Judge while disposing of WPMPs on 17-8-1994 and the dicta of the Division Bench in Government of A.P v. M, Uma Maheshwar Rao, reiterating the decision of the Administrative Tribunal in the first batch of cases. If Para-17 of Annexure-II to G.O. No.716 applies, according to the petitioners Counsel, all those OC candidates who have got 40% or more marks and all the qualified SC, ST and EC candidates irrespective of minimum marks who find place in the merit list – at times loosely described as panel, should be appointed to the extent of vacancies available in the concerned districts – not only present but future vacancies that may arise till the exhaustion of ‘panel’. There cannot be any time limit for appointment, the only limit being preparation of a new panel or list after the next selection. The Rules in Annexure-II to G.O. No.716 have not been superseded by G.O. No.369 dated 17-6-1987 though the notification issued under the latter G.O. purports to say so. Even if it is assumed for a moment that G.O. No.716 is superseded, still selection procedure laid down therein will continue to govern the
recruitment to the posts of Special Teachers as the pivotal G.O. namely G.O. 429 follows the procedure under G.O. No.716 by way of reference. The supersession was only with respect to composition of District Selection Committee and categories of posts. The learned Counsel presses into service the two G.Os namely 301 and 678 issued in the year 1990 (after the Administrative Tribunal’s Order) which provide that the Special Teacher panels shall be valid and operative until all the candidates in the- panel are exhausted.
According to the petitioners Counsel, the petitioners are in the panel or deemed to be so. G.O. No.231 has no application because the post of Special Teacher is not one of the posts specified therein. It is also contended that the information given in the additional counter that special teachers posts were not notified in eight districts is factually wrong. Further, the policy decision taken by the Government to keep the panels/waiting list alive till they are exhausted should be given effect to, without placing bar on upper age limit against the petitioners. There are a large number of vacancies of teachers available in the State and there is no reason why the petitioners who have agitated for long should not be absorbed against such vacancies instead of going in for fresh recruitment. The subsequent abolition of Special Teachers posts should not come in the way of implementation of the panel already formed. It is also contended that the very feet that in some of the Districts like West Godavari, Notifications calling for applications for Special Teachers post were issued even before G.O. No.231 was premulgated will indicated that the respondents were having in view only the procedure as laid down in G.O. No.716. It is pointed out that if G.O. No.716 is not to be looked into, there is no other Rule governing the selection of Special Teachers and there will be vacuum. It is finally contended that those petitioners who could not get the interim orders on account of the supervening event of Full Bench decision of this Court being kept under suspended animation by the order of the Supreme Court, stand on the same footing as 911 petitioners
who could secure the interim orders inasmuch as the Full Bench decision has been ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court.
17. The arguments of the learned Advocate-General appearing for respondents are as follows: In view of the rule firmly laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar’s case (supra) that the High Court should not act as a Court of Original jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees governed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal Act, should first approach the Tribunal, the writ petitions are not maintainable. It is pointed out mat the petitioners did not approach the Tribunal in the first instance. Moreover, the Tribunal’s decisions were not uniform as regards the applicability of G.O. No.716 and other allied issues. If at all, the matters will have to be decided by a Full Bench of the Tribunal afresh but not directly by the High Court as an original Court. Even on the pleadings and the data of selections furnished to the Court, mere are quite a number of disputed questions of fact that ought to be properly investigated by the Tribunal. As regards G.O. No.716, it is contended that it stands superseded by G.O. No.369 dated 17-6-1987 and G.O. No.231 has emerged as a substitute for G.O. No,716 and it lays down the selection procedure in general. There is no good reason why the procedure in G.O. No.231 applicable for recruitment to the regular posts of teachers and other posts in the establishments of Zilla Praja Parishads should not govern the selection and appointment of Special Teachers. The mere fact that Special Teachers posts were not mentioned in G.O. No.231 is not of material significance. There is no bar to switch over to the procedure prescribed by G.O. No.231 after the G.O. was promulgated on 31-3-1989. The more important submission made by the learned Advocate-General in the written arguments is that even if the procedure laid down in G.O. No.716 continues to govern the selection and appointment of Special teachers, the petitioners will not stand to gain anything. The petitioners’ contention that all the qualified
candidates who crossed 40% marks and all the candidates belonging to SC, ST and EC who appeared for interview and whose names find place in the ranking list should be offered appointments is not supported by any provision contained in G.O. No.716. Para 17 of G.O. No.716 only makes a reference to the list of candidates ‘referred to in para-14 above’, and such list alone will be valid till another list for the succeeding year is prepared. The list referred to in para-14 is the allotment list prepared by the District Collector and sent to the appointing authorities soon after the selection. Such allotment is obviously and necessarily correlated to the vacancies, the estimation of which has already been sent by the appointing authorities to the District Collector before the advertisement was issued. Otherwise, para-13 would not have spoken of allotment of candidates and order of merit nor would there have been any need for Rule-14. So, Rule-17 must be read in conjunction with Rule-14 and both must be harmonised. To demand that the list of candidate who qualified themselves for appointment in the year 1989 should be given effect to until all such candidates in the list are exhausted irrespective of the number of years that rolled by is opposed to the ordinary principles of recruitment and unsupported by the very rule on which the petitioners seek reliance. It is submitted that G.O. No.231 contemplated 50% being empanelled in the waiting list over and above the notified or estimated vacancies and G.O. No.231 has thus provided better opportunities to the applicants for the Special Teachers posts. By G.O. No.301 dated 21-11-1990, the vacancies of the Special Teachers were directed to be filled up till the waiting list candidates were exhausted irrespective of the expiry of the life of the panel. Accordingly, this has been done and all the wait-listed candidates have been appointed. As pointed out in the counter-affidavit as well as additional counter, the petitioners could not get the opportunity of appointment despite giving effect to this relaxed norm, G.O. No.678 dated 28-11-1990 which introduced the amendment to para 9(g) of Annexure-U to G.O. No.231
should be understood in the light of G.O. No.301 issued a week earlier. The panel referred to therein represents the selected candidates equivalent to number of vacancies notified and 50% in excess thereof to be kept in waiting list. It is then submitted that the approved panel or select list in any recruitment cannot operate indefinitely and future vacancies cannot be thrown open to the petitioners to the detriment of better qualified younger generation who may also be in dire need of employment. Reliance is placed on the observations and findings of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal in OANo.2400 of 1994. It is then contended that even going by the relief granted by the Tribunal in the earlier batch of cases disposed of in 1990, the petitioners did not have a legitimate claim for appointment. Though the learned Members of the Tribunal held in the first batch that G.O. No.716 applies, still the operative part of the direction makes it clear that the appointment should be limited to the number of vacancies which existed in the district and the number of posts allocated to that district and “not more than that”. Therefore, it is submitted that the reliance placed on the Tribunal’s judgment in RP No.23505 of 1989 and batch is misconceived. In any case, it is submitted that many of the petitioners were not parties to the said judgment and it cannot be said that there is already an adjudication by the Tribunal in favour of all the petitioners. It is finally contended that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Government of A.P. v. Uma Maheshwar Rao (supra) apart from being an adjudication in an interlocutory proceeding, cannot be considered to be a binding precedent and goes counter to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar’s case (supra). Relying upon the additional counter-affidavit, it is pointed out that in some districts, special teachers posts were not advertised at all. It is also pointed out that many of the petitioners are ineligible for appointment, whatever view is taken on the rule position. Further, it is asserted that the first judgment of the Tribunal which has become final, has been implemented in letter and spirit and the
petitioners cannot still take shelter under the said judgment.
18. We have thought it necessary to set out the long history of the litigation and the contentious issues in detail not because we are deciding the case on merits but only to pinpoint the issues of controversy so as to judge whether as per the rule so firmy laid down in Chandra Kumar’s case, the approach to this Court in the first instance under Articles 226/ 227 is barred and whether the facts of the case justify any deviation from the said rule. The answer of the learned Counsel for the petitioners for by-passing the remedy which the petitioners ought to have availed of in normal course is that the Administrative Tribunal had already decided the issue in favour of the petitioners way back in 1990 and that the decision of the Tribunal should be given full effect to, as observed by the Division Bench in (supra)- The denial of relief notwithstanding the decision of the Tribunal which has attained finality is what is being questioned in these writ petitions coupled with a plea that a situation like this docs not warrant the application of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court. This submission of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, having regard to the observations and the clear declaration of the Full Bench that the Court was not prepared to go into the grievances of the petitioners on merits and the petitioners will have to seek redressal before the Administrative Tribunal, there is no option left to the petitioners but to approach the Tribunal to agitate their claims. Otherwise, it would amount to stultifying the ultimate orders passed by the Full Bench in . Despite the positive direction of the Full Bench, the petitioners made bold to once again approach this Court pleading an untenable ground of justification as apparent from the paragraph extracted at pages 20 and 21 supra. In our view, the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata comes into play to forestall a Writ Petition of this nature filed in defiance of the directive given by the Full
Bench. The relief sought for in the earlier writ petitions which were disposed of by the Full Bench and the points raised therein including the finality of the Tribunal’s decision are substantially similar to the relief now sought for and the contentions now raised Having either abandoned these points in the course of final hearing or being under a legal duty to abide by the direction of the Full Bench, it is not open to the petitioners to gain a fresh entry into this Court by reviving the very same complaint made earlier before the Full Bench the complaint regarding the validity of the Act. The course of action adopted by the petitioner-flies in the face of the explicit mandate in the last para of the Full Bench judgment. What is more, the move of the petitioners is in direct clash with the categorical declaration of law by the Supreme Court that the High Court should not act as a Court of first instance but should only exercise the power of Judicial Review of the Tribunals’ decisions. The fact that some of the petitioners approached the Tribunal earlier and got a decision which according to the petitioners is favourable to them, does not as already indicated and for the reasons hereinafter stated, afford an adequate justification for bypassing the verdict of the Full Bench of this Court and the ruling of the Supreme Court.
19. It seems to us that undue reliance is being placed by the petitioners on the Tribunal’s order dated 22-8-1990 which settled the principle that it is the procedure under G.0.716 with regard to the currency of panels that will apply to the appointment of Special Teachers. As already noticed, whether G.O. 716 ceases to apply in view of its purported supersession by G.O. 369 and whether the procedure laid down therein has to be followed even after the advent of G.O. 231 is one aspect of the matter. Leaving the question of applicability of G.O. 716apartfor the time being and also excluding from consideration the different view taken by another Bench of the Tribunal, there still remain many questions which have got to be answered. The applicability or otherwise of
Rule 17 of G.O. 716 is not going to be the ending point of controversy. We have already given a resume of the controversial points that would arise. Briefly stated, the broad question would be:
20. Is it necessary that even if para 17 of G.O. 716applies,allthequalifiedcandidates in OC category who have obtained 40% and above marks and all SC/ST/BC candidates who appeared for interview in the year 1989 and thereby got the eligibility should be offered appointments for the vacancies arising year after year till the new list is prepared?
21. The other questions are: What exactly is the interpretation to be given to para 17 of G.O. 716? What is the true scope and effect of the direction given by APAT in RP No.23505/89 and batch and whether that order of the Tribunal was in fact implemented by offering appointments to the qualified candidates to the extent of vacancies estimated or notified and to the additional extent of 50% kept in the waiting list without insisting on the time limit of one year? Certain factual questions-whether in some of the Districts, if not all the Districts which are mentioned in the additional counter, the Special Teachers posts were advertised at all and which of the petitioners are eligible for appointment even if the broad contention of the petitioners is accepted need to be probed. These and allied questions will have to be decided. In this state of things, there can be no adjudication by the High Court for the first time in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution as these questions were not decided earlier by the Tribunal. However much we wish to adjudicate the dispute on merits in order to shorten the course of litigation, we are of the undoubted view that we cannot do so without disregarding the Full Bench decision of this Court and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar’s case. We cannot carve out exceptions to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court treating the mandate of Supreme Court on the same footing as the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedies. That
would practically amount to diluting the effect of law declared by the Supreme Court. The argument that the Tribunal had already decided the matter in the year 1990 and nothing more needs to be done except reiterating the same principle and directing implementation of the decision of the Tribunal is nothing but an act of over-simplification. We are therefore constrained to reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners vehemently advanced in an obvious attempt to wriggle out of the legal bar created by Chandra Kumar ‘s case as well as by the Full Bench decision of High Court in the case of the very same petitioners. It would in fact be more proper and appropriate that the entire package of issues goes before the Administrative Tribunal in the first instance, now that the Supreme Court has recently settled the controversy as regards the course of remedies available to the aggrieved persons.
22. We therefore dismiss these writ petitions without expressing any view on the merits of the case. We leave it open to the petitioners to move the A.P. Administrative Tribunal for appropriate relief. We are informed that after the Division Bench disposed of the writ appeals against the interim orders granted by the learned single Judge in Uma Maheswar Rao’s case (supra), almost all the petitioners, who were parties to the writ appeals (about 900 in number) were appointed as Special Teachers as per the directions of the Division Bench subject to the result of these writ petitions, In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, they will have to relinquish their jobs provided to them as an interim measure. As we have not decided the writ petitions on merits and as the petitioners have been pursuing a misconceived remedy, we consider it just and proper to direct the respondents to maintain status quo in regard to their appointments for a period of four months from today so that the Tribunal may either dispose of the petitions that may be filed before them or in the alternative pass appropriate interim orders. We are confident that the learned Members of the Tribunals
would endeavour to dispose of the petitions with utmost expedition so that the long standing dispute may be resolved without further loss of time. If it is not possible to dispose of the matters within a period of four months, the Tribunal may consider, having due regard to all relevant considerations, the question of continuing the status quo.
23. Subject to the above observations, the writ petitions are dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
24. Before parting with these cases, we would like to express our disapproval of the practice of combining the petitioners from various Districts in one writ petitions though the selections and appointments are not Statewide, but district-wise. There is no indication in some of the writ petitions as to which of the petitioners were interviewed by which Zilla Parishad. This problem of misjoinder of parties is more apparent in the earliest of writ petitions filed. The Registry should have objected to the filing of such omnibus petitions. By allowing such petitions to be filed, the respondents as well as the Court will be handicapped in ascertaining the true facts in relation to each of the petitioners, if such exercise is warranted.
25. The respondents too have their share of blame. The additional counter which has been filed by an Assistant Secretary to the Government in the Education Department is conspicuous by its vagueness, elusive answers and defectively framed sentences. The learned Counsel for the petitioners is prima facie right in saying that the informations furnished in the additional counter with regard to the absence of notification for Special Teachers posts are not accurate. We are also distressed to note that the learned Advocate-General, despite taking adjournments could not get the relevant records with necessary information about the panels and the waiting lists and the actual appointments made. Only in regard to Nalgonda district, certain records were produced and some assistance was available.
As regards some other Districts, only ranking lists were filed. As we have decided not to go into the merits of the cases, we are not contemplating to take any action of this failure or inaction on the part of the respondents.
P. VENKATARAMA REDDI
26. The above cases disposed of on 8-7-1998 are taken up on this date on a mention made by the Counsel. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri S. Ramachandra Rao that instead of the petitioners being driven to the necessity of filing separate applications at this stage, the writ petitions filed in this Court together with the material papers may be transmitted to the A.P. Administrative Tribunal for treating them as Original Applications filed before the Tribunal. It is pointed out that a large number of unemployed petitioners are involved and if fresh OAs are to be filled before the Tribunal, it would be a time-consuming process apart from the expense involved. The learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the directions given by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16872 to 16875 of 1996. Their Lordships while following the seven Judge Bench decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, and holding that High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions directly, set aside the order of the High Court and gave the following directions:
“We, therefore, accept these appeals and set aside the order of the learned single Judge, as also of the Division Bench and remit the writ petitions filed in the High Court to the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, where the same shall be treated as Original Applications and disposed of in accordance with law. The time spent in the High Court and in this Court shall not be put against the writ petitioners while deciding their cases.”
27. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State has expressed no
objection in principle to the course of action, suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioners.
28. Having regard to the long drawn litigation in these matters and in view of the fact that we ourselves stressed the need for early disposal of the applications by the Administrative Tribunal, we consider it a fit case to dispense with the formalities. Accordingly, we direct that the Original files together with the material papers filed in the writ petitions shall be forwarded by the Registry to the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal may treat them as OAs and dispose them of as per law subject to the condition that in each of the writ petitions, the Counsel shall file the details pertaining to their hall ticket numbers and the districts in which they appeared for the interviews and such other information as the Tribunal may deem fit and proper to insist. Sufficient number of paper books etc., as the Tribunal considers necessary, may be filed. The petitioners’ Counsel shall substitute the true copies of the writ petitions, counters, rejoinders and WPMPs filed in each of the cases which shall be kept for the record of the Registry of the High Court, within a period of two weeks.