ORDER
Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. Guidelines issued by the Government of India in terms of proviso to Regulations 19(1) of the Canara Bank Officers Services Regulations, 1979 provide that while officer employees of the Bank recruited/promoted prior to 19th of July 1969 shall retire on completion of 60 years of age, those recruited on or after the said date shall do so at the age of 58 years. The petitioner’s case in the present Writ Petition is that he was recruited prior to 19th July 1969 and is therefore entitled to retire from the Bank’s service only on completion of 60 years age. The Respondent-Bank, however, disputes this position and contends that the petitioner had been recruited after the crucial date and therefore is bound to retire on completion of 58 years of age. The short question that falls for determination is as to what exactly does the word ‘recruited’ as appearing in the guidelines aforementioned mean and when shall the petitioner be deemed to have been recruited.
2. A few facts may at this stage be stated.
3. The petitioner was initially appointed on contract basis for a period of 3 years on a consolidated remuneration of Rs. 350/- per month in terms of an order dated 18th of July, 1967 ANNEXURE-‘A’ to the Writ Petition. What is significant about the order is that on satisfactory completion of the contract, the petitioner was entitled to be absorbed in the regular service of the Bank as a Probationary Accountant in Routine Officer Grade-IV on a basic pay of Rs 240-25-740-30-800, and upon satisfactory completion of the period of probation, to be confirmed as an Accountant. I shall revert back to the appointment order but only a little later.
4. Nearly a month before the completion of the contractual period of 2 years, the petitioner was; by a communication dated 1st of July 1969 informed that the Bank was prepared to consider his application for Officer’s post Grade-IV (Accountant), against which he had to be on probation for a period of 6 months in the first instance, but, on satisfactory completion of the period of probation, was to be confirmed as Officer, if his work and conduct was found satisfactory, In response the petitioner did make an application in the prescribed form and was by an order dated 18th of July 1969 ANNEXURE-F to the Writ Petition appointed in the services of the respondent-Bank as a Probationary officer Grand-IV (Rank-E). The appointment order, however, mentioned that the 6 months’ period of probation would commence as and from the date on which the contract of his service in terms of para-3 of the said order duly signed was delivered by him or from 17th of July 1969, whichever was later. Reference to the later date mentioned in the order was obviously based on the earlier contract executed between the parties, which was to expire on the 27th of July 1969.
5. Consequently upon completion of the contractual period of 2 years, an agreement of service was executed between the parties commencing from 27th of July 1969, and it is not in dispute that the petitioner was upon satisfactory completion of the period of probation confirmed in the service of the Bank which had in the meantime been nationalised w.e.f. 19th July 1969.
6. In October 1995, the Petitioner appears to have made a representation to the respondent-Bank in which he pointed out that his date of retirement had been wrongly fixed and that the petitioner is entitled to retire at the age of 60 years. This representation was considered and turned down by the respondent by its communication dated 7th of December 1995 – ANNEXURE-P to the Writ Petition on the solitary ground that the petitioner having been recruited in the Bank’s service with effect from 28th of July 1969 i.e., after the crucial date fixed under the guidelines issued by the Government, was liable to retire on super-annuation upon attaining the age of 58 years. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition for a Writ of certiorari quashing the communication aforesaid and for a declaration to the effect that he is entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years.
7. I have heard Mr. A.G. Holla, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sundaraswamy, Sr.Counsel for the respondent-Bank.
8. Mr. Holla strenuously argued that the petitioner had been recruited in the service of the respondent-Bank on a contractual basis prior to the crucial date i.e., 19th of July 1969. He relied upon the contents of the initial appointment order issued in favour of the petitioner and urged that the same was not a simple order of appointing the petitioner on contract basis as was sought to be made out by the respondent. On the contrary, the appointment order contended the learned Counsel contained a specific promise to the petitioner that upon completion of the period of contract, he will be absorbed on regular services of the Bank as a Probationary Accountant and upon satisfactory completion of the period of probation, confirmed as an Accountant. These promises made in the order argued Mr. Holla clearly established that the initial appointment was not a contractual engagement simpliciter but a recruitment which he was to fructify in a regular and substantive appointment in due course upon completion of the stipulated contractual and Probationary periods.
9. Alternatively it was urged that a regular appointment order of the petitioner as a Probationary Officer Grade-IV (Rank E) had also been issued in his favour on the 18th of July 1969, no matter the appointment made envisaged the execution of an agreement in terms of Clause-3 of the appointment order. Relying heavily upon the clarification issued by the Bank ANNEXURE-J to the petition, according to which the period of probation/training followed by confirmation had to be treated as qualifying service for purposes of pension, it was urged that the counting of the contractual period of service for purposes of pension was a clear indication of the fact that the said period was as good as regular service for all intents and purposes. Reliance was also placed upon an office note issued by the respondent-Bank, according to which the contractual period of an employee, who was initially appointed on contract basis, but later absorbed in regular services was held liable to be counted for purposes of grant of milestone award to the employees of the Bank, which was bestowed upon employees, who completed 25 years of meritorious service in the organisation. It was submitted that if the contractual period of service rendered by an employee was counted for purposes of pensionary benefits as also for the grant of milestone award, there was no reason, why the same should also not be counted for purposes of the age of superannuation.
10. Mr. Sundaraswamy on the other hand argued that the initial appointment of the petitioner was a pure and simple contractual engagement, which according to the learned Counsel could not be deemed to be tantamount to recruitment. He relied upon the contents of the appointment order dated 18th July 1969 and the agreement of service executed by the petitioner, in support of his submission that the petitioner’s service in the bank in the capacity of probationary officer commenced only with effect from 27th of July 1969, so that he could not be deemed to have been recruited on any date prior thereto.
11. The guidelines issued by the Government prescribing the age of retirement read thus :-
“The age of retirement of an Officer in the Bank Shall be determined in accordance with following conditions :
(1) An Officer employees of the Bank recruited/promoted prior to 19th July 1969 shall retire on completion of 60 years of age;
(2) An Officer employee of the Bank recruited prior to 19th July 1969 but promoted as an Officer on or after 19th July 1969 shall retire on completion of 60 years of age;
(3) An Officer employees of the Bank recruited whether as an Award Staff or as an Officer employee on or after 19th July, 1969 shall retire on completion of 58 years of age.”
12. A plain reading of the guidelines shows that the critical expression used is ‘An Officer employee of the Bank recruited/promoted prior to 19th of July 1969’. The guidelines do not define the term ‘recruitment. The term ‘recruit’ is however defined by Websters Third New International Dictionary thus:
“to strengthen or supply with fresh or additional members to reinforce fill up or make personnel – to enlist as a member of an armed force.”
In Oxford English Dictionary the following meaning is given to term “recruited”:
“strengthened, restored, enlisted etc.,”
13. Seen in the light of the above it is difficult to give the term recruited a narrow or restricted meaning particularly when there is nothing in the guidelines to show that the Government did not have within its contemplation any recruitment except one on regular substantive basis. Mr. Sundaraswamy also did not dispute the possibility of a recruitment being contractual in nature. His submission, however was that when the contractual recruitment is followed by a regular substantive appointment, then that part of the engagement of the employee as is purely contractual in nature should not be deemed to a recruitment at all. I find it difficult to accept this submission, if recruitment, is permissible both on contract as also regular basis, there is no good reason why a recruitment which initially was contractual in nature should not be termed to be a recruitment for all intents and purposes simply because the contractual recruitment subsequently matures or ripens into a regular substantive appointment. If the intention behind the guidelines was to extend the benefit of higher age of retirement to only such of the employees as were recruited on regular substantive basis, nothing prevented the Government from making the said intention explicit by using a suitable expression to that effect in the guidelines. In the absence of anything to suggest that recruitment within the meaning of the guidelines would not include a recruitment based on a contract, it is difficult to exclude any such recruitment ‘from the expression recruited by adopting a narrow or pedantic approach to the whole issue. I am fortified in my view by a Division Bench decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in BASANT LAL MALHOTRA v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS., 1969 LIC 696, where the terms ‘recruitment’ and ‘appointment’ were held to the different and the former given a liberal meaning so as to signify even a selection or approval for appointment. The following passage from the report is apposite in this regard.
“After giving my thoughtful consideration to all the relevant provisions of the subject, I am led to an irresistable conclusion that the terms ‘recruitment’ and ‘appointment’ are not synonymous and connote different meanings. The term ‘recruitment’ connotes and clearly signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment and not actual appointment or posting in service while ‘appointment’ means an actual act of posting a person to a particular office. In this view of the matter, the word ‘recruited’ existing in Rule 4.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume II, does not mean actual appointment and the petitioner should be deemed to have been recruited on the 26th March, 1936.”
14. The view taken by me finds considerable support from certain important features that emerge from the documents that have been placed on record. The first and the foremost is the initial appointment of the petitioner, according to which the petitioner’s engagement on contract basis does not appear to be a case of contractual employment which was meant to terminate on its own with the lapse of time. It was on the contrary a recruitment, which carried with it two significant promises viz., (1) the promise for absorption in regular services of the Bank as a probationary Accountant on completion of the period of contract and (2) the promise upon completion of the period of probation to be confirmed on the terms and conditions set out in the order. The inference therefore is that the petitioner’s recruitment as an Officer was but one additional step in his becoming a regular employee of the respondent-Bank. The Scheme evolved by the respondents appears to be to first engage the employees on contract basis for a period of 2 years, offer them an appointment on probation after completion of the said period of 2 years and eventually take them on regular basis in the services of the Bank after completion of the period of probation. This is apparent from the fact that the contractual period has in the subsequent correspondence of the Bank been termed also as a “training period”. Reference in this connection can be made to ANNEXURE-J, which is a letter dated 29th of April 1995 from the Personnel Adviser of the Bank to its Divisional Manager, wherein the period for which the Officer has served before becoming a Probationary Officer has been termed as training period qualifying for service for purpose of promotion.
15. The following two passages from the said letter lends ample support to this position :
“(1) We have already clarified that period of probation/training if followed by confirmation shall be treated as qualifying service. The training period of two years during the contract will therefore rank for qualifying service for the purpose of pension.
(2) The trainee officers who are under training before their appointment as probationary officers in their case also training period will rank for qualifying service for the purpose of pension.”
16. In the circumstances, therefore, it is reasonable to presume that as per the Scheme evolved by the respondent-Bank, employees taken on contract basis were considered to be on training for an initial period of 2 years, which training would after the said period entitle them to be appointed on probation ultimately culminating in a regular appointment in their favour. That being so, it is obvious that all such Officers as were initially appointed on contract basis had actually been recruited in the service of the Bank with the intention of conferring upon the status of regular employees subject to their satisfactory performance, good conduct and behaviour. The very fact therefore that the initial period of appointment was termed as a contractual period did not make any difference in so far as the effect of such employment was concerned. This is apparent from the fact that in terms of the orders issued by the respondent- Bank, not only did service rendered on contract basis qualify for purposes of pension, but the same was counted even for the purpose of grant of mile stone awards to the employees.
17. Mr. Sundraswamy’s argument that the benefits for purpose of pension and awards did not make any difference so far as the age of retirement is concerned, does not impress me. What is significant is that the Respondent-Bank has not considered the service rendered on contract basis to be anything different from regular service which counts for purpose of pension and other benefits under the Service Rules. In the totality of the circumstances, therefore 1 find it difficult to accept the view taken by the respondent-Bank that the petitioner’s recruitment in the service of the Bank had taken place not with effect from 18th of July 1967, but only from 27th of July 1969.
18. The alternative submission made by Mr. Holla, also has considerable merit in it. The submission is that even if employment on contract basis did not amount to recruitment, yet the petitioner did have in his favour an appointment order on the 18th July 1969 that is a day before the crucial date fixed under the guidelines. The issue of the appointment order is not in dispute nor is it in dispute that the same contained a specific clause in para-9 thereof to the effect that the petitioner will continue to work at Secretariat of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Accounts Officer, Bangalore, where he was working at that time till further orders. All that was required by the appointment order was the execution of a service agreement in the prescribed form, which was a formality that could have been complied with at any time even subsequent to the issue of the said order. Equally inconsequential is the fact that the appointment was to take effect from 27th of July 1969 keeping in view the fact that the petitioner was allowed to continue to work at the place of his posting with the only condition that his service would count with effect from 27th of July 1969. All this left no manner of doubt that the petitioner stood appointed in the service of the Bank with effect from 18th of July 1969, no matter subject to the two conditions aforementioned.
19. In the circumstances, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 7th of December 1995 is quashed and the petitioner held entitled to continue in service until he attains the age of 60 years. I had directed the respondent-Bank to continue the petitioner in service pending pronouncement of these orders yet in case the petitioner has notwithstanding the said order been removed from service, for any reason whatsoever, he shall be reinstead forthwith and allowed to continue till he attains the age of superannuation as indicated above.
20. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs.