Judgements

Ganesh Agro Steel Industries vs Commr. Of C. Ex. on 6 March, 1998

Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal – Mumbai
Ganesh Agro Steel Industries vs Commr. Of C. Ex. on 6 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998 (101) ELT 83 Tri Mumbai


ORDER

K.S. Venkataramani, Member (T)

1. The Rectification application is directed against the Tribunal’s Final Order No. 336/97/WZB, dated 6-1-1997. The Tribunal in that case decided the eligibility of the applicants to Notification No. 208/83 which exempts final product mentioned therein from duty provided the inputs for the goods are those on which the excise duty leviable has already been paid. There is an explanation to the notification that for the purposes of the notification all stocks of input in the country, except stocks as are clearly recognisable as being non-duty paid, shall be deemed to be inputs on which duty has already been paid. The Tribunal found on facts that in the case of the applicants, the inputs had been received from original manufacturers who had cleared them at Nil rate of duty and the Tribunal therefore concluded that the applicants have been rightly held to be ineligible for the exemption under Notification No. 208/83. On limitation also the Tribunal held that the charge of non-disclosure of full particulars in the declaration by the applicants is established and hence invoking the longer period for demand duty is justified.

2. Arguing on the rectification application, the ld. Counsel Shri Gujaral submitted that the applicants are re-rollers. On 18-5-1988, the applicants had written to the jurisdictional Supdt. of the Central Excise, stating therein that even though their inputs had been cleared at Nil rate of duty in terms of exemption notification, they are entitled to exemption under Notification No. 208/83 since the appropriate payment of duty also means duty as per Supreme Court decision cited in their letter. The department has also accepted the declaration filed by the applicants on 18-5-1988 claiming exemption under notification on the ground that the goods are manufactured from inputs on which duty is already paid or deemed to be paid. Therefore, the ld. Counsel argued that the department had knowledge about the receipt of inputs by the applicants from 18-5-1988. Therefore, the show cause notice issued on 13-4-1989 invoking the longer period for the period 12-1-1985 to 4-5-1988 is barred by limitation. It was also argued that the show cause notice does not allege wilful suppression on the part of the applicants because full particulars had been furnished by them as asked for in 1985-88. The ld. Counsel also relied upon the Supreme Court decision reported in 1981 (8) E.L.T. 613 (S.C.) from which it can be seen that purchase from open market has the same meaning as the purchase from a manufacturer and it was contended by the ld. Counsel that in view of this it cannot be said that there has been misdeclaration on the part of the applicants. Therefore, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the longer period can be invoked in the facts of the case, is erroneous and needs to be rectified. On merits of the case, the ld. Counsel relied upon the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Nova Steel v. Collector – 1997 (18) RLT 198 to show that the goods cleared on Nil rate duty Gate Passes should be deemed to be duty paid goods.

3. Shri D. Gurnard, the ld. DR pointed out that the applicants, in the form of rectification application, cannot be permitted to argue the appeal itself afresh. The scope of rectification is limited and new submissions which are now being made are not permissible in the rectification application. On merits of the case the ld. DR pointed out that when the inputs had been received under nil rate of duty gate passes, they are clearly recognisable as non-duty paid. The declaration filed by the applicants did not disclose the crucial information. The receipt of inputs at nil duty gate passes from manufacturers hence amounts to suppression of facts with intention to evade duty. Further the degree of central excise control over non-licenced units which are only to file declaration is not at all rigorous as in the case of licenced unit.

4. We have carefully considered the submissions. The application for rectification of mistake is only for rectifying any mistake apparent on record. It is now well settled that the error which has to be established by a long winding process of reasoning on points where there may be conceivably two opinions, cannot be said to be an apparent error. An error to be rectified must be an apparent mistake glaring and obvious. See the decision of the Supreme Court AIR 1960 SC 137 and 1971 82ITR 50. In the present application, the applicants have raised several fresh grounds on facts which were not put forth before the Tribunal and the grounds raised in the application are sought to be established by detailed arguments with case laws being cited which exercise was not done when the appeal was originally argued both on limitation and on merits. In such a situation, in view of the law laid down as regards the scope of the rectification of mistake application referred to above, we hold that there is no mistake apparent on record arising from the impugned order of the Tribunal which calls for rectification. The application is rejected.