ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the land admeasuring Ac.0.18 gts. comprised in S. No. 582/1/A situated at Shivareddyguda village, Ghatkesar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. He was utilising the land for floriculture and raising Jasmin, Mogra, Rose gardens etc. His land is situated at Km 21/8-10 of Hyderabad – Hanamkonda near a bridge where the respondents proposed to construct a new bridge and a new road. He alleges that respondents approached him and after negotiations agreed to assign Ac. 0.37 gts. of Government land in lieu of Ac.0.18 guntas of land belonging to the petitioner which was proposed to be acquired for construction of a new bridge. He alleges that an agreement was entered into on 18.1.1990 to that effect. The necessary Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) was published in Gazette on 20.12.1990. As proposed, new bridge was constructed, but the respondents did not give land in lieu of compensation as agreed. Therefore, he filed a writ petition, being W.P. No. 2990 of 1991 before this Court.
2. While the matter was pending, it is alleged, the respondents handed over Ac.0.16 gts. of land instead of Ac.0.37 gts. of land in the year 1990. But, Ac.0.21 gts. of land was not delivered to him and no compensation was paid to the structures, flower bearing trees and other trees which were standing on the land when it was acquired. He alleges that he made several representations in vain requesting delivery of possession of balance of remaining Ac.0.21 gts. of land and also contended that he is entitled to compensation in a sum of Rs. 23,29,000/- as on October, 1998 for a period of nine years. The respondents have not taken any action in spite of sending a number of representations. Therefore, he filed the writ petition complaining that the action of the respondents is illegal and arbitrary. He prayed for a declaration that the action of the respondents in not handing over possession of Ac.0.21 gts. of P.W.D. land adjacent to Hyderabad – Hanamkonda Highway at Km.21/8-20 as illegal and for a consequential direction to respondents to deliver possession of the said land.
3. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 have filed separate counter-affidavits. The third respondent, Executive Engineer, Roads & Buildings, Goshamahal, Hyderabad, in his counter affidavit stated that valuation of flower bearing trees has been assessed by the Director of Horticulture at Rs. 23,908/- as on 22.7.1991 for Rose and Jasmine plants, and that for other flower plants like Kanakambaram, Jaji being small plants valuation cannot be assessed. The amount claimed by the petitioner is disputed as excessive and without any basis. It is further stated that the petitioner made a representation requesting Roads and Buildings Department to handover Ac.0.37 gts. of land on either side of the State Highway in lieu of his Ac.0.18 gts. of land. The Government agreed for exchange of the land and accordingly, Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, handed over Ac.0.19 gts. of land on 18.5.1994 to the petitioner.
4. The fourth respondent filed a counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. It is stated that the petitioner approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991 which was dismissed as infructuous as an extent of Ac.0.19 gts. land was handed over to the petitioner by that date. Therefore, after lapse of eleven years the petitioner is not entitled to file yet another writ petition. The issue is barred by res judicata and the petitioner is estopped from claiming any extent of land as he accepted Ac.0.19 gts. of land in lieu of the land given by him for the construction of the bridge. It is also stated that the petitioner gave consent letter accepting Ac.0.19 guntas in S. No. 582/1/2 of Ghatkesar Village belonging to Roads and Buildings Department. The land was handed over on 25.3.1995 in lieu of compensation to his patta land admeasuring Ac.0.18 gts. in S. No. 582/1/A of the said village. There was no agreement between the petitioner and the third respondent agreeing to allot an extent of Ac.0.37 gts. of land as alleged.
5. Sri W.B. Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the respondents approached the petitioner proposing to acquire his land admeasuring Ac.0.18 gts. in S. No. 582/1/A, he gave his consent agreeing to accept Ac.0.37 gts. of land in lieu of compensation. The same was recommended by the District Collector to the Government. The Government also agreed for the same. In spite of that no land was alienated to the petitioner. Therefore, he filed earlier writ petition. During pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner was given land allegedly admeasuring Ac.0.19.4 gts. in S. No. 582/1/2. However, on measuring the same, it was found that the land admeasures Ac.0.16 gts. only. Therefore, as per the agreement, the respondents are liable to handover an extent of Ac.0.21 gts. of land. The refusal on the part of the respondents in spite of making representations is illegal and arbitrary.
6. Sri E. Peddanna, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that there was no agreement as such between the petitioner and the Government. On recommendation made by the Collector, the Government gave liberty to the Revenue Department to explore possibility for exchanging the land. When the process was on the petitioner approached this Court and filed Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991. While the matter was pending, land was identified and an extent of Ac.0.19 gts. in S. No. 583/1/2 was handed over to him as per his consent. In view of the same, the petitioner himself submitted before this Court that the cause of action does not survive and the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. His claim therefore, is barred by res judicata. He disputes the contention that what is handed over earlier is only Ac.0.16 gts. and places reliance on “handing over proceedings” on the field map to show that the petitioner accepted land admeasuring Ac.0.19 gts. in lieu of compensation. The entire file relating to the issue has been produced before this Court.
7. The short question is whether the Government is not liable to handover Ac.0.21 gts. of land as prayed for. A question is also raised regarding delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court with exorbitant delay of eleven years.
8. It is axiomatic that discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is seldom exercised in favour of those who sleepover their rights and allow the rights to get extinguished. The admitted facts would show that the petitioner handed over Ac.0.18 gts. of land in S. No. 582/1/A some time in 1989. The petitioner gave a letter typed on Rs. 5.00 stamp paper informing his consent to give Ac.0.18 gts. of land for construction of a bridge in exchange of Ac.0.37 gts. of land subject to certain conditions. The fourth respondent then addressed the District Collector seeking permission to have agreement from the requisitioning department for the petitioner for exchange of land. The Collector then addressed the Government by letter dt.30.1.1990 seeking approval for the proposals made in the draft Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) and draft declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. The Government approved the scheme in G.O. Rt. No. 1084, dt.14.9.1990. Nonetheless, the Government in Memo No. 2107/R/III(1)/90-3, dt.18.5.1991 requested the District Collector to take action as contemplated under the Provisions of the Act for effecting exchange of P.W.D. land of Ac.0.37 gts. adjacent to Hyderabad-Hanamkonda Road in S. No. 582/1/A subject to condition that the land cost of Ac.0.37 gts. of P.W.D. land is equal to the cost of Ac.0.18 gts. of land acquired by the Government. The petitioner approached this Court and filed Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991 seeking a direction to the revenue officials as well as officials of Roads and Buildings Department to deliver land admeasuring Ac.0.37 gts. in exchange of his land admeasuring Ac.0.18 gts. When the writ petition was pending, the Mandal Revenue Officer addressed the Revenue Divisional Officer informing that an extent of Ac.0.19.4 gts. of land has been handed over to the petitioner on 25.3.1995 after taking land from P.W.D. Department. In view of the same, Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991 was dismissed as infructuous. The petitioner did not raise any objection and as seen from the file he also endorsed on the map showing that he has taken possession of the land. Therefore, he cannot demur as to the extent of the land or value of the land given being equal to the land exchanged.
9. After this Court dismissed the writ petition as infructuous, the petitioner did not take any action. Obviously he was satisfied with what he got. He did not even make any representation. Except stating in the affidavit accompanying the writ petition that he made a number of representations one such being on 7.10.1998, no material is produced before me. This shows that the petitioner was satisfied with Ac.0.19.4. gts. given to him and did not approach the Court diligently. Therefore, the delay and laches in a matter like this especially when the petitioner’s earlier writ petition was dismissed as infructuous after the Government handed over Ac.0.19.4 gts. assumes importance.
10. In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. DIGAMBAR, and MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR v. SHAH HYDER BAIG, . the Supreme Court held that where delay and laches are of abnormal proportions, ordinarily, the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution is not exercised.
11. In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. DIGAMBAR (supra) it was held:
In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State’s non-compliance with petitioners demands, State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the Governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it.
12. In MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR v. SHAH HYDER BAIG (supra), the Supreme Court specifically considered the effect of delay in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and held:
… It is now a well settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law Courts under Artit.226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, ‘delay defects equity’ has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise.
13. In this case also the petitioner has not explained delay and laches properly and therefore he is not entitled to any relief. It is well settled that the principle of res judicata is equally applicable to writ petitions. A reference may be made to DEVILAL v. SALES TAX OFFICER, , KALAWATI v. BISHESHWAR, , UNION OF INDIA v. NANAK SINGH, , G.K.DUDANI v. S.D.SHARMA, , and ASHOK KUMAR SRIVASTAV v. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
14. In UNION OF INDIA v. NANAK SINGH (supra) it was held:
This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v. State of Gujarat, , observed that the provisions of S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject matter. There is no good reason to preclude such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of the decisions after full contest.
15. When there was delay in exchange of land of the equivalent value, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991, in 1991 and during the pendency of the Writ Petition, on 25.3.1995 the revenue officials handed over Ac.0.19.4 gts. to the petitioner. He accepted the same without any demur and therefore Writ Petition No. 2990 of 1991 was dismissed as infructuous. The question in the said writ petition was whether the petitioner is entitled to Ac.0.37 gts. of land in exchange of land of the petitioner admeasuring Ac.0.18 gts. When the writ petition was dismissed, it operates as constructive res judicata and the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the same ground repeatedly.
16. The writ petition for the above reasons fails and is accordingly dismissed.