ORDER
P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J :
1. This revision petition is posted before the Division Bench pursuant to an order of the learned single Judge who noticed apparent conflict between two decisions of learned single Judges reported in D. Hanumayya v. G. Radhakrishna Murthy, 1989 (2) ALT 100; and D. Anthoney v. M. Raja Lakshmi, 1982 (1) An.WR 412, followed by G Savitramma v. T. Sarojini, 1988 (1) APLJ 461. Accordingly, observing that, “in the said circumstances, I deem this a fit case to be posted before a Division Bench of this Court for an authoritative decision as to whether this Court has the power to review its own orders arising under Section 21 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, directed the office to place the papers before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for orders, for posting the matter before a Division Bench.
2. Tenant is the petitioner whose revision petition was dismissed at the stage of admission on the ground that the respondent-landlord required the demised premises for starting business and that the said requirement is bona fide which was accepted by both the Tribunals and confirmed by the High Court in revision. However, the petitioner filed an application for review. Respondents objected that the review petition is not maintainable; inasmuch as the Court has no power.
3. Sri C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner relying on a decision reported in D. Hanumayya v. G. Radhakrishna Murthy (supra) submits that review petition is maintainable; while the learned Counsel appearing for respondent placed reliance on D. Anthoney v. M. Rajya
Lakshmi (supra) and G. Savitramma v. T. Sarojini (supra), in support of his contention that review petition is not maintainable.
4. The main objects of the Act are fixation of fair rent, eviction of tenants on certain grounds; recognition of right of tenant to fix rent in certain cases; payment of rent during the pendency of the proceeding for eviction; right of the landlord to recover possession for repairs etc, and right of tenant to enjoy the amenities without interference by the landlord etc.
5. When the Rent Controller passes a final order under the Act, appeal is provided against the order of the Rent Controller under Section 20, and further revision to the High Court under Section 22 of the Act. The Act is a self-contained Act and the procedure to be followed by the tribunals in disposing of certain matters arising under the Act as well as period of limitation is specified in the Act itself. Of course in the absence of an express provision with regard to any procedure in the Act, Tribunals are resorting to application of similar provisions available under the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as they are permitted and imported by this Court through its decisions P.N. Rao v. K. Radhakrishnamacharyulu, . Thus, for instance it is understood that Sections 11,60,148, Order 1, Rule 10, Order 6, Rule 17, Order 22, Order 23, Order 26etc., are applicable; while Section 10, Section 151 CPC are not applicable.
6. Now the question is whether Order 47 C.P.C. and would Section 114 apply.
7. The Madras High Court in Subrahmanya v. Govindasami, considering the provisions of Madras Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act which contains similar provisions as A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act held that review of an order passed by the High Court under the provisions of Madras Act is not maintainable. The Apex Court in P.N. Thakeershi v. Pradyumansinghji, categorically held as follows :
“It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication,”
Justice Jeevan Reddy, as he then was, in D. Anthoney v. M. Raja Lakshmi (supra) observed thus:
“‘It is well settled that the right of review is a substantive right and not a mere procedural right unless conferred by a statute, there is no such inherent power.”
Later Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, as he then was in Savitramma v. T. Sarojini (supra) observed thus:
‘(1) The power of review is both substantive as well as procedural;
(2) A substantive review or review on merits like right of appeal, is a substantive right- It has to be conferred either specifically or by necessary implications by the Statute under which an order sought to be reviewed, is passed.
(3) There is no inherent power of substantive review in any judicial or quasi judicial authority.
(4) The power of procedural review inherent in every Court or Tribunal to correct an inadvertent error which crept in the order either due to procedural defect or mathematical or clerical error or due to misapprehension caused by misrepresentation or fraud of a party to the proceedings, ex debito justitiae to prevent abuse of its process.”
8. From the grounds raised for review in this application it is seen that the review is not sought on the ground of any procedural non-compliance, or failure, but sought by way of substantial relief.
9. When the lis is disposed of by the Court it becomes functus officio in respect of the same issue. The Court cannot arrogate power to itself and re-hear the matter which has decided rights of the parties after becoming
final Power of review under the Civil Procedure Code is granted on very limited grounds. In the absence of express or implied conferment of the jurisdiction, Court cannot infer power. Therefore, in our view the power of review conferred under Order 47, on the Civil Court or even the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under other laws cannot be imported into the provisions of the special Act, in the absence of any express provision or gathered by necessary implication. The Act in question is a special and self-contained Act. As such, application for review of an order passed in revision by the High Court is not maintainable.
10. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that Justice Seetharama Reddy in D. Hanumayya v. G. Radhakrishna Murthy (supra) took a contrary view. The learned Judge entertained petition for review of an order made in C.R.P. In that case, it is seen that the review petition was admitted and heard on the consent given by the Counsel for other side.
11. Learned Judge, no doubt, found that review is maintainable. Learned Judge placed reliance on Avtar Singh v. Union of India, , wherein it is held that material error manifest on the face of the order undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. Subrahmanya v. Govindasami (supra), was also taken aid of to come to this conclusion. In Avtar Singh v. Union of India (supra) the apex Court observed that review is not a routine procedure and it cannot be resorted to unless the Court is satisfied that material error manifest on the face of the order undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. While Justice Seetharama Reddy in D. Hanumayya v. G. Radhakrishna Murthy (supra) construing the words “may at once re-hear the case, or make such order in regard to re-hearing as it thinks fit,” occurring in Order 47, Rule 8 C.P.C., held that in view of deployment of those words by the Legislature vide discretionary jurisdiction is conferred on the Court including re-hearing of a concluded trial, and therefore, the Court allowing review
petition does not restrict the scope of the enquiry, if necessary to re-hear the entire case. Those words are omitted under 1976 C.P.C. Hence the said decision docs not advance the case of the petitioner.
12. In Mahumed Ruwther v. L Swaminatha Mudaliar, AIR 1938 Mad. 573 Madras High Court held that review application has three stages viz., admission or rejection at the threshold, rejected if the rule is discharged, and if the rule is made absolute, then the case will be heard which may result in confirmation or modification of the earlier order. These stages do not arise under the Rent Control Act. Therefore, these cases cannot help in deciding the issue, whether application for review under the Act is maintainable or not.
13. In Hari Kishan Singh v. B. Naraycma. 1969 (2) APLJ 290 CM.P. Nos.8369 and 8368 of 1978 were allowed on August 2, 1978 reviewing the orders made by the High Court under A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Justice Madhava Reddy, as he then was, observed that the High Court has plenary power to review its own judgment; that Rule 17(2) of the Rules issued by the High Court for filing application for review shall apply mutatis and mutandis to any application for review under the Act; and that according to the rules, the procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code is applicable for matters arising under the Act. Justice Jeevan Reddy, as he then was, taking note of these grounds observed in Anthony v. Rajyalaxmi (supra) that the ratio of the said judgment rendered under A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 cannot be applied to a case under this Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner attempted to draw support for his contention from a judgment of the apex Court reported in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:
“It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.”
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is entirely different from the jurisdiction to review an order passed in revision under Order 7, Rule 1 C.P.C. Therefore, this decision also cannot help the petitioner.
15. It is next contended that when once the matter reached a particular Court it is axiomatic that the matter has to be decided in accordance with the Rules of practice and procedure adopted by that Court, and as such, the power of review of the High Court under Order 47 would still be available even though the same is not specifically conferred by any particular statute. In this case, no doubt, the Supreme Court observed that once an order under Section 32 for sale is made executable by District Judge in his capacity as District Judge and not persona designata, the provisions of the Code which arc available for him in execution of decree for sale of mortgaged property would also be available. This decision has no analogy to the facts of the present case,
16. The next decision on which reliance is placed in Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan, , wherein the Supreme Court found that there is no legal liability on the Central Government to reimburse on the freight component of the price, and held that although there is no legal liability on the Central Government to do sc and the Central Government should not stand on technicalities, but must be inspired by ethical and moral values must do what is fail and just to the citizen regardless of legal technicalities. On review, the Supreme Court found that in fact clause 8(1) provides that sales tax if legally leviable would be paid in addition to the price given in clause (4) of the Rate Contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court
reviewed its earlier order on the basis of this clause. This judgment is not an authority for the proposition that review petition is maintainable by the High Court even though there is no specific provision in the Act concerned.
17. For all the reasons, we are of the opinion that review petition is not maintainable. Accordingly we are in agreement with the view taken in D. Anthoney v. M. Raja Lakshmi (supra) and G. Savitramma v. T, Sarojini (supra). The reference is accordingly answered and the review petition is dismissed.