JUDGMENT
A.K. Mathur, J.
1. The petitioner by this writ petition has prayed that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, Annex.4 dated 10.4.1989 may be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be restrained from charging permit fee from the petitioner.
2. The brief facts, which are necessary for the convenient disposal of this writ petition are that the petitioner No. 1 is a firm and petitioner No. 2 is its Manager. Recently the petitioner established itself in the year 1988 at Bhiwadi for manufacturing and sale of thinner for which has been given to the petitioner for manufacture and sale of thinner. The State of Rajasthan issued a Notification under Section 28 of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 dated 9.3.1 970, whereby the excise duty at the rate of Rs. 0.65 paise per litre was imposed on denatured spirituous preparation whenever it is exported outside the State of Rajasthan and the same duty has now been enhanced from 0.65 to 1.40 each bulk litre as well as the permit fee has also been imposed to the tune of Rs. 2/-per bulk litre for manufacturing and exporting. It is submitted that, the petitioner has not started manufacturing but he has obtained permit for importing 9000 litres of denature spirit for the purpose of manufacturing thinner. Recently, non-petitioner No. 3 issued a letter dated 10.4.1 989 whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit permit fee to the tune of Rs. 2/- per bulk litre for import of denature spirit, The same has been placed on the record as Annex.4. Therefore, the petitioner by this writ petition has challenged the charging of this permit fee. Incidentally the petitioner though did not specifically state in the writ petition but he has raised the issue regarding excise duty on the denatured spirit and the question of refund and release of bank guarantee given by the petitioner in the litigation in which the levy of excise duty was challenged. Since no averment to that effect has been made in this petition, therefore, it is not necessary for me to go into those questions. More-so, the two decisions of this Court have also been cited by Mr. Maheshwari on this question i.e. Jaipur Minerals and Chemicals v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2092/1980 decided on 25.3.1991) by Hon’ble the Chief Justice and in the case of Pesticides India v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1628 of 1980, decided on 4.10.1991 by Hon’ble J.R. Chopra, J. Therefore, I need not go into these questions when the same have not been agitated in this writ petition.
3. The only question which has been agitated in this writ petition is relating to levy of permit fee.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the permit fee cannot be charged by the respondent State as there is no quid pro quo i.e. no services are rendered, as such this fee is not chargeable. In support of this contention learned Counsel has invited my attention to Kewal Krishan Puri and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. .
5. A reply has been filed by the respondents and the respondents have submitted that permit fee can be charged under Rule 69-B of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 [referred to hereinafter as the Rules of 1956′). It is further submitted that the State has a power to regulate the use of alcohol and that power includes power to make provisions to prevent and/or check industrial alcohol is one of the regulatory measure and there is also quid pro quo to this extent. It is submitted that charging of permit fee is neither contrary to the provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution of India and any other provisions of the Act.
6. I have heard both the learned Counsel and also perused the record. So far as charging of market fee is concerned it is fully covered under Rule 69-B of the Rules, since it happens to be a fee, therefore, learned Counsel submitted that there should be quid pro quo. In that connection learned Counsel has invited my attention to Kewal Krishan Puri’s case (supra). This was a case under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder. In that context, their Lordships have said that generally speaking a fee is defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. In that connection, their Lordships have laid down certain tests for a valid levy of market fees on the agricultural produce brought or sold by licensees in a notified market area. This was a case in respect of market fees, levied on the licensees by the Market Committees. Nature of the fee in the case of Market Committee and the nature of fee levied under the Excise Rules is entirely different. Here, in order to regulate the grant of a permit of spirit and to supervise that spirit (meant for industrial purpose), may not be put to any other use. This itself requires a proper staff for supervision and regulation, therefore, this kind of fee is more of regulatory in nature. More-so, the concept of quid pro quo has recently undergone a considerable change and it is not possible to correlate the services with the market fee in a mathematical manner. The market fee has to be seen in the context it is levied. The market fee under the Agricultural Market Produce Act has a different concept from the fee collected under permit fee, in excise matters. Under the Agricultural Market Produce Act certain facilities are required to be given to the licensees but under the Excise Rules it is more of regulatory in nature. It is the duty of the checking staff to see that the industrial alcohol is not spirted away for any other purpose except for being used in the industrial requirement. Therefore, for this purpose extra staff has to be provided to keep proper check on the use of spirit. More-so, regulation of excise is a sovereign function of the State and, therefore, levy of this kind of permit fee cannot be said to be bad. In order to exercise the sovereign power for regulating the use of denatured spirit a proper staff has to be maintained, therefore, charging of permit fee is more of a regulatory in nature and the State is entitled to levy the same.
7. It may also be relevant to mention here that the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri (supra) has undergone a considerable change and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders and others etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. observed as under:
The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea of change subsequent to decision in . Correlationship between the levy and the services tendered/expected is of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a “reasonable relationship” between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. Moreover, there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It is now increasingly realized that merely because the collections for the services rendered or grant of a privilege of licence are taken to the consolidated fund of the State and not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself decisive. It is also increasingly realized that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not a sine qua non for a fee.
8. This view has bean further affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan 1990 1 SVLR (C) 570.
9. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.