1. The sale to the 6th defendant was attested by all the three living reversioners except the plaintiff who was absent at the time and it was not disputed that the attestation was in token of consent. All those who formed the next reversioners consented to the alienation. The District Judge’s findings are not clear. When he speaks of the transaction as colourable that does not seem to mean more than that the 6th defendant is not proved to have paid money to the widow for the land. It is clear that the occasion was not one on which a ‘colourable’ or ‘unreal’ transaction could be suspected. If the widow desired to benefit her half-brother she could do so by transferring her land to him but not by keeping it for herself. Moreover, it was not the plaintiff’s case that nothing passed by the sale, but only that it did not bind him. The District Judge seems further to hold that the consent of the reversionary heirs was not a sufficient consent because some of them were paid for giving it, bribed, as he says, to give it. He does not find that they were induced by fraud practised on them to assent to the transaction, and the fact that they or some of them received consideration for their assent is not by itself sufficient to annul its effect.
2. The remaining question is whether the widow sold all that remained to her of her husband’s estate. As to this the plaintiff has not shown that she had any other part of the estate in her possession or vested in her at the date of the sale except a small plot of land which was sold to 3rd defendant as a part of the same transaction with the sale to the 6th defendant: and, therefore, we may fairly assume with the assent of the other reversioners. In these circumstances the plaintiff cannot now succeed. The alienation was made with the necessary consent and was an alienation of the whole of the widow’s estate.
3. We must, therefore, reverse the decree of the District Judge and restore that of the District Munsif with costs here and in the lower appellate Court.