High Court Kerala High Court

Gep Thomas.K vs The State Of Kerala on 4 June, 2009

Kerala High Court
Gep Thomas.K vs The State Of Kerala on 4 June, 2009
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C).No. 23298 of 2008(W)


1. GEP THOMAS.K, HIGH SCHOOL ASSISTANT
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY
                       ...       Respondent

2. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,

3. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION,

4. THE DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER,

5. THE MANAGER, C.S. SUBRAHMANIANPOTTI,

6. GEETHA.S, U.P. SCHOOL ASSISTANT,

                For Petitioner  :SRI.P.K.VIJAYAMOHANAN

                For Respondent  :SRI.K.RAVEENDRAN

The Hon'ble MR. Justice T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

 Dated :04/06/2009

 O R D E R
                     T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.
                  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                     W.P.(C) No.23298 of 2008-W
                  - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                Dated this the 4th day of June, 2009.

                                JUDGMENT

The writ petition is filed by the petitioner who is presently working as

High School Assistant having promoted to that post on 9.6.2003. The

challenge is against the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Education

and confirmed in revision by the Director of Public Instruction which are

produced as Exts.P6 and P7. The circumstances leading to the dispute

which is the subject matter of the writ petition, are the following:

2. The petitioner and the 6th respondent are the rival claimants. the

petitioner was originally appointed in the school as U.P.S.A. on 2.9.2002.

That was approved from 2.9.2002 to 31.3.2003 and from 2.6.2003 onwards.

A vacancy arose due to the promotion of one H.S.A. as H.S.S.T. and the

petitioner was promoted to the post of H.S.A. (Maths) by order dated

9.6.2003. The 6th respondent was appointed on 9.6.2003 as U.P.S.A. in the

vacancy which arose due to the promotion of the petitioner. The 6th

respondent was originally appointed as U.P.S.A. in a maternity leave

vacancy from 6.6.2002 to 17.10.2002. That was approved on 12.6.2003 by

the District Educational Officer.

wpc 23298/2008 2

3. It appears that the 6th respondent filed a petition before the District

Educational Officer staking a claim for appointment against the vacancy

which arose on 2.9.2002 to which the petitioner was appointed. The matter

was taken up before this court by the 6th respondent in Writ Petition

No.17296/2004 and this court directed the District Educational Officer to

pass orders on her representation after hearing the petitioner and the

respondents therein. Accordingly, the parties were heard. As per Ext.P4

order, the claim raised by the 6th respondent was rejected. It was found that

the 6th respondent has no claim under Rule 51-A of Chapter XIV-A of

K.E.R. in the vacancy which arose on 2.9.2002, to which the petitioner was

appointed.

4. The 6th respondent filed an appeal as Ext.P5 on 27.9.2005 against

Ext.P4 order dated 5.10.2004. That was disposed of by Ext.P5. The Deputy

Director, after hearing the respective parties, directed the District

Educational Officer to regularise the appointments of U.P.S.As. made by

the Manager from 18.10.2002 and it was held that the 6th respondent has a

claim to the post of U.P.S.A. from 18.10.2002. There was a direction to

realise excess salary, if any, paid to the incumbents by way of irregular

appointments after regularising their appointments within three months

without fail. That was challenged by the petitioner and by the Manager

wpc 23298/2008 3

before the Director of Public Instruction. Ext.P7 is the order passed by the

Director of Public Instruction. The Manager filed a revision before the

Government, wherein Ext.P8 order of stay was granted. It appears that the

Director of Public Instruction again passed a fresh order as per Ext.P9

confirming the order Ext.P7.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the

petitioner was appointed on 2.9.2002 and as on that date the 6th respondent

was already appointed in the school in a maternity leave vacancy which

arose on 6.6.2002 and that vacancy terminated only on 17.10.2002.

Therefore, it is submitted that the 6th respondent has no claim under Rule

51-A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. It is further pointed out that the

appointment of the petitioner was approved as per Ext.P2 order dated

20.5.2003. Prior to that, no claim was raised by the 6th respondent before

the District Educational Officer. It is long after the approval that the 6th

respondent raised a claim before the District Educational Officer. It is

submitted that since the claim under Rule 51-A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. is

not allowable to the 6th respondent, the order Ext.P6 passed by the Deputy

Director of Education without considering any of the legal issues, is

perfectly illegal. It is pointed out that the Director of Public Instruction in

Ext.P7, has not considered anything on the merits and in the subsequent

wpc 23298/2008 4

order passed by the Director of Public Instruction, on Ext.P9 also, no

detailed reasons have been pointed out.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the Manager submitted that

subsequent to the appointment of the 6th respondent on 9.6.2003, two other

vacancies have arisen and the said vacancies have also been filled up. In

fact, the Manager had agreed before the Deputy Director of Education to re-

arrange the appointments made by him in the vacancies which arose after

9.6.2003 and the recognition of the claim of the 6th respondent by the

Deputy Director of Education is without reference to the provisions of Rule

51-A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. It is pointed out that the Manager had filed

a revision challenging Ext.P7 order which was disposed of by the

Government going by the reference in Ext.P9, by directing the Director of

Public Instruction to consider the matter. But no hearing was conducted by

the Government also before issuing such a direction. It is pointed out that if

at all the 6th respondent has got a claim, that can only be in respect of

vacancies which arose subsequently and not in respect of vacancy against

which the petitioner was appointed and approval of which was granted by

the District Educational Officer.

7. Learned counsel for the 6th respondent submitted that the Manager

was bound to accommodate the 6th respondent in the vacancy which arose

wpc 23298/2008 5

on 2.9.2002, as she was already working as a leave substitute and reliance is

placed on a Government Order dated 9.11.1999. It is pointed out that

overlooking the claims of the 6th respondent, the petitioner was appointed on

2.9.2002.

8. Before going into the further details, one aspect also has to be

considered. Learned Govt. Pleader has made available the files leading to

the impugned orders. It is seen that the Government as per letter dated

27.2.2008 directed the Director of Public Instruction to reconsider the issue

after hearing all concerned including a revision petition. A copy of the

revision petition filed before the Government was forwarded to the Director

of Public Instruction. It is clear that the argument raised by the learned

counsel for the Manager that the Government has not disposed of the

revision in accordance with law, is correct. It is not necessary, at this

distance of time, to direct the Government to hear the revision petition,

especially since the said action is not under challenge in this writ petition..

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the

Manager submitted that the 6th respondent cannot have a claim under Rule

51-A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R., as she cannot be treated as a teacher who

has been “relieved” as on 2.9.2002, which alone will satisfy the requirement

of Rule 51-A. Reliance is placed on Ext.R5(a) judgment of this court in

wpc 23298/2008 6

O.P.No.17698/1995. Going by Rule 51-A, qualified teachers who are

relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall

have preference for appointment to future vacancies in the school. This

aspect was considered in Ext.R5(a) judgment. It was held as follows:

“In view of the fact that the vacancy arose in 1993 and at that time

the petitioner did not have any approved service, the petitioner

cannot claim the benefit of Rule 51-A of Chapter XIV-A of the

K.E.R. The subsequent approval of appointment of the petitioner in

1996 cannot clothe the petitioner with any right to be considered for

appointment in 1993.”

Obviously, going by the plain terms of Rule 51-A, the 6th respondent was

not relieved from service as on 2.9.2002 as stipulated under any of the

contingencies provided therein. The vacancy was terminated only on

18.10.2002. The approval was granted later. If that be so, the claim raised

under Rule 51-A cannot be sustained and the Manager cannot be faulted for

not recognising a claim to him under Rule 51-A. In fact, the Deputy

Director of Education has also not found in favour of the 6th respondent

based on such a claim. He has only recognised the right of the 6th

respondent for the post of U.P.S.A. from 18.10.2002 only. In that view of

the matter, the Deputy Director was not right in interfering with the order of

approval granted in favour of the petitioner.

wpc 23298/2008 7

10. Presently, the following position emerges from the entire

scenario. The petitioner was promoted as H.S.A. on 9.6.2003 and in the

consequent vacancy of U.P.S.A. the 6th respondent was appointed. Both

these appointments have not been approved because of the pendency of the

disputes between them. It is also seen that subsequently two more

appointments have been made by the Manager in the category of U.P.S.A.

11. Therefore, P6, P7 and P9 are hereby quashed. The Deputy

Director of Education will reconsider the matter afresh in the light of the

findings rendered above, after hearing the petitioner, the Manager and the

6th respondent or any other claimants who have been subsequently

appointed. The respective parties will be allowed to raise all contentions by

the Deputy Director of Education. Appropriate orders shall be passed

within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this

judgment.

The writ petition is disposed of as above. No costs.

(T.R. Ramachandran Nair, Judge.)

kav/