JUDGMENT
R.A. Mehta, J.
1. The petitioner made an application dated March 11, 1992 to the respondent No. 1 for permission to have electric connection in the suit premises. Stating that the respondent No. 3 is the landlady and she was not giving her consent for such new electric connection. The application stated that the petitioner had been residing in the suit premises from June 1, 1988. It was stated that the landlady had got the electric meter removed by giving an application to the respondent No. 2-Gujarat Electricity Board and, thus, deprived the petitioner of the basic and essential amenity. The petitioner had asked for permission to have a new connection and asked for “no objection” from the landlady and she had refused to give such consent. The petitioner submitted that the electricity is the basic necessity and without the same, he was suffering grave hardships and he, therefore, prayed that new electricity connection be given. This was an application under Section 23A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The said section reads as follows:
23A. (1) When a tenant desires to get supply of Electricity at his own cost from a licensee within the meaning of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the owner of the premises does not give his consent therefor, the tenant may apply to the Collector setting out the scheme for such supply.
(2) On receipt of such application, the Collector may, after giving the landlord and the owner of the premises if he be not the landlord, opportunity of being heard, permit the tenant to get the supply in accordance with the scheme set out in the tenant’s application or in accordance with any modified scheme.
(3) On such permission being given, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in any other law for the time being in force, the owner shall be deemed to have given the requisite consent under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the licensee shall not be liable to the owner for trespass for steps taken for supply of Electricity according to the said permission.
2. On issuance of the notice, the landlady objected to the application being granted stating that the petitioner was not a tenant of respondent No. 3 and that litigation in the Civil Court was pending.
3. The petitioner submitted that he had been paying monthly rent of Rs. 325/- and the landlady had not been issuing any receipt. The petitioner was in occupation since 1988. In the affidavit-in-reply, it is contended that the petitioner never was or is the tenant of the respondent No. 3 and that the petitioner is a trespasser. However, it is admitted that the petitioner’s father was allowed to occupy the premises, but it is stated that it was for a short duration as the petitioner’s father was evicted from Swaminarayan temple and thereafter the father did not vacate the premises and, therefore, the landlady had to file a Special Civil Suit for possession against the father and son. In the suit, the son has claimed that he is the tenant.
4. The Deputy Collector merely held that as there was civil litigation pending in the Court, the application of the petitioner for electricity connection was rejected.
5. Being aggrieved by the same, the present petition has been filed and is admitted. The learned single Judge, while admitting the matter, after hearing both the sides, referred the matter to the Division Bench because the learned single Judge was of the opinion that the judgment rendered in the case of Bai Dudhiben v. Nanji Gordhan 1981 GLH 57 : 1980 (2) GLR 359 requires reconsideration. By that judgment, it was held that revision under Section 29(3) was not maintainable against the order of the Deputy Collector under Section 23A on the ground that it was not a decree or order of any Court. Section 29(1) provides for an appeal against a decree or order made by a Court under Section 28. Section 29(2) provides that no further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under Sub-section (1), but the District Court may exercise revisional powers. Section 29(3) reads as follows:
29(3) Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding (in the City of Ahmedabad the Bench of two Judges, specified in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) and elsewhere) the District Court, may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.
In the case of Bai Dudhiben (supra), the learned single Judge observed as follows:
The Court’s powers in matters arising under the Bombay Rent Act are located in Section 29 of the Act. The said section makes provision for appeals from a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad and such Courts of Small Causes elsewhere under the provision of Small Causes Court Act, 1887 and also from-a decree or order by the Court of the Civil Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act. Section 29(2) then provides for a revisional application and it is also confined to orders or decrees made by those Courts. Section 29(3) deals suo motu and other revisional powers and those powers are also for the purpose of enabling the Court to satisfy itself ‘that the decree or order made in any suit or proceeding was according to law’. Nowhere the order under Section 23A which is an administrative order is subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court I, therefore, hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision application against an order passed by the Collector or the Deputy Collector under Section 23 A of the Bombay Rent Act.
6. With due respect to the learned single Judge, we do not see any reason to restrict the revisional power of the District Court (or the Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad) to the decree or order in any suit or proceeding of the Court only. The plain language of section does not restrict the remedy to orders passed in Court proceedings only. It provides that where no appeal lies against a decree or order in any suit or proceeding, the District Court may call for the case and pass such order with respect to that as it thinks fit. Thus, where no appeal lies under this section from an order in any proceeding, revision under Section 29(3) would be competent. The Legislature has not restricted the revisional jurisdiction only to the orders in proceedings in the Court only. The learned single Judge in the above case held that under the section, nowhere the administrative officer is subjected to revisional jurisdiction of the District Court. In our opinion, the section has nowhere restricted the revisional jurisdiction to the judicial orders in Court proceedings only. When there is no such restriction in the section, it includes all orders passed by any authority in any proceeding under the Act. We, therefore, hold that the District Court has revisional jurisdiction against an order passed by the Collector or the Deputy Collector under Section 23A of the Act because order under Section 23A of the Act is an order in a proceeding before the statutory authority under the Act, namely, the Collector or Deputy Collector and there is no reason to exclude such orders from the purview of a judicial remedy by way of revision under Section 29(3) especially when no appeal is provided against such order. Therefore, we overrule that decision. This question obviously has arisen because of the preliminary objection against he maintainability of the petition.
7. In view of the aforesaid discussion, an alternative remedy by way of revision application would, be available to the petitioner. However, in view of the fact that judgment of the learned single Judge was holding the field, this petition was directly filed against the order of the Deputy Collector and it has been admitted and, therefore, at this stage, we would not be justified in now asking the petitioner to avail of the alternative remedy more particularly in view of the fact that the question is of supply of electricity which is a basic necessity of life and on such question, a litigant should not be directed to go from pillar to post and from forum to forum for no fault of his. Having regard to the law declared by this Court in Bai Dudhiben’s case (supra), he has filed Special Civil Application directly against the order of the Deputy Collector refusing to give new electric connection.
8. We, therefore, examine the merits prima facie. We say “prima facie” because there is civil litigation pending between the parties in the Civil Court and any finding given in this proceeding would be for the limited purpose of Section 23A and any finding given by the authority while deciding application under Section 23A would be a finding for the purpose of that proceeding only and would be subject to any decision by a competent Court which would be binding to the parties. However, merely because some dispute is raised or some dispute is pending in Civil Court, it would be no justification for the authority under Section 23A to reject the application and to refuse to grant permission for new electricity connection. If that were so, the landlady who does not give consent for a new electricity connection would be tempted to raise a case of simple denial of status of the applicant. On mere denial, the authority under Section 23A does not become helpless and does not lose the jurisdiction and cannot abdicate his duty under Section 23A which is meant to give easy and speedy remedy for getting basic and essential amenity.
9. In the present case, it has been prima facie established that the petitioner has been in occupation of the premises since 1988. Till 1992, there is no dispute raised by the landlady and no litigation started by the landlady on the basis that the Petitioner is a trespasser. The petitioner has also stated that he has been paying monthly rent of Rs. 325.00 and that the landlady has not been issuing any receipt and he has been claiming to be a tenant and undisputedly he is in possession of the suit premises since 1988. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to permission for electricity connection under Section 23A of the Act inspite of the lack of consent by the landlady and inspite of her opposition.
13. In the result, the petition succeeds and rule is made absolute by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated May 25, 1992 passed by the Deputy Collector, Bhuj in Electricity Case No. 4 of 1992 and by granting the application of the applicant for permission to have a new electricity connection. The petitioner’s application in Electricity Case No. 4 of 1992 is hereby granted and the Deputy Collector is directed to give permission to get the supply. On such permission being given, the owner landlady is deemed to have given the requisite consent under Section 12(2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the licensee, respondent No. 2-Gujarat Electricity Board shall not be ‘liable to the owner landlady for the trespass for supply of electricity according to the said permission.
14. A writ of this order to be sent forthwith to the respondent No. 1.
No order as to costs.
Direct Service.