ORDER
1. This is a petition for bail. The learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent has opposed the application and has filed an affidavit in reply. I have heard both the sides.
2. The petitioner is one of the accused in N.D.P.S. Special Case No. 2 of 1995 in the Court of Special Judge for N.D.P.S. Cases, Bombay. He had moved an application for bail which was rejected by the learned Special Judge. Hence he has approached this Court for bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C.
3. The prosecution case is that on the midnight of 2nd/3rd October, 1994, the petitioner who was going to board Singapore Airlines flight, on suspicion, was stopped by officers of Air Intelligence Unit of Customs at Sahar Airport. The petitioner was found in possession of a briefcase. The petitioner was brought to the office of the Customs Officer on suspicion. He was questioned whether he was in possession of any foreign currency or any narcotic drugs. The petitioner replied in the negative. Then on suspicion, the concerned officer searched the briefcase which was found to contain 2,400 gms. of opium which had been concealed in the bottom of the briefcase. The same was seized under panchanama. On 4th October, 1994, the petitioner was formally arrested by the Customs Officer and later in the day he was sent to the learned Magistrate with a remand application.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act are violated, and therefore, the accused is entitled to bail. It was also submitted that there is defect in the investigation and on this ground also the petitioner is entitled to bail. Then it was further submitted that the petitioner has not been produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours from the time of his arrest as per the statutory provision in Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the petitioner’s custody was illegal and on this ground also he is entitled to bail. Mr. Satpute, the learned Counsel for the Customs, refuted all these allegations and contended that no case is made out for grant of bail to the petitioner.
5. The short point for consideration is whether the petitioner has made out any ground for grant of bail in this case ?
6. As far as violation of mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted only about violation of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act. That section provides that in the case of a search of a person, he must be given an option whether he desires to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted officer. It was argued that in this case no such offer was made to the accused and hence there is non-compliance of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act and that is a ground for bail. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Kumar v. State of Goa, . No doubt, in that case there is an observation that there was a breach of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act, but the Apex Court has made it clear even in that case that in the case of a chance recovery, the procedure under the N.D.P.S. Act must be followed from the stage when a narcotic drug was found. The Apex Court has also relied on it earlier decision in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh to which I will presently refer. In that case, by chance recovery, two polythene packets of charas were found in the house of accused. Even after finding narcotic drug in the house, the police party continued its search and then person of the accused was searched from where also certain narcotic drugs were seized. In this context, it was observed that there was violation of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act. When the police party found the narcotic drugs by chance recovery, there was no question of invoking Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act. At least after finding narcotic drugs, they should have followed the procedure under the Act as pointed out in Balbir Singh’s case. Even after having found narcotic drug in the house, still the police office searched the person of the accused and recovered more narcotic drugs without giving him an option as provided in Section 50 of the Act. Therefore, the observations of the Apex Court about violation of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act must be read with reference to the particular facts of the case which I have mentioned above.
7. In the present case, the accused petitioner was proceeding to board the flight. He had already taken a boarding card. At that time, on suspicion, he was stopped and questioned whether he had any foreign currency or narcotic drugs. He replied in the negative and on suspicion he was brought to the customs office and then his briefcase was opened and found to contain narcotic drugs. Since it is a case of a chance recovery of narcotic drugs on suspicion, Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act is not attracted at all as pointed out by the Apex Court in Balbir Singh’s Case (supra). After discussing the points of law involved, the conclusions are summarised in para 26 at page 1887 (of AIR) of the reported judgment. In para 26(1) it is clearly observed that in the case of a chance recovery, the search is complete and at that stage Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act is not attracted and hence compliance with requirements of that Section does not arise.
In the present case, if, even after finding the narcotic drug in the briefcase, the police officer had searched the person of the accused and recovered some more narcotic drugs, then there would have been violation of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the ruling laid down in Mohinder Kumar’s case referred to above would have been attracted. Except a chance recovery of narcotic drugs in the briefcase of the petitioner, nothing more is done, and therefore, the question of violation of Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act does not arise as held in Balbir Singh’s case.
No other violation of any other mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act was brought to my notice.
8. Then some comment was made about delay in sending sample packets to the Chemical Analyser, about some discrepancy regarding weight of sample, etc. These are matters which cannot be decided at this stage. It is well settled that a Court cannot conduct a mini trial at the time of considering a bail application. The Investigating Officer may have reasonable explanation for the delay in sending sample packets or for discrepancy regarding weight of sample. All these things will have to be thrashed out during trial. These contentions are too premature to be considered at this stage and the prosecution must have an opportunity to explain these things during trial. It is open to the petitioner to cross-examine the concerned officers on these points. Then these matters can be urged at the time of final arguments only after regular trial.
9. The only other serious argument that was pressed on behalf of the petitioner is that he was not produced before the Magistrate within 24 hourse as required by Section 57 of the Cr.P.C. It was argued that the petitioner was taken into custody in the early morning hours on 3rd October 1994, but he was produced before the Magistrate only in the afternoon of 4th October, 1994 which is beyond the statutory period of 24 hours. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the accused was formally arrested on the morning of 4th October, 1994 and on the same day in the afternoon he was produced before the learned Magistrate which is well within 24 hours from the time of arrest.
Section 57 Cr.P.C. provides that a person shall not be detained in custody beyond 24 hours who has been arrested without arrest warrant. Even Article 22 of the Constitution of India provides that every person arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before a Magistrate within a period of 24 hours. Therefore, we find that in both these provisions the emphasis is that on “arrest of a person, he cannot be detained for more than 24 hours.”
In the present case, as per the record of the Investigating Officer, the accused was arrested on 4th October 1994 and on the same day he has been produced before the Magistrate. Hence I do not find any case of illegal detention of the accused contrary to Section 57 Cr.P.C. or Article 22 of the Constitution of India.
But the learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court Suaibo Inow Cassama v. Union of India, where it has been observed that the accused must be deemed to have been arrested as soon as he is apprehended and contraband articles are seized though formal arrest is shown later. This decision was rendered in July 1993. This decision no doubt supports the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The trial Court has referred to a later decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court. It is the case of Munsamy Shanmugam v. Collector of Customs reported in 1995 Cri LJ 1740 which was decided on 25th October, 1994, where it has been clearly held that mere taking a person to custody for the purpose of enquiry does not amount to arrest and we have to calculate the time of 24 hours from the time of formal arrest. I am in respectful agreement with this later decision of this Court.
In this context, we may make a reference to a decision of the Apex Court Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, where the Apex Court had occasion to consider as to what is meant by the word “arrest”. It was pointed out in para 48 of the reported judgment that in a legal sense in connection with criminal offences, an “arrest” consists in the taking into custody of another person. In para 50, it is mentioned that the word “arrest” includes “custody”, but “custody” may not always amount to “arrest”. Both the words “arrest” and “custody” cannot be used as synonymous terms.
In my view, the accused was questioned on the early morning hours on 3rd October, 1994 to find out whether he has any contraband articles. Then on that day he was questioned and his statement had been recorded. It is only on the next morning that he was formally arrested and within 24 hours he was produced before the Magistrate. Hence prima facie, I do not find any illegality in the custody of the petitioner.
The argument that the petitioner requires some medical treatment, in the circumstances of the case cannot be ground to grant bail having regard to the gravity of the offence. On request of the petitioner, the Superintendent of Jail can send him for treatment to the Government hospital where all facilities are available.
Some of the arguments regarding discrepancies in the timing of apprehension or discrepancies in the timing of parchanama etc. do not merit consideration at this stage. It may also be mentioned that the Customs Officer has recorded the statement of the petitioner where he has made a confession of the whole things. Such a statement recorded by the Customs Officer is admissible in evidence. Prima facie, it shows the involvement of the petitioner in a serious crime for which he is now being prosecuted. In addition to this I may also point out the application is being pressed now nearly 1 1/2 years after the arrest of the petitioner. I do not find that any case is made out for grant of bail to the petitioner, particularly having regard to the gravity of the offence and restricted power of bail in view of Section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act.
10. in the result, the application/petition is dismissed. The trial Court is directed to expedite the trial of the case since the petitionerr is in custody.
11. Petition dismissed.