JUDGMENT
B.J. Shethna, J.
1. The petitioners-accused have filed this revision against the judgment and order dt. 15.9.1995 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur in Cr. Appeal No. 2/93 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners and confirming the judgment and order dt. 10.12.1993 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udaipur in case No. 208/90 by which the petitioners came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 (for short ‘Act’) and sentenced them to pay fine of Rs. 25,000/- each in default of payment of fine, to undergo six months SI.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Garg has raised two contention in this petition. (1) that the complaint was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation of three months of the commission of an offence, which is bailed under Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. (2) that the substance of the accusation was not read over to both the accused in their statements under Section 313 Cr. P.C.
3. Mr. Garg submitted that the accident took place on 27.2.1992 in the Factory of the petitioners for which the complaint was filed by the complainant Nand Lal Salecha for the first time before the trial court only on 5.6.1990. Thus, admittedly it was filed much after the expiry of period of limitation of three months. He has submitted that both the courts below have, therefore, committed an error in convicting the accused in a matter where the courts below could not have taken cognizance against the accused after the expiry of period of limitation.
4. Section 106 reads as under:
Section 106–No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector.
Provided. . .
5. In this case a poor workman has lost his life in an accident which took place in the factory of the petitioners on 27.2.1990. It is true that the complainant Nand Lal Salecha and Chetan Kumar have clearly stated in their evidence that they came to know about the accident on the date of incident itself i.e. 27.2.1990. However, complainant Nandlal Salecha clearly stated in his evidence that he made enquiry about the incident on three different dates i.e. 27.2.1990, 2.3.1990 and 5.3.1990 and after thorough inquiry when he was fully satisfied that the accident took place because of the negligence then only after completing the detailed inquiry in the matter he prepared his report on 5.3.1990 (Ex. P/l) and filed the complaint before the trial court on 5.6.1990 against the accused.
6. Under Section 106 of the Factories Act, the complaint is required to be filed within the period of limitation i.e. three months from the knowledge of an offence by the Inspector. Information of the accident is not sufficient. There is a difference between the information and knowledge. Information may be incomplete. Simple information is not sufficient. One can have full knowledge about it only after detailed inquiry in the accident. In some cases Inspector, on thorough inquiry may come to the conclusion that there was no negligence. He has to arrive at the conclusion as to whether offence was really committed or not. In this case the complainant has enquired on three different dates i.e., 27.2.1990, 2.3.1990 and 5.3.1990. There after, on 5.3.1990 he prepared his report when he was fully satisfied that the offence in question has already been committed. Therefore, the period of limitation would start from the date on which the complainant concluded his inquiry on the information report received by him regarding the incident and not from the date of the incident. In this case the complaint was filed on 5.6.1990, therefore, from the date of report i.e. 5.3.1990 complaint was in time. Thus, first contention of Mr. Garg regarding the period of limitation is rejected.
7. Second submission raised by Shri Garg was that the substance of accusation as required under Section 251 Cr. P.C. was not read over to both the accused, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below are bad in the eye of law, illegal and liable to be set aside. This submission of Mr. Garg has no substance. Assuming for the sake of argument that the substance of accusation was not read over to both the accused then also the trial would not be vitiated unless and until it is pointed that by doing so serious prejudice caused to them. Mr. Garg was unable to show what prejudice was caused to the accused by not reading out the substance of the accusation. Mr. Garg submission is that the substance of accusation required under Section 251 Cr. P.C. was not read over to the accused is factually also not correct. The record is very much before the court. From the ordersheet of the court it is clear that the substance was read out to the accused on 29.4.1991. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was recorded and no grievance was made by the accused when the statements were recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. Hence, the second submission is also rejected.
8. At this stage learned Counsel Mr. Garg tried to raise the contention that the prosecution has not proved that case beyond reasonable doubt that Girdhari Lal was the partner and Rajkumar was the Manager. This contention was raised in the memo of revision at page 6 para 5. This contention was never raised before the courts below, therefore it cannot be permitted to raise before this Court for the first time in this revision petition as it is a question of fact. Mr. Garg was unable to point out that this contention was ever raised before the court’s below.
9. In view of the above discussion this revision petition fails and is dismissed. If the fine is not paid then the same shall be paid within two months failing which the accused- petitioners shall have to undergo six months SI as imposed by the trial Court.