ORDER
1. Certain residents of Bellary Town have preferred the present petition whereby they have challenged the action on the part of the respondent-authorities in shifting the bus stand from the Royal Circle which was known as Adoni Bus Stand to a place near the Sangam Theatre. The authorities concerned had issued two notifications the first dated 3-4-1997 whereunder the bus stand was sought to be shifted and the second notification with which we are concerned here is the one dated 26-3-97 whereunder the authorities had directed that the buses shall no longer be parked at the Adoni Bus Stand i.e., the old bus stand. It is this notification that has been challenged. Mr. D’Sa, the learned Senior Government Counsel who appears for the respondents had brought it to the notice of the Court that the challenge is virtually academic and of no consequence unless the notifion shifting the bus stand itself is challenged because once the earlier notification becomes final, there can be no question of anybody insisting on the buses being parked at the old Adoni Bus Stand and it was only because of certain incidents whereby buses were sought to be defiantly parked at old bus stand, that the second notificatio,. became necessary formally prohibiting any such acts. This issue is not of much consequence because there is on record an application for permission to challenge the notification shifting the bus stand and in any event, in the course of the arguments both the learned Counsel have dealt with that question also and hence, it is unnecessary to go into that aspect of the matter. Mr. Rao, learned Counsels who represents the petitioners has drawn my attention to 3 decisions of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Bkopal v Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. and Another, and AIR 1995 SC 458 (sic), in support of his contention that the provisions of Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act do not invest the authorities with the power. of shifting a bus stand and he points out that if at all there is a reference in the Act to this power that it is in Section 96(2). I do concede that in the cases before the Supreme Court some observations have been made which support the submission canvassed by Mr. Rao. However, the facts of the cases are very different which is why they are distinguishable. I have carefully considered the submission canvassed by Mr. Rao on this point and to my mind, it would be difficult to accept the contention even if a very technical view of the matter is taken. On the other hand, Mr. D’Sa who represents the respondents points out to me that the ambit and scope of Section 117 is broad enough to take into consideration a situation of the present type. I am in agreement with this submission because it will be seen that if an authority has power to set up a bus stand or if an authority has the power to decide which will be the halting place of the buses, then it implies that the authority can also exercise the power of shifting the bus stand. This contention on behalf of the petitioners will therefore necessarily have to fail.
2. The next ground of challenge emanates from the fact that the decision is attacked as being arbitrary and hasty. There is also a challenge on the ground of mala fides, and I shall consider this aspect of the matter along with the earlier two. Mr. Rao has demonstrated to me that the authorities intend constructing a regular permanent bus stand at some distance and that the work on this project has been commenced. He states that as and when that bus stand is operational that the authorities ought to have shifted once and for all instead of causing unpleasantness to the operation and to the passengers by insisting on their shifting to a temporary bus stand at the present spot which was wholly and completely unnecessary. He points out to me that the place chosen by the authorities is unsuitable because there are cinema theatres, a hospital and other institutions around the area and furthermore, that the taxi stand was close to the Adoni Bus Stand and that it was extremely convenient for the passengers to use that place. In support of the plea of mala fides, he demonstrates to me that the corporation authorities are putting up a large commercial complex on that spot and that it is his contention that there are various vested interests who are keen on that project and that it is these persons who have insisted on the bus stand being shifted in a hurry. Mr. Rao submits that the temporary arrangement was unnecessary and furthermore that the wishes of the members of the public ought to have been taken into consideration. Relying on the decision , he has contended that under the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, that it was open to the citizens to insist on public notice being issued and the wishes and convenience of the members of the public being taken into consideration. The attack is basically on the basis of arbitrariness and mala fides and in support of this plea Mr. Rao demonstrated that the sudden shifting to a place where no infrastructure was present is liable to be quashed since it was not in the public interest.
3. Dealing first with the factual position Mr. D’Sa demonstrates to me that it is incorrect to state that there was any haste or hurry involved apart from the record which he has placed before the Court and which I have perused. He points out that the area in question was extremely congested and it was very necessary to shift the bus stand to a nearby convenient spot as the traffic situation had become impossible. He states that it was not desirable to wait until the new project was completed because some immediate solution to the congestion problem had to bo found. As regards the shop complex Mr. D’Sa has pointed out that this was a time-bound project under a World Bank loan and therefore it was necessary to commence the work without any further delay which was one of the reasons why a temporary bus stand was thought of. He also points out to me that it is false to say that the citizens did not have notice because an earlier writ petition had in fact been filed and secondly, it was very much to the public knowledge for several months that the alternate temporary bus stand was going to become operational. He has also demonstrated from the file that the Deputy Commissioner held a series of conferences with the various police, revenue and other authorities before giving final shape to the shift. On the ground of arbitrariness, Mr. D’Sa had submitted that relocation of the bus stand was something that had to be decided on the basis of what the various authorities and experts pointed out and that there is no requirement of law whereby the matter should be publicly notified or what objections should be invited. In sum and substance, he submits that the decision is a perfectly legitimate one and that no interference is called for.
4. I need to record here that issues such as measures for purposes of decongesting a city or matters such as relocation of markets, bus stands and other public places are something which the authorities are required to take in the overall public interest. For good reason, there is no rigid requirement that the matter should be notified and that objections should be invited. Apart from the fact that any such proposals necessarily involve displeasing a certain section of the public, this would inevitably result in resentment and even local agitations, the authorities are required to take a fast decision in consultation with the heads of the departments and the experts and once a genuine conclusion is arrived at that such a step is necessary, it can certainly be implemented without any formal public notice. It is necessary to clarify here that the authorities are required to keep the public interest foremost in mind, not to act in an arbitrary and aggressive manner or to arrive at an unreasonable conclusion but ought to as far as possible ensure that the most beneficial decision is taken. As indicated by me, the conclusion is bound to be resented by some persons but this is inevitable. On the facts of the present case, I am more than satisfied that the area was extremely congested and that therefore it was necessary to shift the bus stand to some other convenient place. It has also been demonstrated that the site was required for the new complex to be put up and that in this background, the moving of the bus stand was certainly justified. What has also emerged in the course of the hearing is that the new spot is reasonably close to the old one and under these circumstances I see no valid ground whatever except the usual motivated agitation which is characteristic as far as resisting any form of change or any activity for the better because it has become habitual to oppose for the sake of opposition and to litigate if other moves fail. Under these circumstances, the action was perfectly justifiable and I do not see any ground on which it can be interfered with.
5. There is one other aspect of the matter namely the challenge that no infrastructure worth the name was available and that the citizens and travelling public were subjected to lot of inconvenience and harassment because of the shifting before the necessary infrastructure had been set up. Several months after the petition was filed, I appointed a Commissioner and from the report it is very clear that even at that point of time the infrastructure was far from good. One of the most basic requirements at public places is the need to provide usable triplets which can sufficiently be clean and which are available in sufficient number depending on the density of population. If this is not done, the entire are is converted into an open-air lavatory. It can have dangerous results on public health. Also, basic facilities such as drinking water provisions and the like must necessarily be provided at such places as these are essential for the travelling public. It is very clear in the present case that this infrastructure was not adequately provided and even the Commissioner’s report indicated that it was insufficient. From this point of view, the challenge on the limited ground that even though the order in question was justified that it was executed at the wrong time will have to be upheld. Had the petition been decided in the month of April 1997, perhaps it would have been open for the petitioners to insist on a relief that they be permitted to use the old premises until the new one was ready. Several months have now elapsed. The buses have long since been using the present bus stand and whatever was at the old Adoni Bus Stand had been demolished and the officers present in the Court inform me that the work of the complex has been started. Under these circumstances the action is irreversible and will have to be set at rest.
6. I need to however lay down that in the case of public authorities who often times take decisions to shift places such as markets, bus stands etc., from one place to the other, that it is a necessary requirement that the new premises or site should be totally and completely utilisable and 100% complete before the shift has been made. The general tendency of public authorities is to suddenly discontinue the old area of facility and to force the use of the new place where for months and years together the basic infrastructure is either non-existent or incomplete. As a result of this there is a total state of mess and one often sees that nothing is done even though several years have elapsed. The petitioners are right in pointing out to the Court that the authorities ought to have seen to it, that the entire infrastructure is completed and only then to have effected the shift. Not having done so was certainly incorrect on their part. All that is left for the Court is to direct corrective steps namely that the respondents shall see to it that within a period of three months from today all the requisite infrastructure that is lacking at the present premises is set up and completed so that no inconvenience of any type is caused to the general public. That is the only direction that is required to be issued on the present petition as I am satisfied that the action in question, is otherwise required to be upheld.
7. In the result, the petition partially succeeds to this limited extent and stands disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.