JUDGMENT
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
(1) The appellant has preferred this appeal against the Judgment dated 4.3.1994 passed in C.W.P.N0.2806/88byK.S.Bhat,J.
(2) In this appeal, a very short controversy is involved. The appellant has been carrying on business of manufacturing of Hosiery for a number of years. It was decided by the respondent Dda to shift the Hosiery industry from the walled city to different industrial areas, including Rampura Industrial Area, and Okhla industrial area. It is alleged by the appellant that according to the Dda, all those who were shifted from the walled city to different industrial areas were entitled to alternative industrial plots and in that scheme the appellant also applied for allotment of an industrial plot. The appellant initially requested that he be allotted industrial plot in Rampura industrial area but the respondent did not agree. It is submitted that the respondent instead of issuing the demand letter without any basis, refunded the earnest money vide its letter dated 16.12.1971. The appellant persistently pursued the matter with the respondent authority and according to the appellant, respondent vide its letter dated 9.7.1980, mentioned that the appellant’s household industry, is not required to be shifted and the appellant’s industry shall not be shifted, therefore, there is no question of any alternative allotment. Even thereafter, the appellant persisted the matter with the respondent authority and wrote a number of letters, mentioning that he was entitled to an alternative plot and the same be allotted to him.
(3) It is alleged that ultimately on 8.2.1983, the respondent agreed to allot an alternative plot to the petition
(4) This court issued notice in the writpetition to the D.D.A.iand thereafter on behalf of the Dda, Mr.S.C.Dikshit,Secretary, Delhi Development Authority filed an affidavit. In the affidavit, it was mentioned that the appellant was found ineligible for allotment and therefore, the earnest money was refunded. .It was further mentioned in the affidavit that the appellant’s name was inadvertently included in the list of persons for allotment, and as a result the allotment was wrongly made to the appellant in lieu of premises no.773, Nicholas Road, Kashmiri Gate, Delhi. It was submitted that proposal for allotment , made on account of the: fact and the understanding that the appellant in fact was functioning at premises no.773, Nicholas Road, Kashmiri Gate, Delhi but he shifted from there to premises no.l667-B/1,Shastri Nagar, Delhi which was a. confirming area. Therefore, the appellant’s allotment was found not to be in order and was cancelled. It is further submitted that it transpired from the licence issued by the Mcd to the appellant that it was for the ‘household industry’. The appellant was in fact functioning from 1667-B/1, Shastri Nagar, New Delhi, which was a conforming area. Therefore, the appellant was not required to be shifted and consequently, the appellant was not entitled to any allotment.
(5) It may be pertinent to mention that even the appellant was offered allotment at commercial rate plus 20 per cent and was asked to deposit Rs.Rs.3,60,944.98 within 15 days from the date of issue of the letter dated 8.2.1983 for allotment of alternative site. However, the appellant did not deposit the said amount till date. Therefore, the appellant was not allotted alternative plot
(6) The learned single Judge had perused the documents and had heard learned counsel for the parties and held that the appellant was not legally entitled to an alternative ‘site because he was ineligible in accordance with the statutory requirements. It was also mentioned that the appellant could not take any shelter under the doctrine of estoppel.
(7) The respondent at the earliest point of time had withdrawn the allotment made in favour of the appellant on the ground that the appellant was not eligible. Mistaken allotment made at one point of time could not be the foundation of estoppel against the respondents.
(8) The learned single Judge has also held that the appellant had contended that the appellant is now willing to pay the commercial rate prevalent in February, 1981 for the site. The court rejected the plea and observed that it was too late for the appellant to take such a stand after a lapse of several years. This court also observed that the court cannot ignore the fact that the prices of the land have gone up several times and the property cannot be directed to be allotted in favour of the appellant at the rate which was prevailing in the year 1981.
(9) Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge, the appellant has a preferred this appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Keshav Dayal and learned counsel for the Dda, Mr. Jyant Bhushan, who chose to argue the case without filing a reply. Learned counsel for Dda relied on the earlier affidavit filed in the writ petition and submitted that the appellant is not eligible for the allotment of alternative site because the appellant is not being shifted. The question of alternative industrial plot would arise only if the appellant is shifted from the existing industry. He further submitted that the appellant could carry on his existing ‘household industry’ and he is not required to be shifted.
(10) Learned counsel for the Dda submitted that there is no question of allotment to the site which was once offered to the appellant by the Dda, (for which the Dda demanded the sum of Rs-3,60,944.98). The value of the same plot of land now is more than rupees one crore, and the appellant cannot be permitted to acquire the alternative industrial plot when he is totally ineligible and not entitled to the same.
(11) When, therefore, the Dda is not insisting on the appellant shifting from the place where the appellant is having his business, one cannot understand how the appellant can claim as in the case of persons sought to be compulsorily uprooted. Alternative land is a matter of rehabilitation. Such a question can arise only if the Dda wants that the appellant’s business cannot be conducted in this zone and he should move out. Such is not the demand of the Dda now.
(12) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant could ‘not satisfy the court as to how the appellant was eligible for allotment of the industrial plot. The question of allotting the plot at any place would, already stated, arise only if the appellant is eligible for the allotment. It is abundantly clear that the appellant wants somehow to get an alternative industrial plot to which he is not entitled because the value of the alternative ‘Austria) plot has appreciate ;d a lot. Any allotment to an ineligible person would be against the policy and manifestly illegal. The respondent cannot permit any such unjust environment on public expense.
(13) The appeal preferred by the appellant is devoid of any merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs.