ORDER
Ghulam Mohammed, J.
1. This writ petition is filed seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the orders of first respondent in ATA No.9 of 1987 dated 24-1-1990 as arbitrary and illegal.
2. The landlords filed ATP No.22 of 1961 before Deputy Tahsildar, Anakapalli, under A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, for eviction of respondents 3 to 8 tenants on the ground that they had committed default in payment of rents and the same was allowed on 21-11-1964. Aggrieved thereby, the tenants filed appeal in TA No.8 of 1965 which was allowed on 21-11-1971 by Revenue Divisional Officer, Visakhapatnam, setting aside the eviction. However, possession was taken over by the landlords in pursuance of the order in ATP No.22 of 1961. Later, the landlords filed writ petition in WP No.5592 of 1971 and obtained interim stay of the order in TA No.8 of 1965. Subsequently, the said writ petition was dismissed on 23-4-1975. The respondents filed an application under Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure for restitution and the same was dismissed as time barred as the tenants have not shown that there was stay throughout to save the period of limitation. Against the said order of District Munsif, Anakapalli, the tenants filed appeal to the District Judge, Visakhapatnam in ATA No.9 of 1987 wherein the dismissal order was reversed on two grounds viz., E.P. was filed within time and that Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act.
3. Pursuant to the order of the Primary Tribunal, the landlords sold the property to the petitioners who are bona fide purchasers for the value under registered sale deeds and the petitioners were not made parties in the execution proceedings, but they got impleaded in the appeal. In fact, a patta was granted earlier by the Inams Deputy Tahsildar but the same was reversed by the Commissioner for Survey, Settlement and Land Record and the enquiry is still pending. The petitioners submit that when there is no period prescribed for such application under the said Act, the residuary clause of limitation under the Limitation Act should be appliedin which case the petition ought to have been filed within three years. In any case, the petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of laches. The tenants have not explained the extraordinary delay in filing the petition for restitution.
4. The learned District Judge framed the following point for consideration in the ATANo. 9 of 1987:
“Whether the EP filed within 12 years from the date of judgment in the writ petition i.e., 23-4-1975 is within limitation or not?”
The learned Judge relying on the decision of this Court in Reddi Ramaiah v. S. Laxmana, 1983 (2) APLJ 424, held that the provisions of the Limitation Act and Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings and consequently the petition for restitution of land has to be filed within 12 years from the date of judgment of the High Court. Further, as per Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, the time during which the execution of the order has been stayed by injunction or stay order has to be excluded and admittedly, the stay was granted in the impugned proceedings and such period has to be excluded. Thus, the learned District Judge held that the E.P., is within limitation as it is filed within 12 years from the date of judgment in WP No.5592/71 i.e., 23-4-1975 and the Tribunal was directed to register the EP and take steps for restitution of land as per law.
5. I have heard learned Counsel for petitioners and learned Counsel for respondents.
6. Mr. P. Sriraghuram, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the residuary clause contained in Article 137 is attracted as the petitioners are the purchasers of the land. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondents contends that the residuary clause is not applicable and Article 136 of the Limitation Act is attracted inasmuch as the restitution petition filed under Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure is analogous to the execution proceedings and in the absence ofany time prescribed under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, the Limitation Act applies.
7. The Supreme Court in Mahijibhai v. Manibhai, , dealing with the question whether an application for restitution is an application for execution of decree held as follows:
“.,..,……If we are not dealing with each of the cases specifically it is only because we have practically dealt with all the reasons given by the learned Judges in support of their respective views. We realize that the opposite construction for which the appellant contended is also a possible one; but it ignores the history of the legislation and the anomalies that it introduces. On a procedural matter pertaining to execution when a section yields to two conflicting constructions the Court shall adopt a construction which maintains rather than disturbs the equilibrium in the field of execution. The historical background of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure the acceptance of the legal position that an application for restitution is one for execution of a decree by a number of High Courts, the inevitable adoption of the said legal position by innumerable successful appellants within the jurisdiction of the said High Courts, the possible deleterious impact of a contrary view on such appellants, while there will be no such effect on similar appellants within the jurisdiction of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view, also persuade us to accept the construction that the application for restitution is one for execution of a decree. We, therefore, hold on a fair constructions of the provisions of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an application for restitution is an application for execution of a decree.”
8. The second contention that the petitioners are bona fide purchasers is not seriously contested before me. However, this Court in Chengayya v. Sub-Collector, Ongole, (1965) II An.WR.197, observed as follows:
‘There can be no question of the Legislature wanting to protect a bona fide purchaser and thereby conferring a greater benefit to him than to the landlord from whom he had purchased. It would never have been the intention of the Legislature to insure the purchaser against the effect of the legislation and to give a better treatment to the purchaser than to the landlord.”
9. Following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mahijibhai v. Manibhai (supra) and this Court in Chengayya v. Sub-Collector Ongole (supra), I am of the view that the decision of the District Judge that the restitution petition is analogous to the execution proceedings and directing the Tribunal to register the EP and deal with the same on merits is justified. I see no infirmity, legal or otherwise, in the impugned order.
10. The writ petition is misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.