Bombay High Court High Court

Governing Body, Nirmal Education … vs Presiding Officer, School … on 4 July, 1996

Bombay High Court
Governing Body, Nirmal Education … vs Presiding Officer, School … on 4 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997 (75) FLR 28, 1996 (2) MhLj 592
Author: A Desai
Bench: A Desai, B Wahane


JUDGMENT

A.A. Desai, J.

1. The termination of the Respondent No. 2 (Teacher of K.G.) was set aside by the School Tribunal which is under challenge before us. Mr. Sambre, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners mainly contended that to deal with the termination or otherwise of a teacher in Kindergarten, the School Tribunal has no jurisdiction. Kindergarten does not come within the definition of “School” as provided under sub-section (24) of section 2 of the Act which reads as under :

“School means a Primary School, Secondary School, or Higher Secondary School or any part of any such School, a Junior College of Education or any other institution or part thereof which imparts education or training below the degree level including any institution which imparts technical or vocational education.”

2. Mr. Bhangade attempted to counter the submission. According to him, the definition as provided is very comprehensive and includes the teacher of any School which imparts instructions below Degree level. In Kindergarten the students are being trained in particular discipline and, thus, it is covered by the definition.

3. No doubt the definition has an ambit of sufficiently long range, but still it is not omnibus. It refers principally to institute of definite description like Primary, Secondary etc. and then of particular nature i.e. imparting educational instructions in any discipline below the Degree level. The definition gives definite indication of its parameter. The institutions which impart education between primary and below degree courses are alone taken within the ambit of the term “School”. The lowest limit is of primary and upper limit is below degree standard. The Kindergarten is undisputedly below primary. The School Tribunal, therefore, has no jurisdiction to deal within the definition. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

4. Shri Bhangade the learned counsel made a statement that the Respondent No. 2 is qualified to teach primary standards. She has experience and was working with the petitioner-Management since 1970. She also, according to the contingency, took classes of primary standards.

5. Having regard to the situation as per termination is as reported owing to the abolition of K.G. Classes, she could be considered sympathetically for being accommodated in any of the institutions of the petitioner. Shri Sambre the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners made a statement that as far as possible the petitioner shall make every effort sympathetically to accommodate the Respondent No. 2 in any of the Institution. In view of this, the impugned order is set aside.

6. Order accordingly.