Supreme Court of India

Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors vs Kalleti Chengaiah on 1 March, 1996

Supreme Court of India
Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors vs Kalleti Chengaiah on 1 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: JT 1996 (6) 75, 1996 SCALE (3)29
Author: K Ramaswamy
Bench: Ramaswamy, K.
           PETITIONER:
GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
KALLETI CHENGAIAH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:	01/03/1996

BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:
 JT 1996 (6)	75	  1996 SCALE  (3)29


ACT:



HEADNOTE:



JUDGMENT:

O R D E R
Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order of
the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated
July 28, 1993 made in Writ Appeal No.752/92. The Director of
Settlement by his order dated October 25, 1990 suo motu
exercised power under Section 5(2) of the Andhra Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari
Act (26 of 1948) (for short, the ‘Act’) and set aside the
order of the Settlement Officer dated February 7, 1983
granting ryotwari patta under Section 11(a) of the Act to
the respondent. When that order was challenged by way of
writ petition, the learned single Judge set aside the order
holding that the exercise of the power after long lapse of
time was arbitrary; there was no material produced to show
circumstances under which the power came to be exercised and
that, under those circumstances, the order setting aside the
grant of ryotwari patta is illegal.

It is seen that Section 5(2) of the Act gives power as
under:

“Every Settlement Officer shall be
subordinate to the Director and
shall be guided by such lawful
instructions as he may issue from
time to time; and the Director
shall also have power to cancel or
revise any of the orders, acts or
proceedings of the Settlement
Officer other than those in respect
of which an appeal lies to the
Tribunal.”

It is settled law that the power of suo motu revision
can be exercised within reasonable time. When it is held
that the power may be exercised from time to time, what
would be the reasonable time depends upon facts of each
case. It is seen that in this case the orders were issued by
the Settlement Officer contrary to the provisions and it was
not known till an enquiry was held and until it came to
light that the exercise of power by the Settlement Officer
under Section 11 (a) of the Act was clearly in contravention
of the provisions of the Act. Under those circumstances, the
Director was constrained to exercise the power. It is also
seen that when the record was called for it came to light
that the record was destroyed. It would be obvious that the
persons behind the scheme had managed to see that the
records were destroyed. Considered from this perspective, we
are of the view that the High Court was clearly in error in
interfering with the order of the Director of Settlement.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders af the
single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside and that
of the Director of Settlement stands restored. No costs.