JUDGMENT
M. Karpagavinayagam, J.
1. Insanity of the appellant, at the time of commission of offence, is the main plea that has been urged before this Court, seeking for setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the trial Court, for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 IPC.
2. The short facts are as follows :
“(a) P.W.1 Raju Naicker is the brother-in-law of the deceased Hanumanthan. Govindaraj, accused, is distantly related to the deceased. Both were inimical towards each other, in regard to a bund, dividing the lands belonging to both.
(b) P.W.1 Raju Nicker is a resident of Pythamparai village. On 02.02.1999, he came to the village of the deceased for attending a function. On 03.02.1999 also, he stayed in the house of the deceased. On 03.02.1999, at about 05.30 p.m., when he was inside the house, he heard a sound outside, where some children cried aloud. P.W.1 came out of the house and saw the deceased, being chased by the accused with a soori knife. He intervened and stopped the accused, questioning him as to why he was chasing the deceased. Then, the accused replied stating, that P.W.1 must be done to death first and then only the entire problem will be solved. So saying, the accused stabbed P.W.1 on the left side of the throat, in the space between throat and shoulder; due to which, P.W.1 fell down. On seeing P.W.1 being attacked, the deceased, who was running, came back. At that time, the accused attacked the deceased and gave a stab on his neck; as a result of which, the deceased fell down and died on the spot. P.W.1 went to hospital and got himself admitted.
(c) P.W.2, doctor, admitted P.W.1 in the hospital and sent intimation to the police.
(d) P.W.7, Sub-Inspector of Police, came to the hospital and recorded a statement from P.W.1 and registered a case for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 IPC.
(e) P.W.10, Inspector of Police, took up investigation; came to the scene and observed all formalities. He conducted inquest and examined the witnesses. Thereafter, the body was sent for post-mortem.
(f) P.W.3, doctor, conducted post-mortem and issued Post-mortem Certificate Ex.P-3, giving his opinion that the deceased would have died of injuries to the vital organ, the greater vessel of the heart and the greater vessel to brain, due to haemorrhage and shock and also that he would have died of about 16 to 20 hours prior to autopsy.
(g) P.W.10, Inspector of Police, thereupon, went to the house of the accused and arrested him.
(h) On 04.02.1999 at about 05.00 a.m., since the accused was found with injury on the head, he was sent to hospital. The doctor treated him as out-patient. Later, the accused was brought back to the station and, then, he was remanded by the Court. The material objects were sent for analysis.
(i) After completion of the investigation, P.W.10 filed charge sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 IPC.”
3. During the course of trial, on behalf of prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 10 were examined, Exhibits P-1 to P-14 were filed and M.Os.1 to 9 were marked. On behalf of the Court, C.W.1 was examined and Ex.C-1 was marked.
4. The accused, on being questioned, denied his complicity in the crime and said that a false case is foisted against him.
5. Before the commencement of trial, since the Sessions Court felt that the accused was mentally not alright, he was sent for medical examination, to find out whether he was fit enough to face trial. The doctor, in the mental hospital, gave treatment to the accused and, ultimately, gave a certificate, stating that the accused was suffering from epileptic psychosis and he was fit to stand trial.
6. The trial Court, having examined the materials, concluded that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and found the accused guilty of the offences under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and sentenced him thereunder. This is the subject matter of the appeal.
7. Mr. P. Venkatasubramaniyam, learned counsel for the appellant, would mainly contend that the accused cannot be liable to be convicted, since he was suffering from insanity at the time of commission of offence and, as such, he is liable to be acquitted, under Section 84 IPC. To substantiate his contention, he cited the following authorities :
(i) (Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat);
(ii) (S.W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra);
(iii) 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 103 (T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka); and
(iv) 2005 (1) Law Weekly (Cri) 465 (Albert Collins v. State).
8. Mr. E. Raja, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, in justification of the reasoning given by the trial Court for convicting the accused, would contend that there is no material to show that the accused was suffering from insanity at the time of commission of offence and, therefore, the conviction is perfectly justified. He would cite the following decisions :
(i) 1976 Law Weekly (Cri) 128 (Balagopal, In Re);
(ii) 1977 Law Weekly (Cri) 28 (Amrit Bhusan Gupta v. Union of India);
(iii) 1978 Law Weekly (Cri) 86 (Palaniappan, In Re);
(iv) 1984 LAW WEEKLY (Cri) 260 (Velusamy v. State);
(v) 1987 Law Weekly (Cri) 170 (Murthy, In Re);
(vi) 2001 Supreme Court Cases (CRI) 980 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand);
(vii) 2003 (2) Law Weekly (Cri) 682 (Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra); and
(viii) 2005 (1) Law Weekly (Cri) 465 (Albert Collins v. State)
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State, and also gone through the records.
10. There are three eye witnesses. P.W.1 is the injured eye witness; P.W.4 is the wife of the deceased and P.W.5 is the son of the deceased. All of them have stated that the deceased was chased by the accused and when P.W.1 intervened, the accused attacked him and when the deceased came back to the scene of occurrence, he was also attacked, as a result of which the deceased fell down and died on the spot. This aspect of the evidence has been supported by the medical evidence, adduced by P.Ws.2 and 3, doctors.
11. The main point, urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, is, that at the time of commission of offence, the accused was in unsound state of mind and, as such, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
12. The law presumes that every individual is sane and possessed of a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his criminal acts, unless the contrary is proved. In criminal cases, where insanity is raised as a plea, the burden of proving the same lies on the defence and it must be established that the accused was of unsound mind, at the time of committing the offence.
13. It is true, as laid down by the Supreme Court, that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea and there is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 IPC and once the prosecution is able to prove that the accused was sane, he may rebut it by placing before the Court the evidence, both oral and documentary, and the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. It is also held by the Supreme Court, that even if the accused is not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time of occurrence, the evidence placed before the Court either by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court with reference to the mens rea of the accused and then, the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused, on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution has not been discharged.
14. On the basis of the above principles, as laid down by the Supreme Court, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even though the accused has not placed any material to show that he was insane at the time of committing the offence, the prosecution has not established that the accused was sane at the time of commission of offence. The learned counsel would point out that in the inquest report, the panchayatdars opined that the accused committed the act only due to mental derangement.
15. We are not able to accept this argument, because, the circumstances, under which the offence was committed, and the conduct of the accused, prior to and after the commission of the offence, would clearly indicate that the accused was sane at the time of commission of offence.
16. According to the prosecution, there was a misunderstanding between the accused and the deceased, regarding a bund, dividing the lands, belonging to both.
17. It is the specific evidence of P.W.4, wife of the deceased, that there used to be frequent quarrels between the deceased and the accused in regard to the said dispute. The fact that both were inimical against each other has been mentioned in the complaint, EX.P-1, given by P.W.1, the earliest document. Further, at the time of occurrence, P.W.1 saw the deceased, being chased by the accused. P.W.1 intervened and questioned the accused as to why the deceased was chased and, thereafter, the accused stabbed on his left throat, saying that only if he is killed, the entire problem will be solved and when the deceased came back, P.W.1 saw the accused attacking the deceased also, by giving a fatal stab on the neck of the deceased; as a result of which, the deceased died on the spot.
18. These things would indicate that when the accused attempted to murder the deceased and also when the said act was prevented from being committed, the accused got angry against P.W.1 and attacked him, by using a knife, and inflicted a serious injury on the throat of P.W.1. Similarly, he attacked the deceased on the vital part, namely, neck of the deceased, and caused his instantaneous death. This would show that the accused was very conscious about his act. Further, after the occurrence was over, he went and concealed himself in the house. Then, P.W.10 arrested him on the next day.
19. There is no material available on record to show, that at the time of offence, the accused was suffering from insanity. Though C.W.1 would give a report that the accused was suffering from epileptic psychosis, that would not be sufficient to hold, that at the time of offence, the accused was suffering from mental and legal insanity, as provided under Section 84 IPC.
20. In this context, it shall be noted that it is not every person, mentally diseased, who is exempted from criminal responsibility under Section 84 IPC. Such exemption can be claimed only when the insane person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or he is doing either wrong or contrary to law. It is by this test, as distinguished from the medical test, that the criminality of the act is to be determined. Of course, in the inquest report, it has been referred to in one of the columns as opined by the Panchayatdars that the accused was suffering from mental disorder. But, that is not enough.
21. Even assuming that there is some material to indicate that there is medical insanity, unless it is established that the accused was suffering from legal insanity, we cannot invoke Section 84 IPC. There is a good deal of difference between ‘medical insanity’ and ‘legal insanity’ and Courts are concerned only with the legal and not the medical aspect of the mater. In other words, it is not every kind of frontic humour or something unaccountable in a man’s action, that points him out to be a mad man, to be exempted from punishment. It is not mere eccentricity or singularity of manner that would suffice the plea of insanity. Abnormality of mind is not by itself sufficient to show that the accused must have acted while of unsound mind. These are all the principles, laid down by various Courts, including the Supreme Court.
22. In view of the above circumstances, under which the offence has been committed, we are of the view that there is no material to invoke Section 84 IPC and, as such, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the trial Court, for the offenes referred to above, are perfectly justified.
23. Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence, imposed on the appellant, by the trial Court.