CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2422 of 1997 PETITIONER: GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS Vs. RESPONDENT: G.V.K. GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2000 BENCH: M.J.Rao K.G Balakrishnana JUDGMENT:
L…..I………T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T..J
J U D G M E N T
M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.
This is an appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh
against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 1745 of
1995
dated 6.8.1996 affirming the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of that Court in Writ petition 15879/90
dated 27.7.1995.
The following are the facts:
The respondent-school was admitted to grant-in-aid
in GO.347 (Ed.) dated 1.8.86 w.e.f. 1.9.85 to 29.2.86
under AP.Act I/82. On the ground that there were some
complaints against various schools, Government
appointed
a Committee on 24.2.88 under GO.220 and this was made
a
statutory Committee by Andhra Pradesh Act 22/88. The
Committee cleared the respondent-School but still the
arrears for the period 1.9.85 to 31.10.89 for the Head
Mistress and from 1.3.86 to 31.10.89 for the staff
were
not paid. Hence, the present writ petition was filed.
After the Writ petition was filed, GO.138 (Ed.) dated
25.4.94 was issued refusing to pay these arrears.
The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ petition
holding that the respondent- school was entitled to
payment of ‘arrears’ of grant-in-aid and quashed
G.O.No.138 dated 25.4.94. Then the State came forward
with a legislation,- after the said judgment, – by way
of Andhra Pradesh Act 34/95 (published in the Gazette
on 20.9.95) with retrospective effect from 17.10.89
which permitted denial of ‘arrears’ of grant-in-aid
whenever such arrears were claimed under “any
judgment,
decree or order of Court or other authority or any
order issued by Government”. In the Writ Appeal, the
State relied upon the said legislation to get over the
judgment dated 27.7.95 of the learned Single Judge
directing arrears of grant-in-aid to be paid but the
Division Bench held that the legislature could not set
aside the judgment of the High Court by Act 34/95.
The
judgment was confirmed and the Writ Appeal was
dismissed. It is against the said judgment that this
appeal is preferred by the State. During the pendency
of
this appeal stay of the High Court’s order was
refused.
For appreciating the points raised in this appeal,
it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the
three
statutes and the various government orders dealing
with
grant-in-aid to schools in the State of Andhra Pradesh
chronologically in so far as they are relevant for the
case before us.
Andhra Pradesh Act 1/82
The Andhra Pradesh Education Act ( A.P. Act I of
1982) deals with ‘grant-in-aid’ Chapter VIII (
sections
42 to 47). Section 42 states that the Government
shall,
within the limits of its economic capacity, set apart
a
sum of money annually for being given as grant-in-aid
to
local authority and private institutions recognised
for
the aforesaid purpose. Section 43 deals with the
authorities which may sanction the grant, ( section 44
has been omitted in 1983), section 45 deals with the
manner of submitting applications for sanction of
grant
and the conditions to be fulfilled on such sanction.
Sub-clause (1) of section 46 gives power to Government
to withhold, reduce or withdraw grant, notwithstanding
anything in the Chapter, on inquiry, (i) on the ground
of non-availability of funds or (ii) because of the
conduct and efficiency and the financial condition of
such institution. The section provides opportunity to
be
given. Sub-clause (2) of section 46 states that,
without
prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-
section (1) or any other provisions of the Act, the
Government may, after making necessary inquiry,
withhold, reduce or withdraw any grant if the
management
of the Institution is guilty of various acts specified
in the sub-clause. Section 47 deals with the manner
of
utilisation of funds and movable property of private
institution.
GO.238 (Ed).dated 27.5.86 and GO.347 (Ed.)dated 1.8.86
Government issued G.O.238(Ed.) dated 27.5.86
stating that all schools which were validly opened on
or
after 1.4.1977 and which had completed 5 years in
respect of boys’ schools and 3 years in respect of
girls’ schools etc. are to be admitted to
grant-in-aid.
As already stated, the respondent-school was admitted
to grant-in-aid as per G.O.347 (Ed.) dated 1.8.86 with
effect from 1.9.85 to 29.2.86 as permitted by Act
I/82.
Complaints and GO.220 dated 24.2.88 appointing
Committee.
On 24.2.88, Government issued G.O. 220 stating
that Government had received various complaints
against
several schools which were receiving grant-in-aid even
though they did not satisfy the necessary conditions.
It was further stated that the Government had,
therefore, constituted a High Level Committee in G.O.
Rt.No.220 (Ed.) dated 24.2.88 to look into every case
of grant-in-aid and make specific recommendations.
Andhra Pradesh Act 22/88: Statutory Committee to
inquire into complaints:
Soon after 24.2.88, the Government felt that a GO
was not sufficient to enable the making of inquiries
into complaints and that legislation was necessary.
It,
therefore,came forward with the Andhra Pradesh Private
Educational Institutions Grant-in-Aid (Regulation)
Act,
1988(AP Act 22 of 1988) which was published in the
Gazette on 29.8.88 and under sub-clause (3) of Section
1
this Act was given effect from 22.7.1985. Section 3
of
the Act reads as follows:
“Section 3(1): Regulation of grant- in-aid to private
educational institutions:
Notwithstanding anything contained in G.O. Ms.No.238,
Education (SSE) Department, dated the 27th May, 1986 and
GO.Ms. No.424, Education (CE) Department, dated the 19th
September, 1985, –
(a) no private educational institution other than a
college established after the Ist April, 1977 land existing
on the Ist September, 1985 and no private college
established after the Ist April, 1977 and existing on the
Ist March, 1985 shall be entitled to receive any grant-
in-aid unless the Committee constituted in GO.Rt.No.220,
Education (SSE-I) Department, dated the 24th February, 1988
recommends that it may be admitted to grant-in-aid; and
(b) no private educational institution other than a
College which has been established after the Ist September,
1985 and no private college which has been established after
the Ist March, 1985 shall be entitled to receive any grant-
in-aid.
(2) A private educational institution referred to in
clause (a) of sub-section (1) in favour of which the
Committee recommends the release of grant-in-aid shall be
entitled to such grant only from the date it satisfies all
the conditions for admission to grant-in-aid specified in
the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 and the Rules made
thereunder, the grants-in-aid Code and the orders and other
instructions issued by the Government from time to time in
this behalf.”
Section 4 of the Act refers to release of grant-
in-aid in respect of certain additional sections and
posts. Section 5 refers to seeking refund of
grant-in-
aid if the Committee in G.O.220(ed.) dated 24.2.88
determines that the institution wrongly received aid.
Section 6 said the Act will have effect
notwithstanding
anything in any law, judgment etc. Section 7 deals
with
validation. Section 8 repeals the Ordinance of 1988.
GO.124 (Ed.) dated 27.1.89 & GO.326 (Ed.) dated
17.10.89: The Committee rejects complaints against several
schools including respondent-School:
Under a G.O. 124 (Ed.) dated 27.1.89 a Committee
was constituted as stated in the above Act 22/88. It
appears that the Committee met and conducted inquiries
into complaints and gave various recommendations.
G.O.
326 (Ed.) dated 17.10.89 was thereafter issued stating
that the Committee had recommended release of
grant-in-
aid to 59 secondary schools and other specified
elementary, oriental schools, sections whose names are
enumerated in the Annexure – “subject to various
conditions” (i) to (vi) and that Rs.63 lakhs was being
sanctioned to these schools enumerated in the Annexure
to this G.O. for the period 1.11.89 to 29.2.90. But
para 12 of the GO. is important and stated as
follows:
“Regarding payment of arrears to the schools now
admitted to grant-in-aid, orders will be issued separately.”
A point has been raised as to whether this para is an
admission that arrears are due and will be paid. As
tothe meaning of the word ‘now’ used in this order,
thereis again some controversy and we shall explain it a
little later.
The Writ petition for arrears and the GO.138 (Ed.)
dated 25.4.94 refusing arrears:
As the arrears of grant-in-aid were not released,
the Ist respondent filed W.P.15879/90, seeking release
of the arrears for the period 1.9.85 to 31.10.89 for
theHeadmistress and for 1.3.86 to 31.10.89 for the other
staff.
As already stated, during the pendency of the Writ
petition Government issued a specific order GO.138
(Ed.)
dated 25.4.94 refusing to pay the arrears. In the
said
GO, Government referred to para 12 of GO.326(Ed.)
dated
17.10.89 as set out above and said that in that para
Government had not made any commitment to pay arrears.
It stated:
“It will be seen from the Government Order cited that
the Government have not made any specific commitment with
regard to the arrears.”
Government then said that after examining the matter
in
detail in the light of “the right of the schools for
grant-in-aid or arrears therein” and also the ‘present
financial position’ of the State Government and taking
into account the fact that there will be the extra
expense of about 4.5 crores, if arrears are to be
paid,
the Government decided “not pay arrears”. The
validity
of this GO was, therefore, gone into by the learned
Single Judge.
Learned Single Judge directs arrears to be paid:
Before the learned Single Judge, apart from
relying on sections 42 to 45 of AP Act 1/82 and the
retrospectivity given to AP Act 22/88, and the various
GOs, the respondent school relied also upon the above
para 12 to contend that the entitlement of the schools
for arrears prior to 17.10.89 was re-affirmed in this
GO.326 but that what the GO meant in para 12 was that
the further order contemplated therein was only for
working out the mode of payment. The Government, on
the
other hand, contended before the learned Single Judge
that in this para 12 of GO 326 Government had
identified
these schools as eligible to receive grant-in-aid
‘afresh’ and it was not a case of re-affirmation of a
previous eligibility. Of course, question is whether
this contention of the Government can fit into the GO
if
para 12 refers to payment of arrears.
Respondent-school
contends that if it was a fresh admission to grant-in-
aid, there was indeed no need at all to refer to any
arrears. We shall revert to this aspect again.
The learned Single Judge had, therefore, to go
into the validity of GO 138 dated 25.4.94 denying
arrears. (By that date Ap Act 34/95 had not been
passed). The learned Judge allowed the Writ petition
on
27.7.1995 and directed payment of arrears and declared
GO.138(Ed.) dated 25.4.94 as inoperative, stating that
under sections 42, 43 and 45 of the Act 1/82, the
statute conferred a right to receive the grant-in-aid
and that initially grant-in-aid was released in favour
of the petitioner for the period 1.9.85 to 26.2.86 as
stated in GO.347 (Ed.) dated 1.8.86, that later on in
view of complaints against various schools, Government
appointed a Committee in GO.220 dated 24.2.1988, the
Committee cleared the case of the writ petitioner,
along
with other schools in GO.326 dated 17.10.89 and while
the Committee was inquiring into the matter, the right
to ‘arrears’ remained in abeyance till the writ
petitioner was cleared by the Committee, that once the
favourable recommendation by the Committee was given,
it
was nothing but a retro-active declaration of the
right
to receive the grant-in-aid from 29.2.86. Learned
Judge
also held that in para 12 of the GO. 326 dated
17.10.89,
the Government had agreed to pay the arrears and,
therefore, they could not have issued GO.138 dated
25.4.94 refusing to release the arrears because of
‘present financial position’ ( i.e. in 1994). The
writ
petition was allowed.
Act 34/95 says arrears need not be paid as per
judgment or Government order:
We have already stated that after the above
judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Legislature
passed Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions
Grant-in-
Aid (Regulation) Supplementary Provision Act, 1995
(Act34/95). It was published in the Gazette on 20.9.95.
It
was given retrospective effect from 17.10.89. It
contains only two sections. There is a long preamble
setting out the gist of the various GOs.set out above.
Section 1 deals with retrospectively and section 2 of
this Act, declares that arrears payable by virtue of
“any judgment or decree of Court or other authority or
any order issued by Government” need not be paid even
if
it had become payable to the schools enumerated in GO
326 dated 17.10.89 read with Go 178 dated 23.07.90.
We
have extracted section 2 lower down in this judgment.
Division Bench says Act 34/95 cannot overrule judgment
of learned Single Judge:
It was this Act 34/95 that was relied upon by the
Government before the Division Bench in the Writ
Appeal
to deny the arrears. The Division Bench, as already
stated, held that once the rights of the respondent
for
release of grant-in-aid got crystallised by way of a
judgment, the Legislature could not have set aside the
judgment by passing a law and therefore,
notwithstanding
the new law, the State was bound to honour the
judgment
of the learned Single Judge. The Writ Appeal was
dismissed. However, the Bench did not go into the
question whether Act 34/95 removed the basis of the
judgment of the learned Single Judge with
retrospective
effect.
Points arising in this appeal:
In this appeal, we have heard learned Senior
counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh Smt.
K.Amareswari and learned counsel for the respondent
Sri
B. Kanta Rao.
The following points arise for consideration:
(1) whether the State can successfully rely on A.P.Act
34/95 to deny the arrears of grant-in-aid if the
arrears
had become payable under Act 1/82 and Act 22/88, and
once the Committee appointed under Act 22/88 had
cleared
the school?
(2) Whether, in the facts of the case, the arrears of
the grant-in-aid could be denied by Legislation even
after the right to the same was declared by the
learned
Single Judge of the High Court?
Point 1:
We have noticed that the period for which the
dispute between the parties survives is regarding
arrears for the period from 1.9.85 to 31.10.89 so far
as
the post of Head-Mistress of this school is concerned
and for 1.3.86 to 31.10.89 so far as the staff is
concerned.
We shall first refer to the effect of Act I/82 on
the facts of this case. Section 42 to 45 of Act 1/82
contain the main provisions as to admission to
grant-in-
aid. In other words, in respect of the schools which
satisfy the prescribed eligibility conditions as
prescribed in the GOs, a statutory right to receive
grant-in-aid is clearly created by sections 42 to 45
ofthe said Act.
No doubt, section 46 of Act 1/1982 permits
withholding or reduction or withdrawal of the
grant-in-
aid. We have already referred to the gist of this
provision but now we shall extract the same:
“S.46–Power of Government to withhold, reduce or
withdraw grant:–
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the
Government may, after such enquiry as they may deem fit,
withhold, reduce or withdraw any grant payable to an
educational institution having regard to the funds at the
disposal of the Government or the conduct and efficiency and
the financial condition of such institution, after giving an
opportunity to the manager of the institution concerned of
making a representation against such withholding, reduction
or withdrawal.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1) or any other provision of this
Act, the Government may, after such enquiry as they may deem
fit, withhold, reduce or withdraw any grant payable to any
educational institution if the manager of the institution
concerned,–
(i) fails to fulfil or any of the conditions of grant;
(ii) denies admission to any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, language or any of them;
(iii) allows any employee of the institution to take
part in any agitation intended to bring or attempt to bring
into hatred or contempt, or intended to excite or attempt to
excite disaffection towards, the Government established by
law in India;
(iv) directly or indirectly encourages any propaganda
or practice of wounding the religious feelings of any class
of citizens of India or insulting the religion or the
religious beliefs of that class;
(v) is guilty of falsification of registers, of misuse
of funds for purposes other than those for which they are
collected;
(vi) fails to remedy within such reasonable time as
may be specified by the competent authority, the defects in
the maintenance of accounts pointed out by the auditors; or
(vii) fails to restore, within the time specified by
the competent authority, an employee whose services have
been wrongfully dispensed with or fails to pay him any
arrears of salary or other benefits when directed to do so
by the competent authority.
(3) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, every
order passed under this section shall be final and shall not
be questioned in any court of law.”
It will be seen that the power mentioned in the first
part of clause (1)(a) could be exercised after inquiry
by the State having regard to the funds at the
disposalof the Government. Under the second part of clause
(1)(a), this power could be exercised based upon
conductand efficiency or financial position of the
institutionalso after giving opportunity. Under clause (2) of
section 46, the power could be exercised if the
managerhad committed certain irregularities as found in an
inquiry where the manager is heard. It is clear that
when Government appointed a Committee to go into
complaints, it was exercising the option under section
46(2). So far as section 46(1) is concerned, there
areno proceedings issued under section 46(1) and no
inquiryconducted under that provision.
Right to arrears flows from Act 1/82 and Act 22/88 and
Committee;s report and is not created by any Government
orders:
It is not in dispute that after Act 1/82, the
respondent-school was admitted to grant-in-aid under
the
said Act in GO 347(Ed.) dated 1.8.86 because the
school
satisfied the conditions in GO 238(Ed.) dated 27.5.86.
Now, after complaints were received, the grant was
kept in abeyance and the cases of the respondent and
others were inquired into under section 46(2).
Initially, the Government constituted a Committee in
GO
220 dated 24.2.88. Later by Act 22/88, the Committee
was
given statutory status to go into complaints. It will
be
noticed that the right to receive grant-in-aid for the
back years i.e. from 22.7.85 was declared under Act
22/88, contingent upon the recommendation of the
Committee. This is clear from section 3(2). It
states
that if the Committee recommends favourably, then the
grant is to be released in favour of an institution,
“from the date upon which it satisfies all the
conditions for admission to grant in aid specified in
the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 and the Rules
made thereunder, or the grant in aid code or orders or
other instructions issued by the Government from time
to
time”. This clause, in our view, therefore directs
release of grant-in-aid from the date upon which the
school satisfies the eligibility conditions. As
already
stated sub-clause (3) of section 1 made Act 22/88
retrospective from 22.7.85. Hence it is as if the
Committee constituted under Act 22/88 was there from
1985. In our view, once the Committee gave its
clearance, the decision would therefore be effective
from 22.7.1985 in respect of all the back years from
dates anterior to the passing of Act 22/88, and the
school would be entitled to release of grant-in-aid
from
the date on which it satisfies the conditions for
receiving grant-in-aid.
It is contended for the State of Andhra Pradesh
that section 3(2) is only prospective. It is true
section 3 does not expressly say that the
recommendation
will be retro-active but from the language of section
3(2) referred to above and also because sub-section 3
of
section 1 says that the Act “be deemed to have come
into
force on the 22nd July, 1985”, in our view, the right
is
retrospectively affirmed for the back years. In other
words, the Committee’s recommendations as to
compliance
with conditions during various years from 1985 though
made after 1988 were to be treated as in existence
from
various dates after 22.7.1985 and if the institution
satisfied the conditions of the Act 1/1982 and also
conditions laid down in other GOs in the previous
years, the Committee’s recommendation in favour of any
school would be retroactive and will apply to those
back years. That the right to arrears is affirmed by
section 3 is also clear from section 5 which relates
to
an adverse recommendation of the Committee. In cases
where the Committee accepted complaints, section 5
requires refund of amounts already paid. Thus, Act
22/88 provided for payment of arrears or for refund of
amounts paid. That was the purpose in making the
provisions of that Act retrospective w.e.f.
22.7.1985.
In our view, these provisions of the Act, therefore,
clearly conferred a statutory right on the writ
petitioners to receive the grant-in-aid right from
22.7.85 onwards in the various years in which they
satisfied the conditions. The right to arrears thus
flows from the statutes and the Committee’s
recommendations and not from any Government orders.
In
other words, the basic right to receive arrears does
not
stem from any Government order in respect of the
schools
enumerated in GO 326(Ed.) dated 17.10.89 read with GO
178(Ed.) dated 23.7.90. The right stems from Act 1/82
and Act 22/88 and the findings of the Committee. This
aspect becomes important when we come to deal with Act
34/95 and as to whether it has removed the basis of
the
judgment of the learned Single Judge.
We next come to para 12 of Go 326 dated 17.10.89.
This GO contained a list of 59 schools like the
respondent wherein it was stated that the Committee
had
given favourable recommendation in favour of the writ
petitioner and other institutions. The GO stated that
these institutions would be entitled for release of
grant-in-aid w.e.f. 1.11.89 to 29.2.90 for the year
1989-90. It, however, contained a note in para 12 as
follows:
“Regarding payment of arrears to the school now
admitted to grant-in-aid, orders will be issued separately.”
In our view, the word “now” used in this GO does not
mean that these schools are identified as entitled to
grant-in-aid for the first time in 1989 in this GO
326.
This is clear from the fact that like section 3 of Act
22/88, this GO also speaks of arrears. If indeed the
previous orders relating to admission to grant-in-aid
were intended to be given a go bye as contended before
us for the State, the Government would not have
referred to the question of payment of arrears in this
GO 326. Therefore, the word “now” in our view, is
used
only to identify those schools etc referred to in
Annexure to the GO.326 and as cleared by the Committee
and was not intended to create a new prospective right
to receive grant-in-aid after 1989. Such
identification would therefore clearly relate back to
22.7.85 which was the date from which Act 22/88 became
retrospective.
Act 22/95: does not retrospectively remove the rights
created by Act 1/82 read with Act 22/88 read with the
recommendation:
Now we shall finally come to section 2 of Act
34/95. The said Act was published in Gazette on
20.9.1995 after the judgment of the learned Single
Judge. But it came into force from 17.10.89, the date
ofGO 326 which said in para 12 that the orders for
arrearswould be passed separately. Section 2 of this Act of
1995 reads as follows:
“Section 2: No arrears of grant-in- aid payable:
Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any Court or other authority, or any
order issued by the Government or any authority subordinate
to the Government, no arrears of grant-in-aid shall or shall
even be deemed to be payable to any private educational
institution admitted to grant-in-aid in pursuance of GO.326
(Ed.) dated 17.10.89 and GO.No.178 (Ed.) dated 23.7.90 for
the period between Ist September, 1985 and 31st October,
1989 and accordingly:-
(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or
continued in any Court against the Government or an;y person
or authority whatsoever for the payment of any arrears of
grant-in-aid for the said period; and
(b) no Court shall enforce any decree or order
directing the payment of any arrears of grant-in-aid.”
The opening part of section 2 refer to the judgment or
decree or order of any Court. The second part deals
with
orders of other authority, or any order of Government
or
Subordinate authority. The second part deals with
rights created by Government orders.
We shall first consider the second part of section
2 as to whether the Act removes retrospectively the
right created by Act 1/82 and Act 22/88. For that
purpose, we come back to the language of section 2 of
Act 34/95.
In our view, what is removed by the Act 22/95 is
the right created by the Government orders and not the
rights created by Act 1/82 and Act 22/88. If any
Government order had conferred any right to the
institutions enumerated in the Annexure to GO 326
dated
17.10.89 read with GO 178 dated 23.7.90, it was only
those rights that were intended to be removed
retrospectively by section 2 from 17.10.89. In other
words, the legislature while enacting section 2 of Act
34/95 failed to remove the rights conferred by the
Principal Act 1/82 and Act 22/88 read with the
Committee’s declaratory findings. Further, the Act
34/95
being retrospective only from 17.10.89, it does not go
beyond that date into the back years.
So far as the first part of section 2 read with
section 46 of Act 1/82, the State has also not placed
any material before Court to sustain the order of
denial
of arrears for want of funds. What budgetary
allocations were made in the concerned years were
never
placed before Court. There is also no proof of any
inquiry as required by the first part of section 46(1)
of Act 1/82. Thus, under the first and second parts
of
section 2 of Act 34/95, there is no removal of the
statutory right created by Act I/82 and Act 22/88,
read
with the recommendations of the Committee. Point 1 is
decided accordingly.
Point 2:
Act 22/95 cannot set aside the judgment of the learned
Single Judge
Now section 2 of the Act 34/95 also purports to
nullify the effect of the judgment of the learned
Single
Judge. It is well settled that the legislature cannot
overrule a judgment by passing a law to that effect
unless it removes the basis of the legal rights upon
which the judgment is based, with retrospective effect
and provided there is no violation of any
constitutional
provision in such withdrawal of rights
retrospectively.
In the present case, we are not going into the
question whether any provision of the Constitution is
violated while passing Act 34/95 denying arrears of
grant-in-aid retrospectively. However, in our view,
inasmuch as the rights created by Act 1/82 and Act
22/88
read with the Committee’s recommendations have not
been
nullified by Act 22/95, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge remains effective. The basis of the
judgment has not been removed. We have already shown
that the rights flowing from the Acts were not
touched.
Only rights flowing from Government orders were taken
away retrospectively. It is therefore necessary to
give effect to the judgment of the learned Single
Judge. The writ appeal was rightly dismissed.
For the above reasons, which are somewhat
different from the reasons given by the Division
Bench,
we dismiss this Civil Appeal. The arrears of the
grant-
in-aid as declared above as per Act I/82 and Act 22/88
and also as directed by the learned Single Judge shall
now be released in favour of the writ petitioner.
There
will be no order as to costs.
……………..J. [M.JAGANNADHA RAO]
NEW DELHI; ……………..J. August 7, 2000.
[K.G.BALAKRISHNAN]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2422 OF 1997
Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Others ..Appellants
Versus
G.V.K.Girls High School ..Respondent
—-
Dear Brother Sri Balakrishnan,
Draft Judgment in the above-mentioned matter is
sent herewith for your kind consideration please.
With regards,
