ORDER
1. Both these writ petitions arise form the proceedings of the District Revenue Officer dated 15-9-1994.
2. The Inspector General of Police, Special Security Force, Andhra Pradesh, sent a requisition on 12-11-1993 and 3-1-1994 for the acquisition of lands situated in Manchirevula Village, Rajendranagar Mandal for the purpose of setting up of operational Headquarters and training with the residential accommodation for the Police Academy. It was found that some of the lands belonged to the Government and certain lands were assigned lands. A proposal was made to resume the assigned lands if possible, so as to avoid payment of compensation. Though it was noted that according to the latest instructions of the Government even if the assigned lands are resumed, ex-gratia in the amount of the market value with 30 per cent
with solatium was to be paid. In any case, the Government proposed examination of the matter and in February, 1994 the Commissioner of Land Revenue, identified 7 irregularities on which the assigned lands could be resumed and stated that action may be taken under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (T.A) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli. Consequently, a show cause notice was issued on 28-3-1994 by the District Revenue Officer, who had been delegated with the power under Section 166-B. After considering the explanation given by the petitioners, who were the assignees of the lands, he passed an order on 15-9-1994 by which he came to the conclusion that all the seven allegations were properly met by the petitioners. In particular he found that the petitioners were in possession of the lands, that the certificates in Form-9 (G) were issued on 21-10-1961 in pursuance of the Government sanction dated 28-10-1953 and, it was, therefore, not effected by the subsequent ban in G.O.Ms.No.1122 dated 29-6-1991 prohibiting assignment of lands within the pheriphery of Hyderabad. The Collector, on a perusal of this order, came to the conclusion that the District Revenue Officer had not examined certain vital aspects, and therefore, he suspended the said order dated 15-9-1994 by order dated 3-1-1995. Writ Petition No.484/1995 has been filed challenging this order of the Collector dated 3-1-1995. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the Collector to the Commissioner, Land Revenue on 29-5-1995. Which was returned on 20-10-1995 by the Commissioner, Land Revenue stating that no action being taken because it was decided to take up the case for suo motu revision under Section 166-C by the Government. Thereupon, he also referred the matter on 20-10-1995 to the Government and the petitioner also made a representation on 26-10-1995 to the Government. Considering all these, the Government passed an order on 24-1-1996 stating that the order of the Collector suspending the order of the District Revenue Officer dated 3-1-1995 was ratified and the Collector was requested to complete the enquiry
and pass final order under intimation to the Government. Writ Petition No.7221/1996 has been filed against this order of the Government.
3. With regard to the order of the
Collector dated 3-1-1995, the simple argument of the learned Counsel for petitioners is that the power under Section 166-B having already been delegated to the District Revenue Officer and exercised by him, a Collector as Enquiry Officer could not exercise the same powers once again. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the Collector could exercise his general powers of supervision to revise any order of his subordinate which he thinks was irregular. But the instructions given by the Government in this regard clearly stipulate that such supervisory powers do not extend to statutory orders of the subordinates. In the circumstances, the order of the Collector dated 3-1-1995 is clearly without jurisdiction and it has to be set aside.
4. With reference to the order of the Government dated 24-1-1996, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the District Revenue Officer having already gone into the merits and found that all the seven irregularities alleged were of no consequence, there was no purpose in the Government reopening the same issue. He also submitted that the entire exercise was only with the mala fide intention of defeating the right of the petitioners for compensation. He argued that the provisions of Section 166-B and C do not lay down any period of limitation and as held by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. P.Raghav, and in Mansaram v, S.P. Pathak, and in such circumstances reasonable period of limitation which can be on par with the appellate jurisdiction could be taken as only 90 days and the proposed action of the Government after a period of 30 years was without jurisdiction.
5. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, submitted that there was some prima facie, material to indicate that
the original assignment was irregular and in the interest of public the Government should not be prevented from having a second look into the matter and resume the lands for the purpose of saving its finances. He also submitted that the writ petition was premature because the Government has only ordered an enquiry and ultimately it may be decided that the assignments were properly made, and therefore, the merits of the case cannot be discussed as it involved disputed of questions of fact. With regard to the question of limitation, he sought to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court by pointing out that in that case the Collector had three months time to reject the application for permission and keeping that in view, the Supreme Court had taken that a normal period of limitation of 90 days could be applied to a case of grant of temporary permit which could be cancelled at any time for violation of the conditions given by the Government. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chittoor District Co-Operative Milk Producers Union Ltd v. C. Rajamma, 1996 (2) ALD 239 to submit that public purpose overrides any private interest and in N. Ramachandra Reddy v. Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, 1990 (2) AWR 534 to contend that where no limitation is prescribed, a revision petition cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation.
6. On a consideration of the views of both sides, I am of the view that the powers under Section 166-B could be exercised by the Government to revise an order passed by the District Revenue Officer to whom such power is delegated. If the Government does so, then the enquiry has to be done by the Government and the final orders has to be passed only by the Government even though the Government may gather information by requiring any subordinate to conduct some enquiry. The impugned order insofar as it requires or delegates the power of passing a final order on behalf of the Government to the Collector appears to be irregular inasmuch as it delegates the power under Section 166-B to the Collector whose power itself was earlier delegated to the District Revenue Officer.
7. Be that as it may, this question becomes academic in view of the feet that the proposed revision by the Government is an attempt to reopen a very stale issue. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the revision by the Government against the order of the District Revenue Officer could be taken up as within the limitation because the petitioner had filed an appeal. We are not concerned with the question whether the proposed revision by the Government with reference to the order of the District Revenue Officer is within the period of limitation. What we are concerned with is the question whether the Government in revision could by substitution exercise the same power of the District Revenue Officer to resume the land assigned more than 30 years back even if certain irregularities are proved. Section 166-B and C do not lay down any period of limitation for the exercise of that power, whereas the Section 159 provides a period of limitation 90 days for an appeal. In a similar situation, the Supreme Court in the case cited above held that it was very plain that it cannot be said that the power can be exercised at any point of time only on the ground that no period of limitation is prescribed. It was held that “it is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.” In the present case also, the provisions of Section 166-B & C being silent with reference to the period of limitation, it must beheld that the power can be exercised only within a reasonable time. In the context of this case, taking into account the period of 90 days prescribed for an appeal, the minimum period of limitation will be 90 days. Even assuming that the matter is one which relates to the resumption of grant of the land and it should be even a longer period of limitation, I do not think it reasonable to extend it beyond one year. The exercise of the power long afterwards, in the present case nearly 34 years after the assignment, is clearly unreasonable
and arbitrary. The purpose of this resumption is also only to defeat the right of the petitioners for compensation. That purpose also may not be achievable because in the note of the Government, which is at page 47 of the additional material papers, it is recorded that as per the latest instructions even when the assigned lands are resumed, for public purpose, ex-gratia amount has to be paid. In the circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the proposed exercise of the power of revision to set aside the assignment made in 1961 is a futile exercise and the petitioners were not required to go through this as it would amount to harassment. I, therefore, deem it fit to set aside both the impugned orders.
8. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. No costs.