JUDGMENT
Das, C.J.
1. These are five miscellaneous appeals which have been heard together and this judgment will govern them all.
2. I may first state the facts so far as they are relevant for these five appeals. On 24-4-1947, one Lachuman Sah filed an application before the District Judge of Saran for being adjudged an insolvent. In that application Lachuman Sah stated that his debts amounted to Rs. 2,00,000/- and odd and that he was unable to pay his debts. This application was registered as Case No. 2 of 1947. The application was admitted and notices were seived on the creditors.
Later on, as a result of an agreement between Lachuman Sah and some of his creditors, Lachuman Sah withdrew his application on 19-7-1947. Thereafter he executed a series of transfers in respect of some of his properties in favour of certain creditors, between dates 22-7-1947, and 15-9-1947. A considerable part of Lachuman Sah’s debts was satisfied by means of these transfers. Among the creditors whose debts were not satisfied was one Chhotu Lal. On 6-9-1947, Chhotu Lal filed an application for adjudging Lachuman Sah, his sons and grandsons, who were members of a joint family and who carried on a business in the name and style of Mangni Sah Lachuman Ram, as insolvents.
In this application Chhotu Lal stated that the debts of the firm of Lachuman Sah amounted to about Rs. 1,98,000/-, out of which the firm owed Chhotu Lal the sum of, Rs. 17,500/- on the basis of certain ‘hundis’. Chhotu Lal alleged that the firm of Lachuman Sah had committed various acts of insolvency which were detailed in para. 9 of the petition, The two particular acts of insolvency which were specially urged were the sales of certain properties in favour of Mt. Gango Kuer and Kapildeo Prasad by means of two sale deeds dated 22-7-1947, and 23-7-1947.
It was alleged that with the intent to defeat and defraud other creditors Lachuman Sah had within three months from the date of the filing of the application made the aforesaid two transfers. According to Chhotu Lal, the assets of the firm of Lachuman Sah amounted to Rs. 32,385/-only. The application of Chhotu Lal was admitted as Case No. 4 of 1947.
A few days after Chhotu Lal had filed his application, Lachuman Sah himself presented an application for being declared an insolvent. In his application Lachuman Sah stated that his debts amounted to Rs. 79,547/- and odd and that he had assets of the value of Rs. 58,340/-, Lachuman Sah said that he was unable to pay his debts and should, therefore, be declared an insolvent. The application of Lachuman Sah was numbered as Case No. 5 of 1947.
3. The creditors in favour of whom Lachuman Sah had made the transfers between dates 22-7-1947 and 15-9-1947, were ranged as opposite party objectors in the application of Chhotu Lal. The case of these objectors was that the transfers made in their favour were genuine and valid, the firm of Lachuman Sah owed only Rs. 3,400/- to Chhotu Lal, and after the transfers made in favour of these objectors Lachuman Sah was well able to pay his debts and Lachuman Sah had committed no acts of insolvency within the meaning of Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6, Provincial Insolvency Act.
4. On 24-8-1948, Chhotu Lal made an application to the effect that one Mt. Rambaso Kuer (along with certain other persons) should be added as a party in his case, because some of the properties of the family of Lachuman Sah stood in the name of Mt. Rambaso Kher, the latter being the widow of Dularchand Sah, deceased, full brother of Lachuman Sah. On 11-9-1948, Chhotu Lal gave details of certain properties which, according to him, stood in the name of Mt. Rambaso Kuer, though they were really the properties of the family of Lachuman Sah.
On 30-11-1948, Mt. Rambaso Kuer preferred a claim by means of an application in which she stated that her husband Dularchand was separate from his brother Lachuman Sah and died in that state of separation. She further alleged that the properties sought to be included in the insolvency proceedings by Chhotu Lal were acquired by her with her own money and in those acquisitions Lachuman Sah or his sons and grandsons had no interest whatsoever. She gave details of the properties which she had herself acquired the properties being certain least lands in village Telpa and certain diara lands in the same village. She prayed that her properties should be excluded from the insolvency proceedings,
5. On 25-11-1948, the learned District Judge, who was in seisin of Insolvency Case No. 4 of 1947, appointed an interim receiver and asked the interim receiver to take immediate possession of all the assets of the insolvent. I have already mentioned the application which Mt. Rambaso had filed on 30-11-1948. On 5-1-1949, the prayer of Ghhotu Lal to add some more parties and some more properties in his case was allowed, and Mt. Rambaso Kuer was added as an opposite party in the case of Chhotu Lal.
On 4-3-1949, the two insolvency cases were taken up together and on that date the learned Additional District Judge adjudged the firm of Lachuman Sah to be insolvent. He appointed one Sri Radha Nath Sahay as the receiver in insolvency, and directed that all the properties of the firm Mangni Sah Lachuman Ram should vest in the receiver. He, however, made an exception with regard to the properties claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer and stated in his order.
“For the time being, the receiver shall not
dispossess Rambaso and decide her claim at an
early date.”
On 10-3-1949, one Thakur Prasad Sah, opposite party 2, filed a petition praying that the order of adjudication passed on 4-3-1949, be annulled. On 24-3-1949, the learned Additional District Judge heard the lawyers. He found that the notices as contemplated by law had not been issued to some of the creditors, and on that ground he recalled the order dated 4-3-1949, by which he had adjudged the firm of Mangni Sah Lachuman Ram to be an insolvent firm.
He did not say anything about the other order which he had passed on 4-3-1949, regarding the properties claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer. On 20-6-1949, Mt. Rambaso Kuer alleged that the interim receiver who hall been appointed by the insolvency Court & who continued to work after the order of adjudication had been recalled on 24-3-1949, had “taken possession of her lands in spite of her claim that those properties belonged to her and not to the debtor firm.
Mt. Rambaso Kuer filed several applications thereafter, on various dates in which she prayed that the produce of the lands claimed by her should be made over to her, and the receiver should not interfere with the possession of those lands by her bataidars and lessees; nor should the receiver settle those lands with other persons.
It appears that the learned Additional District Judge passed an order that the produce of the lands claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer would be made over to her, if she furnished sufficient security. As far as I have been able to make out from the record, Mt. Rambaso Kuer did not furnish the security demanded of her, and the interim receiver made settlements of some of the lands which Rambaso Kuer had claimed. On 8-11-1949, the two insolvency cases, which were being heard together, were transferred to the Additional District Judge for disposal.
The two cases were heard on 14-3-1950, and then again on several dates between 14-7-1950, and 2-8-1950. On 11-8-1950, the learned Additional District Judge delivered judgment. By that judgment the learned Additional District Judge found that (I) the debts of the debtor firm amounted to Rs. 1,35,146/- and odd and the assets to Rs. 60,978/-; (2) that the debtor firm was unable to pay their debts; and (3) that the debtor firm had committed acts of insolvency in respect of some of the transfers made between the dates 22-7-1947, and 15-9-1947.
The learned Additional District Judge found that in respect of some of the transfers the debtor had given a fraudulent preference to some of the creditors and in respect of some of the other transfers, the debtor had made the transfers with intent to defeat and delay the creditors. With regard to one of the transfers evidenced by the document Ex. B in favour of one Sumitra Kuer, the finding of the learned Additional District Judge was that this document came into existence more than three months before the presentation of the application by the petitioning creditor, and with regard to another document, Ex. B (6), in favour of one Kapildeo Prasad, the learned Additional District Judge found that this was preceded by an agreement which took place more than three months before the presentation of the application.
6. On the aforesaid findings the learned Additional District Judge allowed both the applications, the application of Lachuman Sah as also the application of Chhotu Lal.
7. It is against this order of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 11-8-1950, that four of the appeals have been preferred. Out of these four appeals, appeal No. 368 of 1950 is by Mt. Rambaso Kuer. Appeals Nos. 332 and 333 are by some of the objecting creditors in whose favour Lachuman Sah had made the transfers between the dates 22-7-1947, and 15-9-1947.
Appeal No. 432 of. 1950 is by the petitioning creditor Chhotu Lal and is directed against only that part of the order of the learned Additional District Judge by which he held that the transfer in favour of Kapildeo Prasad was preceded by an agreement which took place more than three months before the presentation of the application by the petitioning creditor and was not, therefore, a fraudulent preference within the meaning of Section 6 (o) of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
Besides the aforesaid four appeals there is another appeal by Mt. Rambaso Kuer, which has been numbered 369 of 1950. This appeal by Rambaso Kuer is directed against a subsequent order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. It appears that at the time of the hearing of the two insolvency cases which resulted in the order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 11-8-1950, Mt. Rambaso Kuer did not appeal; nor did she give any evidence at that stage in respect of the properties which she had claimed.
After the order of adjudication had been passed on 11-8-1950 Mt. Rambaso Kuer filed an application on 7-9-1950, in which she prayed that her claim with regard to the properties which she said that she had herself acquired should be decided. This application of Mt. Rambaso Kuer made on 7-9-1950, was considered by the learned Additional District Judge on 9-9-1950.
The learned Additional District Judge then held that as Mt. Rambaso Kuer did not appear at the time of the hearing of the two insolvency cases, her claim presented on 7-9-1950, was not maintainable, and accordingly her claim was rejected. It is against this order of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 9-9-1950, that Mt. Rambaso Kuer has presented her appeal No. 369 of 1950.
8. Having stated the relevant facts, I now proceed to consider the appeals on merits. The two appeals (Nos. 332 and 333 of 1950) filed on behalf of the objecting transferee creditors can, I think, be disposed of on a very short ground. On a consideration of the evidence on the record the learned Additional District Judge fixed the value of the assets of the debtor firm. The assets were classified under different heads and the learned Additional District Judge fixed the value of the korar lands of village Telpa at Rs. 4,640/-per bigha.
The area of these korar lands was in the
neighborhood of 8 bighas and odd, including the
lands claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer. The area
of diara lands in the same village was in the
neighborhood of 17 bighas 15 kathas, including
some of the lands claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer.
The value of these diara lands was fixed at the
rate of Rs. 533/- per bigha. In fixing the value
of these lands the learned Additional District
Judge did not take into consideration the transfers
made in favour of the objecting creditors on the
ground that as those transfers were the subject-
matter of controversy they should not be taken
into consideration.
Mr. Rameshwar Misra, appearing for the appellants in these two appeals, has invited our attention to the recitals in some of these transfers and he has argued that those recitals show that the value of the korar lands in village Telpa was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 400/- to Rs. 500/- per katha. Calculated at that rate the total value of the korar lands will be in the neighbourhood of Rs. 70,000/- or Rs. 75,000/-. The learned Additional District Judge has given the total value of the korar lands at Rs. 40, 909/- only.
Assuming that Mr. Rameshwar Misra’s contention is correct, though I do not think that the value mentioned in the transfer-deeds in favour of the objecting creditors is the true value of the korar lands, the value of the total assets of the debtor firm will be increased by about Rs. 30,000/- or so. Even then the assets will fall far short of the total liabilities of the debtor firm. According to the learned Additional District Judge, the total value of the assets of the debtor firm was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 60,978/-, and the total value of the liabilities was Rs. 1,35,000/- and odd. Even if the total value of the assets is increased by about Rs. 30,000/-, even then the debtor firm is not in a position to pay off their debts.
9. Mr. Rameshwar Misra has not been able to challenge the finding of the learned Additional District Judge with regard to the inability of the debtor firm to pay their debts, in any other respect. The position, therefore, is this. The learned Additional District Judge had before him two petitions for adjudication, one filed on behalf of the debtor and the other filed on behalf of the creditor. If the application filed on behalf of the debtor fulfilled the conditions laid down in Section 10, Provincial Insolvency Act, the debtor firm was entitled to an order of adjudication in their favour under Section 24, Provincial Insolvency Act.
All that the learned Additional . District Judge had to be satisfied about, with regard to the debtor’s application, was that there were ‘prima facie’ grounds for believing that the debtor was unable to pay his debts. With regard to the creditor’s application also the question of the ability of tine debtor to pay his debt was relevant, because under Section 25, Provincial Insolvency Act, the creditor’s application was liable to be dismissed if the learned Additional District Judge was satisfied that the debtor was able to pay his debts.
But the creditor had also to prove that he was entitled to present an insolvency petition against the debtor; in other words, he had to fulfil, the conditions laid down in Section 9, Provincial Insolvency Act, one of the conditions being that the debtor firm had committed acts of insolvency within three months before the presentation of the petition.
What are acts of insolvency is laid down in Section 6
Provincial Insolvency Act.
In these two cases, however, as soon as the learned Additional District Judge was satisfied that the debtor was unable to pay his debts, the order of adjudication would follow as a matter of course, because the other condition laid down in Section 10, Provincial Insolvency Act was clearly fulfilled, namely, that the debts far exceeded the sum or Rs. 500/-. In the peculiar circumstances of these cases it was really unnecessary for the learned Additional District Judge tp go into the further question of the genuineness or otherwise of the various transfers made by the debtor firm.
Even if he had to go into that question, he had to go into the question only for the purpose of finding out whether ‘prima facie’ the creditor had the right to present an application. It is clear that the scope of an enquiry into the acts of insolvency as contemplated by Section 6, Provincial Insolvency Act, is wholly different from the scope of an enquiry for the purpose of an annulment or avoidance of certain transfers under Sections 53 and 54, Provincial Insolvency Act.
The annulment proceedings under Sections 53 and 54, Provincial Insolvency Act, are in the nature of suits in the matter of pleadings, framing of issues, taking of evidence and the giving of judgment and decree, whereas the decision that a transfer is an act of insolvency must be in the nature of the case and at the stage at which it has to be given be based only on inconclusive material; the incidental determination of the question that the debtor firm has committed an act of insolvency for the purpose of deciding whether adjudication should be ordered or not cannot be regarded as a final determination with regard to the transfers for purposes of annulment proceedings under Sections 53 and 54, Provincial Insolvency Act.
In the cases before us, annulment proceedings have not yet been taken; they can only be taken subsequent to adjudication. If and when such annulment proceedings are taken, the question whether some of the transfers made by the debtor firm are hit by Section 53 and some by Section 54, Provincial Insolvency Act, will have to be finally determined. It is sufficient to say that on the materials before the learned Additional District Judge he was satisfied that ‘prima facie’ the debtor firm had committed acts of insolvency.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to determine finally at this stage if any of the transfers in favour of the objecting creditors come under Section 53 or Section 54, Provincial Insolvency Act. Learned Counsel for the objecting creditors appellants has, with his usual fairness, conceded that if he is unable to displace the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the debtor firm is unable to pay their debts, then the order of adjudication cannot be interfered with in these cases, and the further question as to whether the transfers are or are not hit by Sections 53 and 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act must be left for decision in appropriate annulment proceedings, if and when such proceedings are taken.
10. I have already stated that there are no good reasons why the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of the debtor firm’s inability to pay their debts should be interfered with. That being the position, the two appeals preferred by the objecting creditors, namely, Miscellaneous Appeal No. 332 of 1950 and Miscellaneous Appeal No; 333 of 1950, must be dismissed.
11. The position with regard to the appeal filed by the petitioning- creditor, namely, appeal No, 432 of 1950, is also the same. This appeal is directed only against that part of the Judgment of the learned Additional District Judge by which he excluded some of the transfers while considering the question as to whether the debtor firm had or had not committed acts of insolvency. The question whether the transfers excluded by the learned Additional District Judge are or are not hit by Sections 53 and 54, Provincial Insolvency Act, will be gone into if and when annulment proceedings are taken in respect of these transfers. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider these transfers any further at this stage Appeal No. 432 of 1950 must also be dismissed.
12. I now turn to the two appeals preferred by Mt. Rambaso, Kuer. Mr. Ramanugrah Prasad, who has appeared for Mt. Rambaso Kuer, has submitted before us that his client Is not concerned with the order of adjudication. Mt. Rambaso Kuer is not a creditor of the debtor firm, nor has she taken any transfer from the debtor firm. Her case is that certain properties which belonged to her have been unnecessarily included in the insolvency proceedings, illegally taken possession of by the interim receiver and her title to those properties has hot been properly determined by the learned Additional District Judge under Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, and without determining her title under that section the learned Additional District Judge has held in his subsequent order dated 9-9-1950, that she is bound by the order of adjudication dated 11-8-1950.
Mr. B. C. De, appearing on behalf of the petitioning creditor, has contested the two appeals of Mt. Rambaso Kuer and has contended that the order of adjudication passed by the learned Additional District Judge on 11-8-1950, must be treated as an adjudication of the title of Mt. Rambaso Kuer as well, and if Mt. Rambaso Kuer did not choose to appear at the time of the hearing of the two insolvency cases and did not give any evidence in support of her claim at the time of adjudication, she is herself to blame for such negligence. Mr. B. C. De has contended that Mt. Rambaso Kuer is now bound by the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge on 11-8-1950, and she cannot reopen her claim.
13. Two principal questions arise for consideration and decision with regard to these rival contentions. They are (1) if as a matter of law it was open to the learned Additional District Judge to consider the claim of Mt. Rambaso Kuer before or at the time of adjudication, and (2) if in fact the learned Additional District Judge had determined the claim of Mt. Rambaso Kuer by his order dated 11-8-1950.
On the first question several decisions have been placed before us, and Mr. Ramanugrah Prasad has contended that the question of the title of Mt. Rambaso Kuer to some of the properties could have been considered by the learned Additional District Judge only after the order of adjudication had been passed. He has pointed out that if instead of passing an order of adjudication in favour of the debtor firm, the learned Additional District Judge had dismissed the two applications for adjudication, the question of the title of Mt. Rambaso Kuer to some of the properties would have been irrelevant.
Mr. Ramanugrah Prasad has relied on the decisions in — ‘Bibhuti Bhusan v. Birendra Nath’, AIR 1935 Cal 558 (A); — ‘Sadhu Ram v. Kishori Lal’, AIR 1938 Lah 490 (B); — ‘Gonikabai v. Chapsi Purshottam’, AIR 1935 Bom 80 (C) and –‘Chittamal v. Ponnuswami Naicker’, AIR 1926 Mad 363- (D). Mr. B. C. De has relied on — ‘Shankar Lal v. Mohammad Ismail, AIR 1930 All 552 (E) where the question of priority as between the creditors of the alleged insolvents and the creditors of their ancestor, under the Muhammadan Law, was considered under Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, before the order of adjudication was actually passed.
The question was considered in connection with the stay of a sale in another Court. In my opinion, it is not really necessary in these cases to decide this question as an abstract question of law. It seems clear enough from the scheme, of the Provincial Insolvency Act that Section 4 ordinarily comes into play after the debtor has been adjudicated an insolvent; under Section 4 the Court can then decide any question of title or priority arising between the debtor and one or more of his creditors if it considers this to be just and necessary as well as expedient.
It is, however, open to the Court not to go into all these questions, as is shown by Sub-section (3) of Section 4. Under that sub-section the Court can sell the interest of the debtor, leaving the parties to fight out the extent of their interest in a regular suit before the ordinary Courts. But it may be that in an appropriate case the question of title may arise at a stage earlier than the order of adjudication; but such cases can only be very rare.
The question was mooted before us as to whether a third party can apply under Section 4. I do not think that a third party is forced to make an application under Section 4, but there are decisions in which the claim of a third party has been considered under Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act (see — Tool Kumari Dasi v. Khirod Chandra Das’, AIR 1927 Cal 474 (F); — ‘Dwarka Prasad v. Mt, Sunder’, AIR 1935 ‘All 546 (G)).
14. The two appeals of Mt. Rambaso Kuer can, I think, be disposed of on the footing that the learned Additional District Judge did not in fact finally determine her claim when he passed his order of adjudication on 11-8-1950, and the learned Additional District Judge rejected her claim on a subsequent date, 9-9-1950, on an entirely untenable ground. It is true that Mt. Rambaso Kuer was made a party to the insolvency case of Chhotu Lal on 5-1-1949.
She had preferred her claim on 30-11-1948. On 4-3-1949, when the order of adjudication was first passed, the learned Additional District Judge said clearly that the receiver should not take possession of the properties of Mt. Rambaso Kuer and her claim would be decided later. This order of the learned Additional District Judge passed on 4-3-1949, was never set aside. What was set aside on 24-3-1949, was merely the order of adjudication passed on 4-3-1949. Thereafter Mt. Rambaso Kuer filed petition after petition for the decision of her claim and for the release of her properties.
In spite of these petitions the interim receiver appears to have taken possession of her properties, presumably under Section 20, Provincial Insolvency Act, though under the provisions of that section the interim receiver had no authority to take possession of properties which were not admitted to be the properties of the debtor firm. Re that as it may, it is clear that by reason of the order passed on 4-3-1949, Mt, Rambaso Kuer could reasonably think that her claim would be decided after the order of adjudication.
If under that impression Mt. Rambaso Kuer did not appear at the time of the hearing of the adjudication matter, it can hardly be said that her claim has been finally determined by that adjudication order. Learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor has placed the adjudication order before us. In that adjudication order the learned Additional District Judge has not considered the claim of Mt. Rambaso Kuer.
Mt. Rambaso Kuer made two allegations of substance, one was that her husband Dularchand was separate from his brother Lachuman, and the other was that she had acquired the properties standing in her name out of her own funds. None of these two points were considered by the learned Additional District Judge.
The learned Additional District Judge assumed in the ‘prima facie’ enquiry which he made under Section 24, Provincial Insolvency Act, that the debtor firm were in possession of about 8 bighas of korar-lands in village Telpa and 17 bighas of diara lands in the same village. As has been pointed out in the Lahore decision, AIR 1938 Lah 490 at p. 492 (B), the summary enquiry under Section 24 as to whether a debtor is entitled, to present a petition has nothing to do with Section 4 of the Act, which section ordinarily comes into play after adjudication in disputes between the debtor’s estate represented by a receiver and the claims of one or all of his creditors.
Having carefully perused the order of adjudication in this case, I am satisfied that Rambaso’s claim with regard to some of the properties which the petitioning creditor said were the properties of the debtor firm had not been finally determined by the learned Additional District Judge by his order dated the 11-8-1950. When, therefore, Mt. Rambaso Kuer made her application on 7-9-1950, for a determination of her claim, the learned Additional District Judge should nave considered and decided that claim under Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, unless the learned Additional District Judge thought that Sub-section (3) of Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, applied, and it was not necessary for him to determine the question of Rambaso’s title.
The learned Additional District Judge did not, however, do so. He proceeded under the erroneous view that as Mt. Rambaso Kuer had not appeared at the earlier stage, her claim was not maintainable. The order of adjudication had not finally determined the claim of Mt. Rambaso Kuer, and the failure of Mt. Rambaso Kuer to appear at an earlier stage is fully explained by the order which the insolvency Court had passed on 4-3-1949.
15. Mr. B. C. De has referred us to the evidence of some of the objecting creditors and has argued that on that evidence it was open to the learned Additional District Judge to come to the conclusion that the properties claimed by Mt. Rambaso Kuer were really the properties of the debtor firm. It appears that these very objecting creditors were subjected to cross-examination on behalf of the petitioning creditor, and the cross-examination was directed to show that these objecting creditors did not know about the lands of the debtor firm.
Evidence was given on behalf of the petitioning creditor. That evidence did not touch the two allegations of substance which Mt. Rambaso Kuer had made. I have already stated that the learned Additional District Judge himself did not say a word about the allegations of Mt. Rambaso Kuer in his order of adjudication. At the stage of adjudication the learned Additional District Judge was primarily concerned with the question whether the debtor had given ‘prima facie’ grounds for satisfying the Court that he was unable to pay his debts. The learned Additional District Judge found that even including all the lands which the petitioning creditor said were the lands of the debtor firm, the latter was unable to pay their debts.
In the circumstances of these cases, that was not the stage for the determination of Mt. Rambaso Kuer’s claim, and as a matter of fact the learned Additional District Judge did not finally determine the claim of Mt. Rambaso Kuer at that stage. The learned Additional District Judge was clearly in error when he thought that the claim of Rambaso Kuer was not maintainable, because she did not appear at the stage of adjudication. The result, therefore, is as follows. Mt. Rambaso Kuer does not challenge the order of adjudication.
Her appeal No. 368 of 1950, which is directed against the order of adjudication, must be dismissed. Her claim to some of the properties alleged by the petitioning creditor to be the properties of the debtor firm has not yet been determined by the insolvency Court, and the learned Additional District Judge wrongly held on 9-9-1950, that, her claim was not maintainable. Her appeal No. 369 of 1950 must, therefore, be allowed and the order of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 9-9-1950, must be set aside. The application which Mt. Rambaso Kuer had filed for the determination of her claim must now be dealt with by the insolvency Court in accordance with law.
16. The other three appeals, namely, Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 332, 333 and 432 of 1950, must be dismissed for the reasons which I have already indicated in previous paragraphs pf this judgment. The net result, therefore, is that out of the five appeals, four are dismissed, namely, Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 332, 333, 368 and 432 of 1950. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 369 of 1950 is allowed as indicated above. In the peculiar circumstances of these cases, there will be no order for costs of the hearing of these appeals in this Court.
Choudhary, J.
17. I agree.