JUDGMENT
Viney Mittal, J.
1. On a request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the out-set, the present petition is treated to be a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The petitioner is a Contractor who had raised a dispute against the present respondents. The aforesaid dispute was referred by the trial Court for adjudication by an Arbitrator. The respondents also preferred a counter claim before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator took into consideration the material placed before him by the parties. Accordingly, he gave an award dated July 17, 1995. The contractor filed an application under Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 requiring the Arbitrator to file the original award in the Court for making the same as a rule of the Court.
3. The objections were preferred by the respondents. Various objections were raised. It was claimed that the counter claim preferred by the respondents had not been adjudicated upon or gone into by the Arbitrator. It was also claimed that the Arbitrator had passed the award alter the expiry of the period granted to him by the Court, appointing him. Accordingly, it was prayed that the award of the Arbitrator was void ab initio and non-est. Additionally, it was also claimed that the Arbitrator had given an award which was non-speaking and, therefore, the same could not be made the rule of the court.
4. Learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Pathankot, vide his order dated October 31, 1996 accepted the objections raised by the respondents. It was held that the Arbitrator had given the award after the expiry of the period granted by the Court, while appointing him, and there was no extension ever granted by the Court for pronouncement of the aforesaid award. It was also held by the learned trial Judge that the counter claim preferred by the respondents had not been adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. However, the objection of the respondents with regard to the award being non-speaking was rejected by the trial Judge. As a consequence of the aforesaid objections having been accepted, the award passed by the Arbitrator was rejected and the learned trial Court ordered the appointment of a fresh Arbitrator.
5. The Contractor challenged the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Court by filing an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge also re-examined the controversy and came to similar conclusions, as had been arrived, by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Contractor was also dismissed.
6. The Contractor has, accordingly, approached this Court through the present revision petition.
7. I have heard Shri G.S. Bhatia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. Parminder, learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab appearing for the respondents and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case.
8. At the out-set, Shri G.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner states that during the pendency of the present revision petition, the respondents appointed another Arbitrator for adjudicating the counter claim preferred by them on a consent being given by the Contractor. The aforesaid Arbitrator adjudicated the aforesaid counter claim and vide award dated October 8, 2003 had rejected the counter claim. A copy of the aforesaid award dated October 8, 2003 has been appended as Annexure A/3 with the present petition through C.M. No. 8619-CII of 2004. On the basis of the aforesaid facts, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the objections raised by the respondents with regard to the non-adjudication of their counter claim has been rendered infructuous.
9. The factum of an award dated October 8, 2003 having been given by a new Arbitrator with regard to the counter claim by the respondents is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents. However, learned counsel for the respondents says that the award Annexure A/3 was totally contrary to the facts and, as such, was liable to be set aside.
10. I am afraid that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is not before me for adjudication. If the award Annexure A/3 is defective, in any manner, then it is always open to the respondents to challenge the aforesaid award in accordance with law, if so advised. This court in the present proceedings is not called upon to adjudicate the merits of the controversy with regard to the award dated October 8, 2003,
11. However, in view of the aforesaid fact that an award dated October 8, 2003 has been passed by a fresh Arbitrator adjudicating the counter claim filed by the respondents, the objection raised in this regard by the respondents before the learned trial Court with regard to the original award dated July 17, 1995 has been rendered infructuous. Accordingly, the observations made by the Courts below accepting the aforesaid objection are liable to be set aside.
12. Shri G.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the Contractor-petitioner further argues that although the award dated July 17, 1995 was pronounced by the Arbitrator after the period granted by the learned trial Court but during the course of proceedings before the Arbitrator the parties had given a specific consent extending the time for the pronouncement of the award. The aforesaid fact is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents and even otherwise is clear from the orders passed by the Courts below.
13. The Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited v. C. Rajasekhar Rao, has observed as follows:
“the policy of law is that the arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged. The arbitrator, therefore, has to give the award within the time prescribed or such time as the Court concerned may in its discretion extend. The Court alone has been given the power to extend time for giving the award. It can extend time even after the award has been given or after the expiry of the period prescribed for the award. But the Court has to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner. This power can be exercised even by the appellate court. By sub-section (2) of Section 28 the arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the arbitration, the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of lime. In view of the policy of law and in view of the fact that the parties had taken willing part in the proceedings before the Arbitrator without a demur and had all along been willing to extend time, and had also proceeded before the Umpire on that basis, which is just and proper, this will be a fit case for extension of time. It appears that under Section 28 and in the light of Section 3 of the First Schedule the parties are allowed to examine the time. Accordingly, time is granted for giving the award and the award will be deemed to have been given in time.”
14. Thus, it is clear that although in a case where the Arbitrator had been appointed by the Court, and specific time had been given to him to pronounce the award, it was not open to the parties to themselves extend the aforesaid period by their mutual consent but a discretion was always left to the Court to extend the aforesaid time. In the present case, it is clear that the parties had been appearing before the Arbitrator even after the original period granted by the trial Court. They had in fact given a consent mutually agreeing to extend the period. No objection was ever raised for pronouncing the award after the expiry of original period. In these circumstances, it would be appropriate that the time granted to the Arbitrator to pronounce the award is extended by this Court in the present proceedings. Accordingly, in exercise of my inherent powers and in the interest of justice, 1 extend the time granted to the Arbitrator to pronounce the award and it is held that the award pronounced on July 17, 1995 by the Arbitrator shall be deemed to be within limitation.
15. No other objection was raised by the respondents.
16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed and the orders passed by the courts below are set aside. The award dated July 17, 1995 is ordered to be made rule of the Court,
17. Before parting with this order, it is made clear that the respondents would be at liberty to challenge the award dated October 8, 2003, if so advised, in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.