ORDER
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The respondent filed O.S. No. 27 of 2004 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Yellamanchilli, for recovery of certain amount on the strength of a promissory note, date 24-8-2001. The petitioner filed his written statement and pleaded that his signature was forged upon the promissory note. The trial of the suit commenced. The evidence on behalf of the respondent was closed. When the recording of evidence of the petitioner herein is in progress, he filed LA. No. 67 of 2005 under Section 45 of the Evidence Act (for short ‘the Act’), with a prayer to send the promissory note for the opinion of an expert in relation to the signature on it. Through order, dated 28-4-2005, the trial Court dismissed the I.A. Hence, this civil revision petition.
2. Sri K. Sarvabhouma Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the view taken by the trial Court that the application was filed at a belated stage cannot be countenanced. He farther contends that mere fact that the Court can undertake comparison of signatures etc., as provided for under Section 73 of the Act, by itself, does not disable the petitioner herein from filing an application under Section 45.
3. Sri P. Rajasekhar, the learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the application was filed only with a view to protract the disposal of the suit and that the trial Court did not feel the necessity of sending the document for expert’s opinion at that stage.
4. The trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioner on two grounds. The first is that it was filed at a belated stage and the second is that in view of existence of power in the trial Court under Section 73 of the Act, it may not be necessary to accede to the request to send the documents to an expert’s opinion. The first reason assigned by the trial Court does not appear to be sound. It is not as if the application under Section 45 of the Act must be filed soon after the written statement is presented. There may be instances where the necessity to file such application would arise after the oral evidence of certain witnesses is over. In case, the party concerned is able to elicit necessary information or admissions during the course of evidence, the necessity to file an application under Section 45 of the Act may not arise. Nothing prevents the party to a suit to file an application under Section 45 of the Act, even at the stage of arguments.
5. So far as the second observation is concerned, it is evident that it is always competent for the Court to undertake comparison of signatures of disputed document by itself. The opinion rendered by an expert is only a supporting material and cannot be treated as conclusive. Ultimately, it is for the Court to come to a conclusion as to the genuinely and otherwise of the signatures. If the Court is capable of forming of such an opinion on the strength of oral and documentary evidence before it, in the exercise undertaken under Section 73 of the Act, the necessity to send the document for expert’s opinion may not arise. On the other hand, even at the stage of hearing, if the Court feels that it must seek the help of an expert in coming to a proper conclusion, it can send the document on its own accord by requiring the party concerned to meet the expenditure. Therefore, the second reason assigned by the trial Court is not sound and proper.
6. For the foregoing reasons, the civil revision petition is disposed of, directing that the question as to whether the disputed document must be sent for opinion of an expert shall be kept open. In case, the trial Court feels that it can record a finding on this aspect, there shall not be any necessity to send the document for an opinion. On the other hand, if it feels that such an opinion is necessary, it can take necessary steps in that regard. There shall be no order as to costs.