JUDGMENT
R.K. Varma, J.
1. This is a second appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff a registered Company, against the judgment and decree dt. 30-4-85 passed by the learned District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Appeal No. 26-A/83 arising out of the judgment and decree dt. 19-9-83 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class 1, Khachrod in C. C. No. 85-A/82.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly stated, are as follows –
The respondent was an employee of the appellant-plaintiff-Company and was required to serve in the plaintiff’s guest-house. He was provided with a quarter for his residence, as a term of his employment and was exempted from payment of rent because of his employment in connection with the guesthouse as an attendant therein. The services of the respondent were terminated w.e.f. 4-12-1979 and he was given a notice to vacate the quarter which is the suit accommodation. The notice sought to terminate his tenancy w.e.f. 30-12-1980. Since the respondent did not vacate the premises, the appellant-company filed this suit on the ground inter alia that it required the quarter in suit bona fide for the use of its employees and that the respondent was liable to be evicted under Section 20 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as well as under Section 12(1 )(j) of the Act, as a result of termination of his services. The trial Court after trial of the suit, passed a decree for eviction against the respondent-defendant and awarded rent @ Rs. 5/- p.m. from the date of termination of the defendant’s services till delivery of possession of the suit-quarter.
3. On an appeal having been filed by the respondent the learned lower Appellate court found it necessary to remand the case for a finding by the trial Court on the question whether the dispute raised by the defendant regarding validity of termination of his services was pending before the Labour Court and if
so, to consider the effect of such pendency. Accordingly, the learned Lower Appellate Court by order dt. 25-1-85 remanded the case to the trial Court apparently under Order41, Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. After remand of the case, the learned Trial Court gave a finding that the dispute regarding termination of respondent’s employment was pending before the Labour Court and the respondent was not liable to be evicted until the decision of the dispute by the Labour Court as contemplated in Sub-section (8) of Section 12 of the Act.
5. After receipt of the finding from the Trial Court, the learned Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal of the respondent-tenant by the impugned judgment holding that no decree under Section 12(1)(j) of the Act could be passed in view of Section 12(8) of the Act because of pendency of the dispute in the Labour Court as to whether the defendant-tenant had ceased to be in the employment of the plaintiff-landlord. The learned Lower Appellate Court further considered the plaintiff’s case for eviction on the basis of Section 20(a) of the Act and in that connection also it has held that till the case pending before the labour Court is not decided the defendant-tenant has not ceased to be in service or employment and as such, he cannot be evicted under Section 20 of the Act. Apparently such a finding implies import of a fiction that pendency of dispute in Labour Court is tantamount to continuance of service of the defendant.
6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Lower Appellate Court the appellant-plaintiff has filed this appeal.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant-Company has submitted that the learned Lower Appellate Court was wrong in finding that the respondent-defendant had not ceased to be in service of the appellant Company merely because the dispute as to the validity of termination was pending in the Labour Court and on the basis of such erroneous finding the learned Lower Appellate Court has wrongly held that the defendant cannot be evicted under Section 20 of the Act.
8. There is no doubt that the ground of eviction based on termination of employment as envisaged in Clause (j) of Section 12(1) of the Act, does not enure to the benefit of the landlord if any dispute as to whether the tenant has ceased to be in service or employment of the landlord is pending before any authority competent to decide such dispute, as is clear from a reading of the provision of Section 12(8) of the Act.
9. But so far as Section 20 of the Act is concerned that is a special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12 of the Act or in any other law and one of those cases is where a suit has been filed for , recovery of possession by a Company which is the landlord in respect of the suit accommodation, which has been let for use as a residence to the tenant at a time when he was in service or employment of the landlord on the ground that the tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment and the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord. It would be useful here to reproduce the provisions of Section 20 of the Act which is as under : —
“20. Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases.-
Where the landlord in respect of any accommodation is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord; or in the case of a public institution for the , furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12 or in any other law, the court may, on a suit being filed before it in this behalf by such landlord place the landlord in vacant possession of such accommodation by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, the Court is satisfied –
(a) that the tenant to whom such
accommodation were let for use as a residence
at a time when he was in the service or
employment of the landlord, has ceased to
be in such service or employment; or
(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy accommodation; or
(c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such accommodation; or
(d) that the accommodation is required — bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities.
x x x
Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Clause (a) of Section 20 of the Act. It has been established that the landlord in respect of the accommodation in suit is a Company and that the accommodation is required for the use of employees of the Company. It has also been established that the defendant was a tenant to whom the suit accommodation were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in service or employment of the company. It cannot be disputed that the defendant has, in fact, ceased to be in service or employment of the landlord-company. The provision of Section 20 is, therefore, applicable to the instant case and can be invoked for eviction of the defendant, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12 or in any other law. As such, the fiction spelt out by the learned lower Appellate Court on a reading of Section 12(1)(j) and Sub-section (8) of Section 12 of the Act that the respondent has not ceased to be in service or employment of the landlord because of the pendency of dispute as regards termination of service in the Labour Court can have no bearing on the provision of Section 20(a) of the Act on account of the overriding effect of this provision vis-a-vis the provision of Section 12 of the Act.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Section 20 of the Act is a special provision and Section 12 is a general provision in the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. As such, the provisions of Section 12(i)(j) and
Section 12(8) of the Act can have no bearing on Section 20 which operates notwithstanding Section 12.
A decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Sud v. Madhav Pustakalaya, Jivaji Chowk,
Lashkar, (1978) 1 MPRCJ Note 50 Page 110 has been relied upon by the learned counsel
wherein it is held that Section 20 has to he regarded as a special provision and Section 12 is a general provision in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and consequently, Section 20 will govern the suit and Section 12 is inapplicable to the case.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision in Sudhan Singh v. University of Delhi, 1986 MPRCJ 134 : (AIR 1986 SC 710) wherein dealing with Section 22 and Section 14 which correspond to Section 20 and Section 12 respectively of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, their Lordships have held that in invoking Section 22 (Section 20 of the M. P. Act) a public institution is not subject to the restriction imposed by Section 14 (Section 12 of the M. P. Act) or by any other law.
12. In the case (supra) and landlord was a public institution viz., the University of Delhi which was held entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 22 of the Act to evict its tenants from the premises which were needed for its employees and it was held that to provide accommodation to the employees, directly comes within the expression “for the furtherance of its activities” contained in Clause (d) of Section 22 (Clause (d) of Section 20 of the M. P. Act).
13. In the instant case the landlord is a Company and the premises in suit are required for the use of its employees and the defendant to whom the premises were let for use as a residence at the time when he was in the service of the Company, has ceased to be in such service. As such, the instant case is squarely covered by Clause (a) of Section 20. It must, therefore, be held that the appellant-landlord Company is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 20(a) to evict the tenant defendant who was provided with the suit quarter for residence when he was in service of the Company and who has ceased to be in such
service by the termination of his service. The fact that a dispute has been raised by the defendant regarding termination of service in the Labour Court, cannot affect the appellant-Company’s entitlement to invoke Section 20 of the Act to evict the tenant-defendant. The pendency of dispute as regards termination of service of the defendant in the Labour Court can only avail the defendant as against the ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(j) of the Act. But where the application for eviction falls squarely under Section 20, which has overriding effect as in the instant case, the landlord Company becomes entitled to eviction under Section 20 of the Act notwithstanding anything contained in Section 121 of the Act.
14. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff Company has proved that the suit premises were let to the defendant for use as a residence when he was given employment and that the defendant’s services have been terminated by the Company and that the premises are required for the use of its employees. It is, therefore, held that the appellant is entitled to evict the defendant from the suit premises under Section 20(a) of the Act. The judgment arid decree of the learned Lower Appellate Court is based oh a wrong view that Section 12(8) of the Act could affect the applicability of Section 20 of the Act, Consequently, the judgment and decree of the learned lower Appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the appellant plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction under Section 20 of the Act.
15. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Lower Appellate Court are set aside and the plaintiff-Company is held entitled to a decree for eviction. There shall, however, be no order as to costs which shall be borne by the parties as incurred.