ORDER
1. The facts briefly stated leading to this Writ Petition are the following :-
2. The Petitioner was enlisted on February 15, 1972 as Security Guard in the Central Industrial Security Force. On September 26, 1979, he was on duty at Main Gate No. 1, C.I.S.F; Unit from 20.15 to 20.30 Hours. A Jeep came and stopped near the barrier. He went near the jeep and saw the Commandant, Mr. H. C. Ramaiah sitting in the front seat and Assistant Commandant Mr. Janakiraman sitting in the driver seat. Having paid the compliments to the Commandant he returned back to the barrier and opened the gate. It was alleged that on that day at about 20.30 hours, he deliberately disobeyed the lawful order of the superior Officer, in that when the Assistant Commandant, Mr. Janakiraman ordered the Petitioner to open the barrier for the Commandant to enter inside the Range, he did not do so. The Petitioner obeyed the order and opened the gate. If there was any hesitancy in opening the gate immediately, it was due to the necessity of checking the vehicles, when they enter/the unit.
3. According to the Petitioner, the charge itself was wrongly framed in stating that he refused to open the barrier, which is factually wrong. All the witnesses say that he opened the gate since the Commandant ordered him to open it. The evidence is not consistent with the charge. A minor incident has been made very grave and air extreme penalty of dismissal was inflicted on him to create a fear in the minds of the other members of the Force. It is the further case of the Petitioner that the oral enquiry was vitiated by material and procedural irregularities and that it was held in violation of the principles of natural Justice. The charge was framed by P.W. 4 the Commandant himself, who was the person aggrieved and later a prosecution witness. Further under Rule 29(A) of the Rules framed under Section 22 sub-section (1) of the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1978, the disciplinary action against a member of a Force should be taken by the authorities, under whose control, the member was serving at the time when the incident look place. In the case of the Petitioner, the oral enquiry was conducted by an authority under whom, he did not serve at the time of incident. The Petitioner requested the Enquiry Officer to supply copies of statements of witnesses and vehicle diary so as to enable him to make out his defence on the basis of the evidence recorded. But the Enquiry Officer refused to give the copies of statements asked for by the Petitioner. On the ground that the Central Industrial Security Force Rules do not provide for giving copies of such statements.
4. The Petitioner states that except the interested and one sided oral testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 4, there was no independent witness or any other documentary evidence to prove the charge. The Petitioner also states that the punishment meted out to him for the minor charge is highly excessive, unconscionable and grossly disproportionate amounting to victimisation.
5. On the basis of the above said enquiry, the charge was held proved against the Petitioner and an order of dismissal was passed by the third respondent on February 28, 1981. The appeal filed by, the Petitioner to the Second Respondent was rejected on May 6, 1982. Thereafter, the revision petition filed by, the Petitioner to the first respondent also met with the same fate, in that the revision petitioner was rejected on March 9, 1982. It was under those circumstances, the Petitioner approached this Court and presented this writ petition, seeking the relief of the issuance of a writ of cetriorarified mandamus to call for and quash the impugned orders with a direction for reinstatement of the Petitioner in service with back wages.
6. The second respondent has filed a counter affidavit contending that on September 26, 1979, the petitioner was on B 1 shift duty at Main Gate I SHAR Center at about 20.20 hours. The Commandant CISF Unit SHAR Centre entered the main gate area from Sulurpet in his jeep accompanied by the Assistant Commandment, R. Janakiraman. When the Assistant Commandant ordered the petitioner to open the barrier to enable the Commandant to enter inside the range, he did not do so. He was placed under suspension by the Commandant SHAR on September 29, 1979 with immediate effect. His Headquarter was ordered to be shifted to South Zone Office, Madras as per the order dated March 1, 1980. He was served with the charge memo on October 4, 1979. The petitioner neither acknowledged receipt of the said charge memo nor did he submit his explanation within the time limit specified. Since the Commandant was himself one of the witnesses, the power of the disciplinary authority was ordered to be exercised by Sri A. T. Thiruvengadam, Assistant Inspector – General (Southern Zone). Sri T. P. Balakrishnan Nambiar/Assistant Commandant (JAC). Southern Zone was appointed as the Enquiry Officer by order dated December 21, 1979. Later on, when the Assistant Commandant T. P. Balakrishnan Nambiar was transferred to MPT, Sri N. Ramadoss Assistant Commandant Group Headquarters was appointed as the enquiry, Officer by order dated August 6, 1980. Four witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution. The petitioner was given an opportunity to cross examine these witnesses. The petitioner neither produced any defence witness nor filed any document in support of his case. However, he gave a statement before the Enquiry, Officer at the time of enquiry. On the basis of the material available before him, the Enquiry Officer found that the charge framed against the petitioner was proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and issued a show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal on December 20, 1980. The petitioner submitted his reply to the same on January 8, 1981. It was thereafter a final order imposing the punishment of dismissal from service from the date of receipt of the said order was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner also acknowledged receipt of the said order on March 6, 1981. The appeal and the revision petition filed by the petitioner before the second and first respondent respectively were rejected.
7. It is denied that the petitioner had put in ton years of loyal and sincere service. The petitioner was fined seven times, censured three times and his increment was withheld twice for the offences committed by him till April, 1981. It is also denied that the petitioner went near the jeep for the purpose of checking the vehicle before it entered the gate. The evidence given before the Enquiry Officer clearly points out that the petitioner refused to open the gate and that he did not open the barrier and asked the Commandant Ramiah to talk to the Association leaders. He deliberately refused to open the barrier, inspite of the orders of the Assistant Commandant. It was only after the Commandant directed him to open the barrier, the petitioner opened the gate. The incident covered by the charge is not a minor incident but concerns the discipline of the Unit and that the petitioner being the number of the security force was not justified in refusing to open the barrier.
8. According to the respondents, the enquiry conducted was fair and proper and that there were no procedural irregularities in the enquiry so conducted. The principles of natural Justice were also not violated in holding the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the Rules. It is further stated that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is not excessive of disproportionate and that it does not amount to victimisation. The quantum of punishment is not excessive since indiscipline in a uniformed force would destroy the morale of the a Force. Thus, it is prayed for the dismissal of the Writ Petition.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner urged :-
1. The charge framed is one, as if the Petitioner refused to open the gate to allow the jeep of the Commandant and thereby deliberately disobeyed the order of the superior, which is an act of gross indiscipline as a Security Guard but the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 clearly and consistently show that the petitioner did open the gate after some hesitance. The charge being one and the evidence being contrary, the order of dismissal based on such enquiry report cannot be sustained,
2. The enquiry was held in utter violation of the principles of natural justice; copies of statements of R. Ws. and the document viz., vehicle diary were not made available to the petitioner, P.W. 4. A. Ramiah, the Commandant himself was the complainant. He was examined as P. Ws. 4 and he himself framed the charge against the petitioner. Thus the petitioner was prejudiced in the enquiry; and
3. At any rate, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service imposed on the petitioner is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the act of indiscipline alleged and held proved against the petitioner.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents argued in support and justification of the impugned orders contending that the enquiry held was fair and proper and was strictly, in accordance with the Rules; that the petitioner was not entitled for copies of the depositions although he had access to the records; the petitioner was given opportunity to cross examine all the four witnesses examined in support of the charge; the Petitioner did not choose to file any written statement in answer to the answer to the charge framed against him; he neither produced any defence witness nor filed any document in support of his case. In all fairness, when the Commandant himself was one of the witnesses some other officer was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The Petitioner has failed to establish as to how he was prejudiced in the enquiry. He further submitted that the order of dismissal is quite justified, in that it was not for the first time there was a charge of indiscipline against the petitioner. In ten years of service, the Petitioner was fined seven times, censured three times and his increment was withheld twice for the various offences committed by him. Thus, the previous adverse remarks and the punishments imposed on the petitioner lend support and justification for the order of dismissal.
11. I have carefully considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties on their relative merits. The following points arise for consideration :
1. When the charge was one and the evidence let in was different, whether the order of dismissal was justified ?
2. Whether procedural irregularities were committed in holding the enquiry and whether the enquiry conducted was in violation of the principles of natural justice ?
and
3. Even accepting that the charge framed against the petitioner is proved whether the imposition of extreme penalty of his dismissal from service is shockingly, disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct of the petitioner.
12. I will deal with all these three points in seriatim :
Re : Point No. 1
The charge framed reads thus :
“Gross indiscipline misconduct while on duty at about 20.20 hours on September 26, 1979 at the main gate SHAR center by deliberately and intentionally disobeying the lawful orders of the superior officer in that when the Assistant Commandant Sri Janakiraman ordered SG. 7211162 M. Bose to open the barrier for the Commandant CISF Unit SHAR centre to enter inside the Range, he did not do so”.
According to the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 examined, in support of the charge, the petitioner did open the barrier reluctantly. On the basis of this evidence, argument was built that the charge was that the petitioner intentionally disobeyed the order to open the gate and whereas it is clear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 that the Petitioner did open the gate, but with some hesitance. There are therefore two different versions. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner being a Security Guard at the gate, it was his duty to check the vehicle before opening the barrier. It was at 20.20 hours on September 26, 1979. There was no special mark on the jeep so as to identify the jeep as of the Commandant and so also there were no instructions to open the gate during night hours, without checking. Therefore, the petitioner went near the jeep and after seeing the Commandant and as per his order opened the gate. The other vision as put forward by the respondents is that the petitioner in spite of the Assistant Commandant ordering the petitioner to open the barrier, knowing fully well that th@ Commandant was in the jeep, he did not deliberately open the gate immediately. He took sometime to open the gate and he opened it only after the Commandant ordered him to open it. Looking to the cross examination made by the petitioner with reference to stated, the High Court, cannot act as an Appellate Court in exercise of this supervisory jurisdiction, particularly in disciplinary proceedings, when the findings of fact are supported by the reasons recorded based on evidence. Hence, my answer on the second point is in negative.
13. Re Point No. 3 :
The charge in the case on hand levelled against the petitioner was that he refused to open the gate, so as to allow the vehicle of the Commandant to enter the range of the Unit. The evidence on record shows that he opened the gates not immediately, but hesitantly after sometime. On the basis of the material on record, a finding of fact is recorded that there was disobedience on the part of the petitioner in not opening the gate immediately and that it amounted to gross indiscipline on the part of the petitioner. In view of the conclusions I have arrived on Point Nos. 1 and 2, 1 proceed on the basis that the charge framed against the petitioner is proved. But then the only question remains for consideration is whether the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct on the facts and circumstances of this case.
14. It is the crystalised Judicial view that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably including the exercise of disciplinary power. If the quantum of punishment is grossly disproportionate, it may bear upon the reasonableness of the exercise of a disciplinary power and if so, it vitiates the ultimate decision on penalty. Indeed if the management dismisses a servant for trivial act, it may indicate vindictiveness on its part which may invite interference by Court. The penalty imposed in any disciplinary proceedings cannot be so disproportionate to the act of misconduct that no reasonable person would have ever imposed in the circumstances of the case. In the decision. Bhim Singh v. Distt. Supdt. of Police (Guj) 1982 (2) SLR 629 in paragraphs 7 and 8, it is stated as follows :
7. In S. M. Shah v. South Gujarat University 23(1) G.L.R. 233., it was observed that the doctrine that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably is too firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence to brook any refutation and that the exercise of disciplinary power is not free from the said inhibition or limitation. The quantum of penalty, if it assumes disproportionate dimensions, may bear upon the reasonableness of the exercise of the disciplinary power and, in the result, it may vitiate, at least, the ultimate decision on penalty. Having regard to the wide perspective and pervasiveness of Article 14, the penalty imposed in any disciplinary proceeding cannot be so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that no reasonable person would have ever imposed in like circumstances. The arbitrary, unjust and unfair exercise of penal powers would be manifest under such circumstances and such an action would not constitute a ‘right and just and fair’ decision. If there is any statutory instrument prescribing minimum penalty for any specified misconduct, which is grossly disproportionate and which leaves to discretion with the disciplinary authority, such instrument and the action thereunder will both be exposed to the risk of a challenge under Article 14; in the absence of such an instrument, the order imposing the disproportionate penalty will be laid bare to a similar challenge.
8. It is further observed in the said decision that the age, maturing, antecedents, family background, motivation, socio-economic factors, roles played in the commission of malpractice or unfair practice, etc., are all factors which must enter into account in the quantification of penalty in disciplinary jurisdiction. Besides, though penalties are imposed with the end in view of creating a deterrent effect, the current thinking in penology even in the context of hardened criminals is that reformation and curative technology, are also as much a part of penalty procedure as retribution. This thinking must be reflected with greater force in the disciplinary jurisdiction.
15. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India Private Limited (1984-I-LLJ-546), at the conclusion in paragraph 13 has stated thus :
“… We are therefore of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him. We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances the punishment of dismissal on the employee and that victimization or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the management in awarding the extreme punishment of dismissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of the factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellant’s service is invalid and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service …”
The Supreme Court in yet another decision in Ranjit Thakur v. Union India (1988-I-LLJ-256), dealing with the proportionality of punishment in regard to the case of misconduct, referring to the decision Bhaghat Ram v. State of H. P. (1983-II-LLJ-1), pointed out that the punishment imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found that the punishment imposed was strikingly disproportionate and it called for interference. Paragraph 25 of the said Judgment reads thus :
“… 25. Judicial review generally, speaking, is lot directed against a decision, but is directed against the ‘decision making process’. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court – material. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-material, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.”
In Council for the Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Service 1984 3 WLR 1174 (HL), Lord Diplock said :
“Judicial review has, I think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community,”.
Keeping in view, the aforementioned judicial pronouncements. I am of the view that in the case on hand the extreme penalty of dismissal of the petitioner from service is strikingly and shockingly disproportionate to the act of misconduct. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the petitioner did open the gate/barrier. According to the petitioner, only after checking the vehicle and satisfying that the Commandant was in the jeep, he had done so. As a Security Guard, may be the petitioner was vigilant in his duties. But the evidence on record shows that inspite of the orders of the superiors, the petitioner took sometime to open the gate and the petitioner opened the gate hesitatingly. For all these reasons, I am very clear in my mind that no reasonable person would ever have imposed such an extreme penalty of dismissal on the petitioner considering the nature and gravity of misconduct alleged and proved.
16. In order to justify this major punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service, on the basis of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is nor for the first time, that the petitioner was proceeded with the disciplinary enquiry. In the last ten years of his service, the petitioner was punished on several occasions; he was fined seven times, censured three times and his increment was withheld twice and that therefore the impugned orders dismissing the petitioner from service are justified. I must state at once here that the previous punishments or adverse remarks made against the petitioner were not made part of the present charge. In the show cause notice dated December 20, 1980 issued by the third respondent, proposing to impose punishment of dismissal from service also nothing is stated about the previous adverse remarks made or punishment imposed on the petitioner. It is therefore clear from the records that right from the date of issuing the charge memo to the petitioner till the date of passing of the order or dismissal, at no point of time or on no occasion, the petitioner was made known that at the time of imposing the penalty, pursuant to the charge made against him, the previous penalties, or adverse remarks made against the petitioner would be used against him. The past service record of the delinquent official cannot be taken into account while determining quantum of punishment unless it was made known that such record would be used against him. Or else he cannot he deemed to have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penal action amounting to negation of a basic principle of natural Justice. An attempt is made by the respondents for the first time by stating about this aspect in the counter affidavit to justify the penalty i.e., the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service. It cannot at all be accepted. Law in this regard is very clear.
In Gopal Rao v. State Government, Madhya Pradesh A.I.R., 1954 Nag. 90, paragraph 10 reads :
10. It was not disputed that the competent authority is entitled to take into consideration the record of a civil servant’s past service in order to determine the quantum of punishment. What however was contended was that if the civil servant is not at all apprised of the record of his past service, nor is he informed that it will be taken into account in order to decide the question of punishment, he cannot be deemed to have been given a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to show cause against the proposed action. Normally, the question of punishment is linked up with the gravity of the charge and the penalty that is inflicted is proportionate to the guilt, where the charge is trivial and ‘prime facie’ merits only a minor penalty, a civil servant may not even care to defend himself in the belief that only such punishment as would be commensurate with his guilt will be visited on him. In such a case, even if in the show cause notice a more serious punishment is indicated than what the finding of the guilt servants, he cannot be left to guessing for himself what other possible reasons have impelled the proposed action. It is not, therefore, sufficient that other considerations on which a higher punishment is imposed are present in the mind of competent authority or are supported by the record of service of the civil servant concerned. In a case where these factors did not form part of any specific charge and did not otherwise figure in the departmental enquiry, it is necessary that they should be intimated to the civil servant in order to enable him to put up proper defence against the proposed action”.
In the decision reported in State of Mysore v. Manche Gowda , the Supreme Court has held that nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from taking the previous record of the Government servant into consideration during the second state of the enquiry even though the previous record was not the subject matter of the charge at the first state, but it is essential that the Government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact so as to enable to meet the same. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said decision run thus :
“Under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a Government servant must have a reasonable opportunity not only to prove that he is not guilty of the charges levelled against him, but also to establish that the punishment proposed to be imposed is either not called for or excessive. The said opportunity is to be a reasonable opportunity and, therefore, it is necessary, that the Government servant must be told of the grounds on which it is proposed to take such action, see the decision of this Court in the, State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit (1963-I-LLJ-295), Civil Appeal No. 832 of 1962 D/12.2.1963. If the grounds are not given in the notice, it would be well nigh impossible for him to predicate what is operating on the mind of the authority concerned in proposing a particular punishment; he would not be in a position to explain why he does not deserve any punishment at all or that the punishment proposed is excessive. It the imposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous record of a Government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was withheld from the knowledge of the Government servant. It would be no answer to suggest that every Government servant must have had knowledge of the fact that his part record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him; nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he knew as a matter of fact that earlier punishments were imposed on him or that he knew of his past record. This contention misses the real point, namely, that what the Government servant is entitled to is not the knowledge of certain facts but the fact that those facts, will be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him. It is not possible for him to know what period of his past record or what acts or omissions of his in a particular period would be considered. If that fact was brought to his notice, he might explain that he had no knowledge of the remarks of his superior officers, that he had adequate explanation of offer for the alleged remarks or that his conduct subsequent to the remarks had been exemplary or at any rate approved by the superior officers. Even if the authority, concerned took into consideration only the facts for which he was punished, it would be open to him to put forward before the said authority many mitigating circumstances or some other explanation why those punishments were given to him or that subsequent to the punishments he had served to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned till the time of the present enquiry. He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the doctrine of ‘presumptive knowledge’ or that of purposeless enquiry as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of ‘reasonable opportunity. We, therefore, hold that it is incumbent upon the authority to give the Government servant at the second stage reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment and if the proposed punishment is also based on his previous punishments or his previous bad record, this should be included in the second notice so that he may be able to given an explanation.
8. Before we close, it would be necessary to make one point clear. It is suggested that the past record of a Government servant, if it is intended to be relied upon for imposing a punishment, should be made specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and if it is not so done, it cannot be relied upon after the enquiry is closed and the report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An enquiry against a Government servant is one continuous process, though for convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry officer is only recommendatory in nature and the final authority which scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to impose the same. Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not depends to some extent upon the nature of the subject matter of the enquiry. But, nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry, for essentially it, relates more to the domain of punishment rather than to that of guilt. But what is essential is that the Government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact and meet the same”.
17. In the light of this legal position, I have no choice, but to reject the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the past record and previous penalties imposed on the petitioner should justify his dismissal from service on account of the misconduct proved. In this view of the matter, I hold that the penalty of dismissal of the petitioner from service is grossly and shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved against him. Unfortunately the Appellate Authority has also not considered as required under Rule 47(2)(c) of the rules as to proportionality of punishment.
18. Having regard to the conclusions arrived at by me as aforementioned, I have now to consider as to what should be the punishment and what should be the final order. From the records, it appears that the writ petition was filed in the year 1982. The case was transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras by this Court and it was numbered as T.A. No. 344 of 1985. Subsequently, it was held that the case was not maintainable before the Central Administrative Tribunal and therefore, it was retransferred to this Court on November 4, 1986. Learned Counsel for the petitioner by his letter dated November 2, 1984 made a request to trace out the case papers and post it for final bearing stating that the case was twelve years old. When the papers pertaining to this writ petition could not be traced out inspite of the serious efforts made, orders were obtained to reconstruct the file on March 30, 1994. It was thereafter, the matter was listed for final hearing.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Ex Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India (1992-II-LLJ-155), having found that the evidence in that case was duly recorded and the trial was not vitiated, as no, prejudice had been caused to the delinquent held that the sentence awarded to him was wholly disproportionate to the offence committed. In that view, it is stated that the ends of justice would sufficiently be met, if a lesser punishment was awarded to the appellant in that case. In the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of (Supra), the Supreme Court found that the punishment imposed was strikingly disproportionate and called for interference. Accordingly, the order of punishment was quashed and the appellant in that case was ordered to be reinstated with all monetary and service benefits.
20. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the various cases aforementioned, I am of the firm opinion that unduly harsh and grossly disproportionate penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner cannot be allowed to stand. Hence, I record the finding on Point No. 3 in affirmative.
The order of dismissal was passed on February 28, 1981. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I think that ends of justice would amply be met, if any one of the punishments provided under Rule 31 of the Rules mentioned in clauses (e) to (h) is imposed on the petitioner.
21. In the result, for the reasons stated above, I pass the following order :-
1. This Writ Petition is allowed.
2. The impugned orders dismissing the petitioner from service are quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits that flow from quashing the impugned order of dismissal subject to term 3 of this order;
3. The respondents may impose any one of the penalties under Rule 31 in clauses (c) to (h) of the Rules.
4. There will be no order as to costs.